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THE KAISER AS NAVAL SPY.

HOW THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY SCORED IN THE GAME OF ESPIONAGE. (By HAROLD WHITE, in "Sunday Pictorial.") Mr Arnold White is one of the most influential and popular of British publicists. An ardent patriot he persistently warned the public of the German menace before the war. No one has dealt more thoroughly wit,h the scientific system of German espionage, which has been carried on so long in England. Twice lately hav e 1 attended divine service in St. George's Chapel, Windsor. Overhead hung the banners of two German naval spies, At the close of th e service, meekly bending on my knees, I listened to the prayer offered up to the Most Hight God for the Knights of tha Most Noble Order of the Garter. Sonic arc noble: two are naval spies. Kaiser Wilhelm has combined espionage with treachery; also Prince Henry. Pretending to be a friend of England the Kaiser frequently boarded British ships of war in his capacity of Admiral of the British Fleet. The last time he boarded a British battleship was at Kiel, a few weeks bel'orr the war. He asked many questions. He always received the same answer from officers: "I do not know, your Ma.i esty."

Bluejackets, when interrogated by the Imperial spy, bluffly replied: "Don't know, your Majesty." British counter-espionage was at work —successfully. Our naval officers are judges of character. Therefore they are good dip. lomatists. Naval- men never confuse violent language with firm action. Kaiser Wilhelm since 1905 ; has never personally obtained any information of value about the British Fleet. That was withheld by authority. Had he succeeded it would have been impossible that the German High Seas Fleet would have found itself interned in the Kiel Canal merely because the Germans failed to understand the meaning of the British big-bore gun. Drunk with pride, the "Admiral of the Atlantic" and his spy brother, the charming Prince Henry of Prussia, grossly exaggerated the skill and foresight of Yen Tirpita in the matter of gunnery, and absurdly undervalued the brains and' skill of our Sea Lords and our Directors of Naval Ordnance. | Th 0 German naval spy system .has [been vaunted, advertised, and extolled The Intelligence Department of our Admiralty has been decried and decided unt-il one would imagine that ".very German is a Sherlock Holmes r <m\ every Briton a blockhead. That is where cur Admiralty scores. It does not advertise. The German Marineamt screams at the top of its voice. Yet -■iiv Admiralty's knowledge of the secrcts of the German Navy is greater —;' ~' greatev-than (t ny knpwler-./:-•>osses-?ed by tho Marineamt of our ■dmiralty's secrets. I wish I could say how I know.

It is understood that the German system of espionage in England is bor. rowed from the Russians, The Russian system is excellent. I betray no confidence in saying that much of our knowledge of the state of Germany at the .present time is largely obtained, from our Russian Allies.

In considering the British system of naval espionage w e must remember that the first line of defence of the British Empire is not the Navy, but Knowledge. In vain we might possess an overwhelming Fleet, unless we knew before hand the intention of the enemy. Our system of naval intelligence has been well-nigh perfected during the last few years. The idea of a sudden raid —at all events,;/since ; of 1905 —would have bean possible only in the event of treachery or inebriety on the part of the Lords of our Admiralty and of the Commanders-in-Chief of our fleets. It may be admitted some students of naval affairs have been apprehensive—the writer among the number—that the Admiralty were relying merely on positive information as to movements of a possible enemy. The only safe plan in time of peace was to establish a system by which British agents of the Admiralty on the Frisian coast should communicate regularly j twice in the twenty-four hours with Whitehall through the medium of other agents posted at various places in freindly or neutral countries, and then if the Admiralty heard nothing for twenty-four hours from any of their agents to assume that the worst had happened. The presumption was that cur agents had been arrested by Germany and that automatic movement of British squadrons to their proper place would take place without waiting for an order. That this system ,or something like it was adopted there is good reason to believe. At all events, for the last ten years few people who knew the facts felt apprehension as to the landing of Lord Haldane's seventy thousand. Germans. The real danger was that the British Naval Intelligence Department was so conspicuously efficient that Ministers hav 0 been tempted to stint the Navy, trusting to luck to make good its deficiencies after war broke out.

Why was it Sir Doveton Sturdee's squadron reached the Falkland Islands without detection by tho Marineamt? The nglish Admiral must have threaded the aones of many German or proGerman wireless installations. The Admiral must have coaled, oiled or watered his ships on the way cut. But no news was tapped by the Spy Department of Germany. How was it that the designs of th 0 British all-round fire big-bore swift Dreadnoughts and su-

! j ■r-D read j oughts were successfully concealed from the Germans while the Britiish knew exactly what the Germans were doing and encouraged them to stereotype their mistakes?

In no department ■ of naval intelligence in this wr.rr.is' accurate knowledge more important than in relation to mine-fields and the defences of and channels leading to enemy ports. True to the traditions of the Great Silent Navy the Admiralty is dumb as an egg. Naval officers responsible for keeping open the war channel on the East Coast—which is th e jugular vein

of Britain—are in good spirits. The good spirits of the Admiralty are rising. Quiet consciousness of coming victory animates the quarter of a million men and boys borne on the pay roll of the Navy.

If We sedentary folk sleep quietly in our beds; if our daughters and sisters are safe from th© kisses of intoxicated Huns —the reason is that our : Naval Intelligence D/epartment haJs beaten the German spy system.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TAIDT19150618.2.8

Bibliographic details

Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 226, 18 June 1915, Page 3

Word Count
1,038

THE KAISER AS NAVAL SPY. Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 226, 18 June 1915, Page 3

THE KAISER AS NAVAL SPY. Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 226, 18 June 1915, Page 3

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