DANGERS OF RETREAT.

Taihape Daily Times, Issue 220, 20 April 1917, Page 6

DANGERS OF RETREAT.

Commenting on the- railroad sysrterns in France and the probable lines ,of retreat for the Germans, the “Military Expert” of the New York Times, in a recent issue says:—Behind the German lines from Arras to Noyon there are but two railroads running generally east and west, or, what is the same thing, coming up to the battle front perpendicularly. One of these, the most northern, is the line running through Douai and Valenciennes. The second is that running to Amiens through Le Fere and Laon. It is evident, then, that these two are the main lines of communication of the German forces occupying the north and' south stretch of trenches. Food and supplies destined for this part of the German army are brought over one of these lines aim stored in certain central points from which they are distributed by means of the various branch reads to points nearer the front. If one of these roads could be cut at som e point well to the east of the battle line it is readily conceivable that the burden of traffic, thrown suddenly on the other, would congest it to the point where it would be unable to perform its function. All other roads, except the minor connections, run north and south or parallel to the front and are extremely useful as furnishing excellent lateral lines for distributing purposes, but are of little value when looked fit as mahTTThes for distributing pui'poses, but are of little value when looked at as main lines reaching to the home bases of supplies. Indeed, if the main east and west lines were to be cut, the north and south lines would be of little advantage, as they would be mere blind alleys. In view of this situation, we may therefore find a solution of. th e problem as to where the British attack will be directed, assuming j that the Somme front will not witness the only offensive operation of the I year. j

The southern road through Laon and La Fere is guarded by the screen of the Aisne River as far east as B'er-ry-au-Bac, due north of Rheims. In the light of what the German defen-

sive is, we are not apt to see an effort to force the German front by an attempt to drive across the Aisne. This is a serious if not a fatal barrier to an Allied offensive between Scissons and Rheims. Eas’d of Rheims the Aisne turns towards the north, so that there is no such defensive screen in front of the German position. If, therefore, the Allies should strike against this main line, the blow would of necessity fall at some point of the line between Rheims and tTTe heights of Lorraine. This would embrace the Verdun sector.

; POINTS OF ATTACK. | The criTic abov e referred to thinks [ tie most favourable point of attack is the section between Rheims and the Argonne Forest, or, in other words, the Champagne Country, where the attack was made a year ago last September. He says: "Hero, behind the merman front, there is one section of the southern railroad, a section which runs from Challerange to Bazancourt. It is the link which tics the array of the Crown Prince to that on his right and makes it possible for one to stiffen the other by reinforcements when occasion demands. The first effect that would be produced if this road

were severed would be to make these two separate and distinct armies, almost incapable of acting in concert on any given proposition. The next point is the isolation of the German forces in a large section of territory between the Aisne and the road from Rumigny (west of Mezieres) to Laon. They would not, of course, be isolated entirely from the rest of the German army. Wer e this done it would mean capture or destruction. But it does mean that all of the German forces in this territory would be able to communicate directly with Berlin, or, which is more to the point, with the nearest German base, except by means of the road from Rumigny to Laon. This would present a serious problem in transportation that would tax all the ingenuity of the German command to solve. The first point the Allies would drive for after crossing the railroad would b e the junction point of Tourteron. This is about fifteen miles north of the lines as they are to-day. But, although it may seem impossible that the Allies should push forward this distance, the entire problem mpist he looked at in the light of what we believe to be the Allies’ intention—breaking through the German lines or at least shoving them back for a considerable distance.