DARDANELLES REPORT

Taihape Daily Times, Issue 220, 10 March 1917, Page 5

DARDANELLES REPORT

A STORY OF MISMANAGEMENT. & apportioning the blame. WITHIN 14 MILES OF BAGDAD s ° ITS FALL IMMINENT. 'lit* * '■ ''Si* k "Of-. V SO) E. CARSON'S SOLEMN WARNING

AMERICAN AFFAIRS.

GERMAN WIRELESS PLANT IN MEXICO. - - ReceveU 9 a.m. WASHINGTON, March 9. A semi-official source states that a powerful wireless plant iu Mexico City has established direct communication -with Germany. An investigation has been ordered. It is believed that efforts have been made by Germany to persuade Carranza to invade Guatemala, with the promise that Mexico will hold Guatemala in the event of Germany’s success.

A SIGNIFICANT PURCHASE.

Receved 9 a.m. WASHINGTON, March 9. The New York World says German plotters have bought a tract of .highlying land opposite the Military Academy at West Point. The Federal authorities are investigating.

FOREIGN LOANS INVESTMENTS.

Receved 9 a.m. WASHINGTON, March 9. Federal Reserves Board states issued in November has been misunderstood. It now endorses in foreign loans.

A CONSPIRATOR ARRESTED.

Received 9.40. NEW YORK, March 9. A German officer named Captain Alfred Fritzen has been arrested al Los Angeles. He is alleged to be connected with plots to destroy the Willand Canal in Canada. It is believed the connection between Fritzen and Consul Popp has been established. Fritzen visited Cuba and Mexico recently.

GERMAN INTRIGUE.

NEW YORK, March 8. The United Press representative, after visiting all parts of Mexico, learned on the highest authority that immediately after the Zimmerman Note reached Mexico German agents urged Villa to a raid against America in the event of hostilities between the United States and Germany.. The agent offered Villa fifty thousand pounds in gold to bind the compact, promising a monthly allowance for the upkeep of the army. Thus the schemers would have been assured of Mexican annoyance of America even if ,£arranza were not seduced. The German cabal close to the Carranzas intimates were the instigators of Carranza’s Notes to neutrals, asking for an embargo on supplies to belligerents. It was originally hoped to induce Carranza to cut off oil exports from Tampico, to cause Great Britain to land troops to protect her interests, giving cause for trouble between Britain and America. Responsible officials at Washington admit the truth of the stories of German intrigue against India. The revelations disclose plotting and widespread plans, which have now led to arrests in various parts of America, Panama, and the Philippines. The documentary evidence discloses a farreaching scheme to destroy American Property.

ENEMY’S FOOD SHORTAGE.

Received 9.40. ROTTERDAM, March 9. The Prussian Food Commissioner, in a speech at the Parliament, warned the people they were faced with a graver situation than ever happened before; It was necessary to take specially difficult steps and unusually se*|iJre measures to enable the country to hold out another year. The Government regulations must be strictly followed. *

A SOLEMN WARNING..

BY SIR EDWARD CARSON. EMPIRE’S EXISTENCE AT STAKE. I -- { Received 10.5. LONDON, March 9. Sir Edward Carson at the Aldwych Club, said: —“I openly confess that we have not yet satisfactorily solved the problems wherewith the Navy is grappling to maintain our supremacy at sea. Nothing is to be gained by exaggerating or minimising the anxieties we feel as to the grave position of the Nation to-day. We have to deal with an enemy N.ho nas set at nought-all the humanities of man. The power of our race will assert itself, but It must know its rusk, and is exhorted to pay no attention to amatuer stategists. We could aot ali'ord to gamble with our fleet, which, if it failed, would mean the end of the Empire. If the Germans gambled their fleet it would not mean even the oud of the war. 1 am determined to see our sailors have lull scope without interference. I am neither coward no,r a pessimist; we will stick to it to the end.” He instanced the Navy’s gigantic effort. We had 150 small patrol boats at the outbreak of the war, and there are 3000 now. We must not un-dcr-cstimate the difficulty and dangei of dealing with submarine mine layers. Mines had been laid as far as the Cape of Good Hope, the Gulf of Aden, Colombo. Men in the mine-sweepers were momentarily risking their lives, and are feeding Britain. We do not believe the sailors of any other countiy would face those dangers. Honest Englishmen would be ashamed to strike at shipyards and arsenals if they understood tko Navy ’s privations. Half a million tons of shipping were sunk in February, whereof half were British. He believed still more drastic restrictions on imports viOuia oe necessary.

