NUMBERS IN WAR.

Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 218, 2 June 1915, Page 3

NUMBERS IN WAR.

WHY GERMANY HATES A LONG WAR,

MR. HILA'IRE BELLOC’S ARTICLE?.

In, the March number of Pearson’s Magazine, is an inspiring article by Mr Hilair e . Belloc on numbers in war. In the course of his article Mr Belloc deals, with, two aspects of the matter which, he names (1) the effect of absolute numbers and (2) the effect of proportionate numbers. Dealing with the former, by which he, means, by the effect of absolute numbers,, the fact, that a certain minimum is required for any particular operation,, the writer illustrates the impossibility of one force holding a wall a mile long which the. enemy desired, to surmount, with one man, even though the enemy consisted of on e mam. The opportunity for the success of. the enemy would be too great. It could hardly b e held by 100. against 1000. But supposing there were 3000 using no weapons hut their hands. Then this number could hold the wall, not only against 3000 others, but against any number of thousands, for every man would have as his task the pushing of a ladder off no more than a very small section of the wall, with which his own hands could .deal. This, states th e writer, is exactly w'hat is the case in a great line of trenches. The defending forc e does not get weaker as it diminishes in number until it reaches zero; it is able to hold trenches of a certain length with a certain minimum of men, and when it falls below that minimum, it cannot hold that line at all. By a series of diagrams Mr Belloc illustrates his arguments. He shows that every man in a trench accounts for a certain angle, and to hold the trench with less leaves a gap through which the trench would be carried. He contends that it will be found that a line of trenches is not successfully held with less than 3000 men to the mile. He points out that the Germans are holding in the west a line of trenches 400 miles long with something like 5000 men to the mile; so the best work in the war would seem to have been done by a portion of the Briitsh contingent in front of Ypres when, apparently, a body of only 1500 men to the mile, and those, he understood, dismounted cavalry, successfully held some three miles of trenches for several days. By a fine diagram Mr Belloc shows the German line from Ostend facing Verdun and Metz to the Swiss mountains. If dwindling numbers forced 1 them to take up a shortened line, they could either abandon Alsace-Lorraine and make the line at right angles from Verdun to the Rhine, or abandon most of Belgium and Northern France and make the line from Antwerp to Verdun. With still failing numbers their line would have to be shortened by making it from Liege to the Swiss mountains. But if th e Germans fell back on the Rhine it would not shorten their numbers

Dealing with proportional numbers, Mr Belloc stresses its importance because upon it will depend the issue of the campaign. Again by the use of

diagrams he shows that Austria and Germany ebgan the war with a very j great preponderance in numbers - of trained and equipped men ready, to take the field within the first six weeks. After reviewing the forces each, contending force can put in the field,- the writer says that, taking roughly the first few months of the war,..apart from: wastage!, cduir month after month far superior to either half of the Allies they are fighting —the French and English in the west and the Russians in the east. “Remember,” he says, “that w r e shall not;- at our least maximum, put as against Austro-Germany in the west more than 6 to 9 for a long time to come, nor Russia in the east certainly more than 5 to 9.” The Allies combined may at last be just superior to their enemy numerically, but only superior in a.,proportion of 11 to 9 (exclusive of wastage),and that maximum has not nearly yet been reached. The writer stresses the foregoing because. hb. says a misapprehension of so simple a truth is at the bottom of the conceptionrthat victory would be easy and short; at the bottom of the conception. that it would be certain, and it is at,rth'e«bottom of much foolish impatience and criticism to-day. Turning to wastage, Mr Belloc; says that luckily for us German necessities, as well as German doctrine,- haye involved very heavy wastage- and (lucky for us, that wastage has beem>particularly heavy in the matter-of officers. Why have the Germans been thus prodigal of men in their determination to win rapidly; he asks, and--'shows- four reasons why a long war-is-dreaded by Germany—(l) Russia■ and' Great Britain’s indenfiite powers of expansion; (2) French power to .rally,- and : unless pinned after ther first defeats their tenacity will he increasingly dangerous; (3) power of British Fleet of establishing a blockade; (4) the strategical position —fighting upon two fronts involves, as a method ' of :' victory final success upon one front before success is assured on the ether As in our case he says that the proportion of hit wounded, and . caught officers;was large compared to that of men; but wiiat is more important, perhaps,- the proportion of officers killed" or-badly wounded w r as very much larger in proportion to the slightly wounded'than was the case with the men; ■ it- is- fairly certain that one-half of- the trained professional officers of the German service were permanently out of action by the end of .the year. By calculations he show's the enemy’s wastage - to- be very much greater than ours;.