The Taihape Daily Times AND WAIMARINO ADVOCATE. FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1915 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.

Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 226, 11 June 1915, Page 4

The Taihape Daily Times AND WAIMARINO ADVOCATE.

FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1915 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.

(With which is incorporated The Tab hape Poat Walmarino News.)

It is recognised by friends and enemies that Italy is going to play a more important part in the war than the selfstyled war lord of Europe anticipated. Her troops are equipped with artillery that is enabling her to force a way into the exceedingly difficult mountainous . frontier much more rapidly than Aus-tro-Germany was prepared for. It was thought they had a weak, unprepared Italy to deal with, an Italy that was blustering and not capable of acting, who was capable of blackmail, but not of enforcing her rights by arms. Now, lioweevr, yesterday’s cables tell us that the greatest of great German supermen, a man who, it is stated, lias easily thrown the Kaiser himself into tho shade, has been selected to stem the onrush of the brave, fresh, well-equip-ped Italian troops. A rapid offensive from either side for the possession of passes and strategical crests is absolutely essential to Italy, as the topographical difficulties to armies fighting in the face of opposition from either side arc of an extreme character. “The events of 18G6 gave Venotia to Italy, but left Austria in occupation of the crests of the Alps and the heads of the principal valleys.” Right from Switzerland to the Julian Alps the frontier follows the crest of the hills at an elevation of seve.n thousand feet or more. A mountain9 US zone some 30 miles broad separates’ the frontier from f the Venetian Plain, a.nd except in the I valley of the Adige there are few facilit is for the movement X)f masses of trooph across this part of the frontier. But, between the Julian and the Adriatic,; eastward, tho character of the frontier changes. The gfouiid gradually falls, and there are no unct'imAion Obstacles 'to prevent;,a strong AuaitrifrJ}, arrhy from advancing into -FriuUrba a ' bjfOoJ front The Tyrol juts into the I plafng n£ like Ipgstiop; on j

its western frontier there nre three roads crossing between Stelvio and the Adige; on the eastern side It is more accessible, and the Adige leads right into the heart of the Tyrol. Between Krutzberg and Tarvis, the Carnic Alps has no roads fit for wheeled traffic. Extensive and, in many cases, elaborate, fortifications menace any Italian advance on the Tyrol. A group of works at Eiva and another at Franzenfeste protect the railway ;junction, and a powerful fortress at Trent serves as the keep of the Tyrol and is surrounded by a strong girdle of batteries and armoured forts. To the menacing batteries of Tyrol, Italy has replied by a se*iM of works intended to bar the exits by the chief roads, Verona, on the Adige, is a moflj ambitious place. It is a reply to Trent, and is surrounded by a girdle for forts pushed well out from the town. To the north-east there are the so-called zones of asscm-3 bly in the upper valleys- of the Astico, Brenta, aud Piave, while north eastward again come works at Agordo, Piave di Cadore, Vigo, and Osoppo. There are no modern fortifications east of the Tagliamento. There is little* armour in these Italian forts, but a* number of cupolas have been recently added to afford greater stength. The role of the Austrian garrisons of the Tyrol is to hold out against assaults until the main Austrian army approaches the Brenta, and then to come down from the hills and combine with the main attacks. The events of I Sufi, when General von Kuhn, with 16,000 men, victoriously resisted Garibaldi wth his 40,000 volunteers, show that the Tyrol has good capacity for resistance. Austria has one double and three single linos of rail leading to the Italian frontier. Three of these lines lead towards Isonzo, and only one to the Tyrol, and Innsbuck and the Bremner Pass. The Pusterthnl railway connects the two parts of deployment, but it is too near the frontier to be safely used for the purposes of strategic concentration. Narrow* gauge lines to improve the local network of the Tyrol and other lines of normal gauge to increase the facilities for deployment near the Isonzo, on the line Villach-Goritz, have been recently prosecuted to aid the strategic facilities. Italy has also three lines for a concentration on the lines of the Brenta. The railheads for this purpose would be Chioggia, Padua, and Vicenza. For a more forward concentration in Venetia there are only two lines. With the exception of certain portions of on of these lines, the railways are of single track. Like Austria, Italy is endeavouring to improve her railway equipment, and has devoted large sums since 1905 to increase her plant and to double ccrtan lines, so that a timely advance to the line of the Tagliamento may become practicable.

The above is gathered from the writings of a British military expert who was over the Austro-ltalian frontier some short time before T war was declared. The nature of the country will disclose the importance of Italy’s rapid advance and feverish anxiety to get possession of Austrian fortified points. But since these observations were made Italy has made provision for much more rapid concentration of her armies, and has, where deemed necessary, strengthened her fortifications, and it Is more than probable that since the European conflagration commenced she has laid up stores in her own fortresses, not only munitions of war, but also of greater calibre and more powerful ordnance. To-day’s cables disclose that the Italian Army is successfully operating in the localities mentioned.