BRITISH FOOD PROBLEM

! FIXING PRICES. Received 9 a.m. LONDON, March 9. At Lord Devonport’s instance the Produce Exchange will hold a convened meeting with the principal provision firms throughout the country. It has been decided to fix a maximum price for butter, cheese, bacon, and lard, and prohibit inter-trading. Importers must only sell to wholesalers, and retailers, and not to Importers, except without profit or commission, similarly wholesalers are onl/ to sell to retailers, who will only sell to Cunsumers.

COUNT ZEPPELIN DEAD

A DISAPPOINTED MAN. Received 11.10. WASHINGTON, March 9. A message from Philadelphia says that the Countess Anna Dagenfeld, Zeppelin’s niece, is of opinion that Zeppelin’s death was due indirectly to the failure of balloons to accomplish the purposes intended by their inventor. The Countess recently received a letter from Count Zeppelin, wherein he expressed regret that his balloons had not been more effective over British cities.

INCIDENTS OF THE WAR.

COUNT TISZA'S FALL IMMINENT. AMSTERDAM, March 9. Advices from Switzerland state that Count Tisza’s fall is iminent. Count Tisza is th e Hungarian Premier. He has thrice been the object of assassination, and was very considerably the instigator of the present war.

DISTINGUISHED NEW ZEALANDERS.

LONDON, March 9. The King of Montenegro has awarded the Order of Danilo to the following New Zealanders: Major G. Barclay and Captain M. Urquhart.

ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

BATTERING THE GERMANS. Received 11.15. PARIS, March 9. It is scmi-officially stated that though the situation on the Ancre is momentarily stationary, th e British continue driving in the German flanks on both sides of the river. Artillery activity at Verdun continues, and is concentrated on the left of the Muese, whore the French arc ceaselessly battering the German works.

SUBSTANTIAL GAINS BY THE FRENCH,

Received 9.40. LONDON, March 9. The High Commissioner reports: A French official message states that according to latest information our attack yesterday between Butte de Mesnil, Maisond, and Champione resulted in the capture of enemy positions on a 1500 metre front to a depth varying from six to eight hundred metres.

ON THE SEA.

GERMANY’S SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN. A CONSEQUENCE OF ITS FAILURE Received 9 a.m. ROME, March 9. Advices from Berlin state the Mexican affair and the failure of submarine warfare’-has led to violent agitation against Count Hollweg and his colleagues, and a crisis is regarded as inevitable. The Kaiser has summoned Buelow and Tirpitz to Headquarters. ,

A MYSTERIOUS CRAFT.

Received 9.40. NEW YORK, March 9. The freighter Suraga arrived from Havre, and the captain reports a mysterious craft of the cargo typo, with two masts and one funnel, approached the Suraga on February 20 off the Azores, completely circled them and disappeared. No signals were shown, and the description is that of the South Atlantic raider.

SITUATION IMPROVING.

LONDON, March 8. A naval correspondent says that the weekly returns of submarining show the situation is improving. Hauls arc the poorest for some time. Arrivals and departures have substantially increased during the 35 weeks of the 1915 campaign. Th e average loss of ships from submarines and mines was 5.35. The highest arrivals and sailings for any week during the sarqe time wa *1604. While it is undeniable that the menace is serious the damage is light iu proporton to the tonnage. The enemies’ efforts to terrorise trade have been a failure. Hunting and attacking (as shown by 40 combats in 18 days!) give the submarine little time to harass trade. The .returns should reassure neutrals and re-establish confidence among shippers. Anti-submarine measures continue successful. Airships are playing a prominent part in locating submarines. Few once located escape the patrol boats. A well informed correspondent asserts that numerous submarines have been captured. Whether anything went wrong with the supply ships, or the Hun crews disliked their tasks, tke fact remains that submarines crews murdered their officers and surrendered. New detectors on destroyers are operating successfully. It is only a mattqr of time for the new devices to operate with cumulative effect.

