INVASION OF ENGLAND.

Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 261, 23 July 1915, Page 2

INVASION OF ENGLAND.

WHAT ARE GERMANY’S PLANS?

INTERESTING DISCLOSURES

Does Germany still mean to attempt the invasion of Britain? Th e heavy fighting in the region of Flanders would apparently show that Germany is still aching to hack her way through to the coast. Once by th© sea, would she endeavour to cross to England? .An amazingly interesting hook, “Truppenlandungen in England,” by Major Max} von ■ Schrejlbershofen, which has just found its way to England from Leipzig, is on© of a series which are being published with Government aid. Whenever the Government wants the German people to think in any particular way a pamphlet or two are published, a number of articles appear in hireling journals, and soon the people’ think to order. This book deals with th© possibility of Invasion. It is a sober production by a soldier who has studied the matter. His argument is that an invasion of England is theoretically essential, as otherwise we can never h© beaten.

“Even a defeat,” h e writes, “of the British Expeditionary Corps in France would not be a blow at Britain’s life veins or nerves. For this reason it would be worth while examining if it would not be possible to carry th e war into England’s own territory and to strike the island Power at her very heart. “It would b e then possible for Germany to besiege her hard-necked opponent and impose on her her own terms.” These are good enough reasons, argues the major, to make an expedition worth while, but how many ships would be necessary? As the result of innumerable ex-* peri men Is, both in England and Germany. the following formula has been found to b e the absolute minimum:

Registered tons T battalion 3,1)00 1 squadron 2,300 1 horse battery 3,300 1 light munition column.. 2,009 SHIPS THAT ARE WANTED. In other words in order to transport one infantry division on a journey last ing not more than one week including ammunition columns and field hospitals), ships totalling 85,000 tons would b e necessary. During a series of experiments in Germany it took a battalion on the average despite the fact that everything had been repeatedly rehearsed —from on e to one and a half hours to embark. ■■ , PROBLEMS OF EMBARKATION.

But if embarkation is going to present problems, the, question of disembarkation of the troops when they get to England is still more difficult. When the major turns to the difficulties of an invasion of England he becomes a veritable Jeremiah. He points out that an absolute sine qua non for an invasion is surprise. Without surprise nothing can be done. Assuming, however, that surprsi e were possible, he goes into a long detailed description of what is to be done on landing. , “Cavalry patrols must immediately b e . sent out to cut railway and postal connections and get information as to the movements of the population. Cyclists should also be dispatched for the purposes of reconnaissance, and these must be furnished with explosives (Zerstorungswerkzeugen) for the purpose of damaging property. LANDING PARTIES’ BOMBS.

“If you are fortunate enough by the throwing of bombs to break up the railway line it will be all the better, as it will facilitate landing operations' ■ “As to further operations,” he writes, “these must depend on purely local circumstances.” in the most favourable circumstances 25,000 infantry, 1,000 horsemen and GO guns can be, landed in six hours. Where could the Germans land? The major thinks the South Coast might be best. ‘ With further victories Dunkirk and Calais will fall into the hands of the Germans. This will give a splendid basis fcj- operations against the South Coast.” Nevertheless, Major von Schreibershofen is not optimistic He thinks that Britain’s naval defences would be far too effective, quite apart from the risks of any transports being met by submarines or other ships. On th e "’hole, he thinks that an invasion would not he more than an interesting, but risky, experiment. Which seems common sense and a tribute to th e British Navy.