OUR PLEDGE TO SERBIA.

Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 319, 30 October 1915, Page 3

OUR PLEDGE TO SERBIA.

UNABLE TO REDEEM IT. A DEPLORABLE FACT. USELESS TO SEND TROOPS NOW. LONDON, Oct. 28. Referring to the Balkan campaign, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, in his lecture at Queen's Hall', said our pledge to help Servia was made with all honourable intentions. It is deplorable that we are unable to redeem it. Servia must not go under, or make terms. It is useless for the Allies to pour troops into Salonika. The difficulties are enormous. It is a mountainous country, the railway is cut, and there are no roads. It is equally impossible to attack Bulgaria. Only three or four weeks remain in which a campaign is possib'Je. Our mistake was in not going to Macedonia long ago and occupying the Vardar line, which is one of the best defensive positions in the world. I am not pessimistic. "We are bound to win the war, but we are going the wrong way. The enemy is now able to send men to any part in the Near East in three or four days. We take three or four weeks, and the troops arrive in the wx>rst condition. When we direct our forces in the right channel the real end will begin.

The British Cabinet in "July deckled to send out reinforcements to secure decisive results in Gallipoli. It would have been far better to have used the troops to force Bulgaria to join our side. The Bulgarians could have got astride of Bulair, and with our attacks on the coast and the submarines in the Sea of Marmora, we could easily have cut off the Turks in Gallipoli; The Bulgarians were sympathetic with the Eussians then, and up to the last did not desire to fight against the Allies. The diplomatic situation.wanted proper stage management, and the diplomatists needed plenty of money to spend. As these were lacking, Servia was sacrificed. In view of Bulgaria's indecison, our best course would have been to land north of Bulair. The difficulty was the length of communicatione, which was 30 miles if Enos were chosen as the base. If we landed at Bulair alone the sea communication would be equally lengthy, although the Navy undertook to land troops anywhere. Even if the attack at.Anzac had succeeded, Mr. Bartlett is convinced it did not mean getting to Constantinople, as the Turks had fortified the channel beyond the Narrows and the entrance to the Sea of Marmora. Even if a large part of the Navy reached Constantinople, it was doubtful if the Turks would have surrendered. "I have never wavered in my opinion that the attacks attempted had not the smallest chance of success," said Mr. Bartlett.

No Regulars were landed at Suvla who were trained to fight in- any climate. The attackers deserve all honour and consideration, but they were not trained in the oM-fashioned skirmishing warfare required in Gallipoli. The men were trained to modern trench warfare, and when unable to see. their officers and . required to worl individually, they failed. The ob.ie.c-

tive was the capture of the Anafarta heights. The English nation is one of the thirstiest in the world; and it was impossible to supply the Suvla troops with water, particularly as Turkish corpses were found in the wells. - The whole operation at Suvla was far too difficult in the face of modern rifle fire. The Australlanas and New Zealanders at Anzac put up a remarkable fight The great tragedy is that they did not succeed. He hoped that if they took the position they woud get to Constantinople, but it was useless to hide the fact that it was a very bad reverse. When the Bulgarian attaches found that we had failed, they reported that they thought the other side would win. "Now that the Bulgarians and the Turks have joined up, and the Austro-G-ermans are moving south, it is tor much to hope that we shall reach Constantinople," he said. "I don't think we can advance any farther at the Dardanelles."

The popular query, said Mr. aßrtlett. was why the Allies did not persevere in the attack on the Asiatic side. The fact was we had hardly enough troops to hold Cape Helles and it was essential to bring back the French to extend our lines. Another possibility was a "landing at Bulair, but, though a naval demonstration revealed no Turks we landed no troops. Cape Helles was selected because the landing was easily covered by the fire of th battleships. Mr. Bartlett considered the Sanding at Anzac unwise, as our hands were full at Cape Helles in withstanding the Turkish counter-attacks. If the Australians had been ashore at Cape Helles there owuld have been enough men tr capture Achi Baba. This would not have been decisive, but useful in view of future operations. The task of the Australianas was to push on to Maidos, capturing the Narrows, but the scheme failed. A new situation arose after the faiiiure of the May attacks New plans should have been intrrr*-

ed at this juncture. It was quite evi dent- the Turks were not feeble •anf not going to surrender the DardanePes English divisions continued to arrive and were used in various local attacks, but to little purpose.

False optimism prevailed everywhere. People seemed to think it was hn accident that the Turks had held out so long. In reality they were becoming more skilful and more tenacious daily. The positions at Aehi Babn and Anzac were stronger than those at Plevna.

The operations in Gallipoli were severely handicapped by the difficulty in getting concentrated fire upon the trenches.