ICELAND ISOLATED

COPENHAGEN, March 8

Owing to submarinings Iceland has been isolated for a month. The situation is alarming, because there are no foodstuffs. A hundred Iceland merchants are stranded. Copenhagen is urging that a Danish warship be sent to Iceland with supplies.

IN MESOPOTAMIA,

THE PURSUIT CONTINUES. NEARING BAGDAD. Received 9.40. LONDON, March 9. The High Commissioner reports; Mesopotamia official: Telegraphing at midnight on the 6th, it is stated there is little opposition to our pursuit. Our cavalry passed Ctesiphon, which was unoccupied, bivouacking near Baive, six miles south-east of Dialah, Our advance is now 14 miles from Bagdad,

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

Received 11.15. LONDON, March 9. The Imperial Conference opens on the 20bh February.

DARDANELLES COMMISSION.

REPORT OF THE INQUIRY. LONDON, March 8 The report of the Dardanelles Commission was laid on the table of the House to-day. The report ‘stated that from the commencement of the war until November 25, 1914, no change was made in the machinery for the superior conduct of naval and military operations, This machinery consisted of the Cabinet, assisted by the Commitee of Imperial Defence, with the War Office and the 'Admiralty acting as executive agents. It must have been obvious from the first that it was far too numerous a control to effectively conduct the war. Cabinet appears to have been generally informed of any important decisions taken by the War Council, but not until executive steps had been taken to give whole or partial effect to the Council's decisions. This was what happened over the naval and military operations in the Dardanellse. Mr Winstone Churchill, ex-First Lord of the Admiralty, during his examination, said —“I often heard Cabinet say it did not wish to be told this secret matter, that the fewer knowing it the better. ’ ’ The report add—These members very rightly were content to delegate the full powes of Cabinet to their colleagues, on the Wa,r Council. Mr Reginal McKenna, ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, in evidence, confirmed this delegation of power. Distinction has been made between the real responsibility devolving upon several Ministers who wore .also members of the (War Council. Mr Lloyd George, Earl Grey and Earl Crewe exercised undoubtedly very legitimate influence, but the main responsibility rested on Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener and Mr Churchill. The latter, in evidence, said —ln the early stages the wa,r was carried on by Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener and me, but I was on a rather different plane. I hadn't the same authority as Mr Asquith and Lord Kitchener. If they said this or that must be done, that settled it. The Commission finds that this desscription of the working machine is substantially correct, save that Mr Churchill probably assigned himself a more unobtrusive part than he actually played. There was a distinction between the War Office and the Admiralty. General Sir James Wolfe-Murnay stated that , Earl Kitchener acted very much as his own Chief of Staff. He (General Murray) was never asked to express an opinion. The Admiralty, was different. Mr Churchill was not an expert, and Lord Fisher and Admiral Wilson acted as experts.

Lord Fisher explained that neitehr he, Admiral Wilson, nor General Murray were members of the ...Wan Council. They were all experts who only opened their mouths when told. They were never asked anything about the Dardonelles.

Admiral Wilson confirmed Lord Fisher’s statement.

M,r Churchill, in his evidence, declared that his naval colleagues had the right and power to correct him or dissent from his views, and were fully cognisant of their rights. Viscount Grey stated that the War Council went entirely in naval and military matters by opinions expressed by two Ministers. Mr Balfour expressed the opinion that if experts had expressed their views he would infer that they assented. He did not think that they should remain silent if they did not agree with the propositions. The military experts stood on a different footing, because Lord Kitchener was an expert. He, however, thought the member of Cabinet presiding should have facilitated the experts’ assent or dissent by asking them. Lord Haldane said that he would expect Lord Fisher, if he had objections, to have stated them. He had not concurred in Lord Fisher’s view of the War Council. Lord Crewe thought that the political membes of the Council did too much talking and the experts too little. Mr Lloyd George disagreed with Lord Fisher’s view 1 . None of the Junior Sea Lords were consulted about the Dardanelles. Commodore Lambert expressed the opinion that the Darbanolles was the proper subject for the Admiralty’s discussion. In November 22, 1915, the Junior Sea Lords submitted a minute to Mr Balfour that the principle that the supremacy of the First Sea Lord was complete and unassailable had been pushed too far back, and tended to imperial national safety. The Commission was convinced that had the naval members of the Board been regularly and collectively consulted on large questions of war policy during the present naval campaign,som e at least of the events which the Empire was bitterly deploring would not have happened; that until the authority and responsibility of the Sea Lords was enlarged and definite, there was no adequate assurance that similar disasters would not recur. Mr Churchill ageed that the four Sea Lords should be fully consulted, but Prince Louis of Battenburg and Lord Fisher did not favour that. The Commission found that Mr Asquith was ill informed of the way the Admiralty business was conducted when he told the Commission that the War Council was entitled to assume that any

view submitted by the first Sea Lord was the considered opinion of the Admiralty Board.

