GERMANY'S PEACE EFFORTS.

Taihape Daily Times, Volume 8, Issue 36, 12 February 1916, Page 3

GERMANY'S PEACE EFFORTS.

Mr. Hillaire Belloc, in Land and Water, comments on the new German effort to achieve peace, and explains why it is made just now, and shows that it seeks to achieve by political means what Germany cannot achieve by arms.

"Th e enemy, now at the maximum of his actual occupation of territory, at the maximum, therefore, of his extension of front, and also at the end (with the exception of his classes 'l6 and 'l7) of his reserves of men, is clearly sounding opinion neutral and belligerent for the chance of peace. From this moment onwards that political effort will proceed. The various stages of that effort will follow eacli other now at short intervals as the strain of the war increases. So long as there was no question of either party accepting anything nc-ar his opponent's terms, the military problem alone was sufficient, and the increasing effort to conclude the great war upon terms that shall leave Prussia strong, and though only negatively successful, still successful in the eyes cf her own subjects and allies, must form as largo a part of our appreciation of the war as the movement of troops, the rate of losses, or th e progress of Russia's re-arming and equipment. "W e must keep in mind three main points in the whole of this all-impor-tant busness: (1) The effort for peace is coming from Prussia. (2) It is coming from Prussia because the Prussian Government knows that it has passed its military maximum, and that in material and numbers the future in general is full of disaster, even the immediate future full of peril. (3) The terms of peace will be made as favourable as possible to the Allies because Prussia needs only one thing: time to recuperate —that is, to be left intact and strong. Conversely, such a peace would be, for the Allies, a defeat—however favourable the terms —so long as Prussia was left intact and strong. The indications that the general effort for peace has begun are many. It was perfectly clear to anyone who cared to follow th e known figures of the enemy's m?,n-power and the known figures of his wastage, that this effort would begin when his efficient. reserves we* 1 nearing their end. His efficient reserves have new neared their end and the effort has begun. •

"Let ns examine the basis upon which-that effort reposes. We know in the first place that it makes no apr to military opinon. The soldiers know well enough what the position is: (1) The enemy is holding fronts of about 1,500 miles. (2) H e cannot continue to hold those, fronts much longer, because his efficient man-power in the field is beginning to decline. (3) He has against him superior man-power potentially. With only this element still in •his favour, that the Russian numbers are not yet equipped, armed, and munitioned. Regarded as a purely strategical problem to be worked out on military grounds alone, the enemy is beaten and knows that ha is beaten. But there are, unforutnately, other elements. There is the establishing of a

false judgment upon the war in the mind of civilians, and particularly or neutrals, which it is hoped may grow into a force too strong for the soldiers. There is the hope upon the enemy's side of political changes in his favour. both through th c action of armies now neutral and through divergence in aim between the various allies. Finally, there is the appeal to what is called 'financial exhaustion.' When the enemy says, 'Let us make peace en the basis of a "draw"! I am in occupation of much invaded territory and I can hold it indefinitely,' he is talking nonsense, dangerous as the nonsense is, for in truth lie has his powers at the utmost stretch, and knows that his time is short. But when he says, 'Make peace because there are still other factors that may come in against yon,' he is nearer to talking sense."