The Taihape Daily Times AND WAIMARINO ADVOCATE MONDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1916. RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR.

Taihape Daily Times, Issue 219, 4 December 1916, Page 4

The Taihape Daily Times AND WAIMARINO ADVOCATE

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1916. RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR.

(With which is incorporated The Taihape Post and Waimarino News).

The German Chancellor has once more made a strong appeal for peace, but it will have been observed that such appeals eventuate whenever Germany makes a set at some one or other of the small, weak States. There is a possibility that Germany may succeed in pushing back the Roumanians very considerably, and even capture their capital city. The German Chancellor is, however, much more concerned about peace than he is about such raids, and with that end in view the spies with which neutral nations are permeated, are exerting a supreme effort in organising peace parties wherever possible. The Chancellor talks loudly about the German lines being unbroken, but where have the Allied lines been broken, except in little communities, which smacks more of the work of a bully than of a fair light? Can Germany break tiie lines of either of the three nations with which she is really at war? She moved all the powers that Teutonic peoples could bring to bear at Verdun, and how dismally she failed. Bethmann Hollweg boldly asserts that Germany m not responsible for the war; that her strained efforts for peace are dictated by considerations of humanity and not of apprehension. “Under the solemn consciousness of the sanctity of the flame of life, which should not be lightly extinguished by human misunderstandings which common counsels

might dissipate.” Nothing is more nauseating and contemptible than duplicity and humbug. The world has a short memory, but the British Empire has reason to refresh hors frequently during the past two years —on this question we were going to say, but there is no question. First, the Crown Prince of Austria was murdered on Servian territory, but not by a Servian. Austria then made demands up-

Jon Servia which no self-respecting na- ( tion could accept, but Servia’s reply went far beyond what any great Power expected, and it even surprised Germany that Servia would submit to such indignity. Austria was not satisfied, and the British Ambassador reported to London that Austria’s Note was intended to make war inevitable. Sir Edward Grey immediately wired to Berlin that he hoped Germany would urge Austria to accept. Several such pressing telegrams were sent to Germany, but she calmly and indifferently just passed then on to Austria through the German Ambassador at Vienna. Who was it that was desirous >of averting war in these proceedings? Shortly afterwards the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador that all Sewia’s pretences to concession were a mere sham. Then Austria declared war. The next day Sir I Edward commenced efforts to stop the 1 war that will for ever live in the his--1 tory of the world. Sir Edward wired J to Germany that he was willing to go . to any extreme that country liked to suggest to avert war, if Germany would only press the button in the interests of peace. The reply came in the German Chancellor asking the jß'ritish Ambassador: “Would Great Britain promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies?” He said if Belgium remained passive no territory would be taken from her. Sir Edward Grey’s reply was a flat refusal. He said: “The business of Europe was to work for peace, and that was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would now prove by her actions that she desired peace Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the might of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.” Does this indicate that Germany was anxious for peace; that she had “ a solemn consciousness of the sanctity of the flame of life, which

should not be lightly extinguished by human misunderstanding which common counsel might dissipate,” All Europe professed to desire peace, and yet Germany asked Britain whether she would remain neutral while she overran France and took possession of France’s colonies; would Britain look on while Belgium was invaded and France was subjugated? This enquiry unequivocally let the German cat out of the bag. Britain now knew that Germany had planned a war on France. It was plain that Germany would have war and was actively preparing for it, although the AustroServian trouble precipitated it rather sooner than was intended.

In Marc- I .i, 1913, the law was enacted to increase the German Army, and a report was issued under the heading, “Aims and obligations of Our National Policy, of Our Army, and of the Special Organisation for Army Purpose.” This was for secret circulation among the military and governingclasses, but copies reached the various Ambassadors in Berlin, and are now Government documents in their respective countries. Inter-alia it said, we must accustom our people to think an offensive war is necessary in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. AVe must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sac rifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak should be considered a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. Wo must stir up trouble in Russia, Africa, and Egypt, in order to prepare measures necessary in a European War. Political risings in enemy countries must be worked by our political agents. We must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the East and West, but it will also be necessary that small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. These small States can be rapidly conquered, and then follows a statement of what part each small State, including Belgium, Holland. Denmark, and Switzerland, is to play in the war then being planned. At the commencement it would be necessary to concentrate a large army to induce small States to follow. Arrangements made with this end in view will allow us to hope that it will be possible to take die offensive iramdiately after (lie complete concentration of the Army of the Lower R-hine. An ultimatum with a short time limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient

justification fcr our action in international law.” After perusing this German Order issue ( ] in 1913, in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey’s efforts to avert conflagration, and the German Chancellor’s admission that Germany was designedly violating Belgian neutrality, and his shamelessness in connection with the memorable “Scrap of Paper,” there can be no doubt i n the mind of any sane person who it was that wanted war in 1914. Germany is litre the gambler, who, with loaded dice, has won a considerable sum. and then wishes to get away with his ill-

(gotten winnings when his cunning is discovered. Germany would like a peace now that would enable her to retain the small States she has subdued, because she knows that the armies of her enemies are only just arriving at their full strength and power. Germany engineered and willed the war, as the above-quoted facts so clearly substantiate, but she does not possess the power to will its ending. Sword in hand, while those she would destroy were ungirt, she rushed in and struck what she hoped would be final, but the then ungirt are now fully equipped and have risen in their strength, and Germany fears the array, and cries for peace. It was Germany’s self-claimed privilege to start the war, it must be the privilege of those attacked to will its ending. Germany was to subdue the world in one great swoop, but the rest of the world has yet to be reckoned with. To urge that Germany did not will, prepare for, and start the war is speciousness that needs strong words to truly characterise.