Regarding the War Office administration the Commission thinks it regrettable that the devolution of authority and responsibility, on which the War Office was based was ignored bv Lord Kitchener. All evidence points to the fact that Lord Kitchener did not consult his subordinates, and gave orders over th e chiefs of departments, and that he centralised the whole administration in his own hands. When an Order in Council at a later stage restored the power of the Chief of the General Staff. Sir Reginald Bray was of opinion that this was due to Lord Kitchener not asking or disregarding the advice of the General Staff. Lord Kitchener pushed centralisation to; extremes. Though it proved eminently successful in the Soudan it was unsuitable for a large scale of operations, and threw wo,rk on the hands of one man with which no individual could successfully cope. Dealing with the narrative of the Dardanelles, the Commission concurs with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson that the November 3rd bombardment was a mistake, calculated to place the Turks on the alert. The order emanated solely from the Admiralty, and the War Council was not consulted. On 2th of November Mr Churchill suggested an attack on Gallipoli which would give control of the Dardanelles, and enable Britain to dictate terms at Constantinope. Lord Kitchener agreed that it might be necessary to make a diversion by attacking the Turkish communications, but the moment had not arrived.

On January 2, 1915, the Russians were somewhat hard pressed in the Caucasus, and Russia asked for. a demonstration against the Turks in order to relieve the pressure; • The Foreign Office sent a telegram to Russia in reply to her request for a demonstration to relieve Turkish pressure in the Caucasus. This reply, drafted by the War Office, stated that demonstrations would be made, though it was feared that any action would not sqriously affect, the withdrawal of the enemy troops in the Cacasus. Mr Asquith and Mr Churchill did not see the telegram, though the latter thought Lord Kitchener’s reply was the outcome of a conversation with him. Lord Kitchener, writing to Mr Churchill, said that he had troops to land anywhere, and the only place for demonstration was at the Dardanelles, but were not ready for anything big for some months. The Commission is of opinion that although Lord Kitchener pressed for demonstrations that did not necessarily involve an attempt to force a passage. The proper conclusion seems to be when a demonstration appeared necessary Mr. Churchill thought it possible to convert it into an attempt to fo, rc e a passage. As Kitchener’s new army was not ready and he had to provide for Home defence, he was unwiling to withdraw a single man from France. Mr. Churchill’s views as to the success of purely naval operations were more optimistic than was warranted by the experts’ opinion. Therefore Lord Kitchener grasped too eagerly at the proposal to use the Fleet alone, but th e responsibility rested rather on Mr. Churchill, who alleged the marvellous potentialities of the Queen Elizabeth, whose astounding effectiveness would revolutionise naval warfare.

Admiral Carden, replying to a telegram asking whether it was practicable to force the Dardanelles by ships alone, said he did not think they could be rushed, but might be forced by extended operations with large numbers of ships.

Mr. Churchill replied:—“High authorities concur in your opinion, Admiral Carden supposed that the high authorities meant Admirals Fisher and Jackson. The former did not see the reply, and the latter could not remember whether he was consulted.” Admiral Carden suggested the methodical destruction of the Dardanelles Narrows defences and an advance into the Sea of Marmora. He estimated that it would take a month to carry out. Admiral Jackson agreed to attack the outer forts, but considered it was not feasible for the Fleet to get through the Dardanelles alone. The Commission states that the evidence confirms the accuracy of Mr. Asquith’s statement that Lord Fisher reluctantly acquisced in the Dardanelles operation so long as h e thought it would not seriously interfere with his plans elsewhere. It may be that when convinced that the demands made on the fleet for the Dardanelles prejudiced his alternative schemes he resigned. Although Loyd Fisher In evidence said that he was dead against a naval operation alone, he did not at the time express any such decided opinions. The actual decision arrived at by the War Council on January 13, after hearing Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill, while Lord Fisher, Admiral Wilson, and General Murray remained silent, was couched as follows: “A naval expedition iu February to take Gallipoli, with Constantinople as its objective,”

