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SUBMARINE MENACE.

WHAT THE BRITISH BLEST 13 DOING-. I t would be idle to deny writes the naval export of the London Daily News) that the exploit destruction oi the Cvessy, the Hogue, and the Abouhir) reflects the greatest credit on the German submarine service. There ma\ be some who will ash why the British Navy, which is between two and three I times as strong as Germany in submarI iues. cannot do likewise; but to that j question the answer is simple. The principal ships of the German Navy arc stowed away securely in | their harbours, sheltered behind shallow waters, throw gh which run navigable channels of exceedingly narrow width and defended by powerful fortifications and widely dispersed minefield a.

The British fleet, uviable in these conditions to “dig the rats out of their hole,” is compelled to adopt the tactics of the Nelsonian era—to keep watch and ward at sea until the enemy can summon enough courage to venture forth.

Our Naval Gommamler-in-Chief has to bear in mind the possibility of a “sudden raid’ ’across the North Sea. The preventaion of such a raid has been declared to be the principal reason for the formation of the Home Fleet. The consequence of this is that we are bound to keep within easy reach of our east coast and therefore well within the striking range of submarines act-

in" from German harbours. Granted that much, the rest, however deplorable, is simple. A submarine having steamed across the North Sea, has only to lie in wait and take advantage of any opportunity that offers. Our own submarines have been engaged in this - work. Unfortunately, however, the German Fleet is so effectively dry-nursed that the best they were able to accomplish was the sinking of the small cruiser Hela. We cannot afford to lay our fleet up as Germany is doing. Charles the Second tried it in 16(37, and the result was that the Dutch captured Sheerness, burnt Chatham, and took or destroyed every British warship that had been stowed away behind the booms across the Medway. These are the risks the nation does not run to-day; but our security is purchased only at the greater risk and sacrifice of the navy. It has been claimed that the submarine renders blockades altogether impossible, but the main German Fler, is still effective»v blockaded in spite of these craft. Not that our own fleet is anxious that its enemies should remain “nngetntable.’ ’ Far from it. Nelson, whose sing vigil over the war ports of Napoleon was the deciding factor in the breakdown of that great soldier’s plans, always objected do the use of the term ' ‘ blockade ’ ’ to describe his operations. Mis greatest desire was not to keep the enemy in his harbours, but to induce him to come out, and he indulged in all sorts of ruses with that object. Admiral Jellicoe has followed the same line of action. Twice the British Fleet has -.wept into r'm Bight, of Heligoland, and once it remained there in action with a detached force of the enemy for eight hours. But nothing would move the German main fleet. The Germans’ Only Chance. Wo cannot blame our.enemies for the line of p alley they aie p’.r « i. g fh-v could not face our fleet in the* open with any hope of victory and their only possible chance of ultimate success—and it is an exceedingly remote one—lies in reducing our superiority by guerilla tactics—by means of the mine, the submmnc, and if m; i i ! 'y i.ffers, tlio dost rover.

The iac dents of the naval war have gone not a little way towards .-justifying Sir Percy Scott’s claim that the submarine is the only naval type, if not of to-day, then surely of to-morrow.

AVc may rest assured of one thing: That the incidents, far form quelling the spirits of our seamen, will but render them the more anxious and determined to get at and anihilato the German fleet. It will inspire them with a desire for immediate offensive actionnot precipitate, but cautious, calculated and coacV sive. The successful exploits of the German submarine flotilla may thus prove to have hastened ‘‘ the day ’ the day when the German Navy shall disappear from the face of the sea. So may it be.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TAIDT19141202.2.6

Bibliographic details

Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 79, 2 December 1914, Page 3

Word Count
714

SUBMARINE MENACE. Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 79, 2 December 1914, Page 3

SUBMARINE MENACE. Taihape Daily Times, Volume 7, Issue 79, 2 December 1914, Page 3

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