The Taihape Daily Times AND WAIMARINO ADVOCATE. WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1915. HOW LONG.

Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 226, 16 June 1915, Page 4

The Taihape Daily Times AND WAIMARINO ADVOCATE.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1915. HOW LONG.

(With which is incorporated The Ta, hape Post oaa Waimarino News.)

If there is one question .more ithan , another to which a definite answer.is universally sought it is, “ When .will .the war end?” This question .is being asked wherever one .goes, and .by. all classes osf people, with such earnestness that the questioned might well .Wish for some power of ,divination ■ or prophecy. One reads column, uponv.coluytn of newspaper writing on the subject but it 1 , is only to find the huge preponderance of sack ; it contains. We do not belie ve that any .'journalist, whether ho also be scientist nr military specialist, p ossesses any mundane 'knowledge thlat will permit of an.intelligent estimate of the position and were St possi ble by mental .telepathy, or-any other p recess,to drain-the minds of our greates t military -strategists we might jflnd th; it there was ;a much nearer equiponxleranc e of power -between "the Alii es and their' enemies than we seem v. rilling to believe. On the other hand, the question is so enshrouded ;in secrecy that -one •need not feel the slightest' surprise iif something happened to clear the national vision and tiisclsoe an end only ssome •months distant. Thore need be -no .pessimism, but "fee view‘.expressed isnohat may be learned from! gathering op'in- ( lons from leading British, French, Russian and German sources. Perhaps,: [on e «of the shrewdest, cleverest, and best informed men, one* whose opi-n- i ions <on the sublet would almost be received as gospell, is the professor of military history at the Oxford L'jjiver-. sity. Mr Spencer "Wilkinson. In along article In the Westminster Gazette, he: indicates that swift success requires thg combination in favour of o ne slide of all the elements of superiority VThene must be. leadership, men and armaments. Though Germany had all" 1 the j advantages of preparation and a great! numerical supremacy at the start, e.*i&- | bling them to overrun Belgium an.’ij Flanders, they have failed to advance f further, and have not secured any decisive result against Russia, which is almost essential to their success in ( th© West. He firmly believes ribat success at the. Dardanelles will open up < to.itbe Allies a.means Of crushing Airs- x -trfa., When ’the Professor wrote, Itqly:. % ;bad apt .erntered waj*, Rutcveri itow.it n£4st take some time before' Ger-’ many's vitals can be reached through! Austria. He goes on to point out that; : j "The fcnSfce operations may. i&fee one (

two characters. The two armies \ may try to wear each other out by a M lynj; process o£ local attack and coum ’ tefsattack such as has been going on ) for some weeks. But if one side can develop a more effective generalship than the other, coupled with a better discipline in the various ranks of command and in th© staffs, it might be possible for that side so to ’manipulate its reserves as to 'anticipates the enemy in prponderance first at one point and then another, and in that way to gain a marked superiority. The one process, that of continuous local wear and tear might 'last 'for many months. Th e other would alter the balance in a few weeks, a palpable advantage * gained by either side would influence the neutral Bowers. Th e process of local wear and tear without decisive strokes is 'exhausting for both sides, but so long as the Allies remain superior at sea tells to the disadvantage of Germany. If therefore, the policy lof decisive strokes is found impracJ ticable, the Allies may have recourse ,to another plan indicated by the expedition to the Dardanelles. 1 am well aware of the vagueness of these speculations. They have, however, a specific purpose. I think they show that we must be prepared for a continuance of the struggle, at the very least until the end of the autumn, because even in the most favourable hypothesis that of the early entrance in th c "field’in co-operation with the Allies of considerable armies at present neutral months will be required before their action will have produced its effect. The first result of their accession to the coalition would prob- ' ably’b e 'to induce the German Govern- ; merit to attempt to negotiate. Such offers would have to be refused, because the’agreement between the Allies-im-plies terms of peace such as Germany will not accept before decisive defeat.” 'There is one aspect in which 5 the whole of the Allies have definitely expressefl There iis *to be no 'final cessation until the military power of Germany has been totally : destroyed. France will not lay down her arms until she has regained the provinces that war© snatched from her I by Germany, and restored to Belgium ■ her material prosperity and political independence. Italy has mad e somewhat. similar vows, and Russia says ■ that peace will be made only after the complete and final victory over Germanism, for only in that event can enduring tranquility prevail. Russia says this result could be obtained 1 now, but. that wotld necessitate the sacrifice of two or three hundred thousand lives. Rather than such slaughter, while fully assured of final they , think it better to prolong the event. In conclusion, it may be said ■ that if the feverish production and acchmdlation of mlmitions of war by all the Allies means anything, it portends that a supreme, perhaps finally decisive effort is shortly to be entered upon, with its success or failure will the continuance of war depend. Therefore, the consensus of opinion of all leading Britsh FTench and Russian journals is thus reached ■ — war may practically be over in from three to . six- months, or it may be dragged on i through another winter, but it is believed that unless Germany has some : greater possibilities than she seems to hold at present, her people, will not ■ face another winter campiagn.