SCENE AT THE WAR OFFICE

LONDON, March 9

The Minority Report states —Later, at the War Council, a dramatic incident occurred. After Mr Churchill explained his scheme on the-map Lo,rd Fisher left the table. Lord Kitchener followed, and asked Lord Fisher what he intended to do. Lord Fisher replied that he would not return to the table, and that he intended to resign as First Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener urged Lord Fisher that as he was the only dissentient, and Mr Asquith had decided upon the venture, it was Lord Fisher 's duty to remain at The Admiralty. Lord Fisher, after further consideration, reluctantly gave in to Lord Kitchener's entreaties, and resumed his seat. On May I4th, when the War Council had decided to persevere with the scheme. Lord Fisher thought his great alternative scheme—which liad been his main preoccupation during this period, and to which his mind and energies had been almost exclusively devoted —was doomed. He said, “I am faced by the progressive frustration of my main schemes of naval strategy.” The following day he resigned his post. Meanwhile, on March 12th, Sir lan Hamilton had been nominated fqr the command of the Dardanelles forces, leaving for the Dardanelles the next day. He was assisted by no staff preparations, and there was no preliminary scheme of operations of any kind. It was still assumed that the Navy would force the passage. The War Council on March 19th authorised Mr Churchill to inform Admiral de Roebuck to continue the Dardanelles operations as he thought fit. The War Council did not meet until May 14th. The War Council concentrated its attention too much on the political ends which might bo gained b\ r an Eastern offensive. The War Council never had details of staff, estimates of men, munitions and materials, or definite plans showing what military operations were possible. The War Council underestimated without any real investigation the strength of the Turkish opposition. Mr Churchill failed to present fully to the War Council the opinions of his naval advisers. Mr Roche further states that the forcing of the Dardanelles had been considered when Lord Fisher command-’ ed in the Mediterranean, later when Lord Fisher was First Lord, and later (in 1916) by the General Staff. Lord Fisher decided it would be mightily hazardous. The General Staff decided against naval or military action on the 28th December, 1914. Hankey circulated a memorandum to the WatWar Council suggestnig that Germany ■would be struck effectively through Turkey. In January, 1915, Mr Lloyd George sent a memorandum outlining far-reaching policy against Austria, in co-operation with the Greeks, Roumanians, and Serbians, also the withdrawal of substantial forces from the West. Admiral Jackson presented Mr Churchill a memorandum against the possibility of rushing the Dardanelles, showing the losses involved even in reaching the Straits. Admirals Fisher, Wilson, and Oliver expressed objections to a naval attack, but after the War Council's meeting on January 13, commenced working out details for the systematic reduction of the forts by naval bombardment. Later Lord Fisher told Mr Churchill that he would not attend the War Council, as he did not like this Dardanelles affair, whereupon Mr 'Asquith wrote to Lord Fisher stating that he thought it imperative that Lord Fisher should attend. Saif an ho-ur before the meeting on the 28th of January for the discussion, Messrs Asquith and Churchill and Lord Fisher fully discussed the proposal.

REPORT TO BE DEBATED

Received 9 a.m. LONDON, March 9. Mr. Asquith will ask the Government whether it will grant a day for the discussion of the Dardanelles report and publish the evidence. It is understood th& debate will be permitted, but it is unlikely evidence will be published without careful editing.

COMMENTS ON THE REPORT,

Received 9.40,

LONDON, March 9. Comment on the Dardanelles report is of a most scathing character, though there is a variety of opinion as to apportioning the blame to anj individual. It is generally considered the report sheds a most disagreeable light on the War Council’s discussions. Attention is mainly directed to the lack of systematic procedure, also the ambiguous nature of the experts status at discussions. Most newspapers blame Mr. Asquith for not insisting that experts should give their views fully and frankly. Some arc indisposed to accept the censure on Lord Kitchener, pointing out he might have justified the delay in sending the Twenty-ninth Division.