The Legislative Council

Sun (Auckland), Volume IV, Issue 992, 7 June 1930, Page 8

The Legislative Council

A PLEA FOR REFORM

(Written, for THE SUH a HEN I was very young I was often taken to visit an old gentleman who lived in quiet retirement in the suburbs of Auckland. He was a fine old chap, who had served his country well. If he ever possessed any vices he had long since lost them, and at this time he had but one outstanding weakness—by a queer twist of the brain he imagined that the lifaori Wars were still being fought in 1910. However, this little defect did not prevent his continuing to sit in the Legislative Council till his death. So he was still cogitating schemes for combating that rascal Te Kooti and his tuparas, or for getting supplies through to General Cameron at a time when we were being called on to face poison gas, Fokker planes, and Krupp guns, and when England was nearly starved by submarine blockade. But before doing our coronial duty by our own dead though living Legislative Council, let us examine the principle of Upper Houses in general, with particular reference to the House of Lords. There is much wisdom in the saying of the French priest who used to amuse himself in making constitutions for his ‘fellow-revolutionaries: “If a Second Chamber dissents from the first, it is mischievous; if it agrees with it, it is superfluous.” That is the gist of the attack which has so often been directed against-the two-chamber system in the last 140 years. Supporters of that system have variously maintained that an Upper House can serve a useful purpose by examining and revising Bills, by barring hasty legislation, and by discussing matters of general importance in a cool and impartial fashion. To all this answers have been found: Revision and drafting is better done by permanent officials; . legislation is scarcely ever too hasty, and its lagging steps usually need an incentive, and not a hindrance; and any possibility of impartial discussion is usually spoilt because the body has an overwhelming majority in favour of one opinion. The latest suggestion as to its requirements is that, if it thinks that legislation proposed by the Lower House is not to the taste of the people, it should block the measure till the people have a chance to express their opinion (by the unsatisfactory method of the referendum).

The arguments against the institution are advanced mainly, of course, by radicals, partly because radicals are, by definition, favourable to change and experiment, partly because Upper Houses are almost invariably strongholds of conservatism. However, thus far the system has withstood attacks fairly well. Such •a body has good reasons for its existence in a federation such as the United States of America; there its purpose is to see that the rights of the individual States composing the union are not infringed. But even in unitary States (and it is with these we are mainly concerned here) it has lasted fairly well. England, from 1653 tc f 1657, under the Commonwealth, France, and the United States, have all tried one-chamber government, but have all reverted to a two-chamber system. And bicameralism prevails throughout the Empire (Queensland and Nova Scotia are exceptions), while most of the new constitutions adopted in Europe since the war have embodied some form of Second Chamber.

In England, as in New Zealand, a change is long overdue, and in both countries everything has been done for a reform—except doing it. Scarcely anyone doubts the need for a drastic overhaul. In 1927 there were 742 peers entitled to sit in the House of Lords, but 156 had never even troubled to turn up and take the oath. The work is always left to a few regular attenders, and a muster of 200 is exceptionally large. The long-disputed question of the right of peers to blcfck legislation was settled in 1911 by the famous Parliament Act, after a furious and obscure battle, which raged through an elec-.

by H. Jl. h. tion, a dissolution and anotlier election, strong Irish complications, the death of King Edward and the accession of King George. Briefly, it decreed that Money Bills were to become law after one reading in the Commons; other Bills after three readings, even if the Lords rejected them. At the same time suggestions were made for reform of the composition of the Upper House, but the War came on before anything was done. However, in 1917 a representative committee was set up under the distinguished jurist, Viscount Bryce. Many opinions were maintained, from total abolition to the maintenance of the existing conditions: a majority report, however, advised that a reformed House should be constituted mainly by election by the Lower House. Nothing was dene; the Labour Party, as in so many cases, was enthusiastic for reform till it became the Government, but is less so now. In times of great economic stress political reforms fall into the background, and the House of Lords may yet stay on for a long time under much the same conditions as when Gladstone stormed against it or Gilbert satirised it. In New Zealand provision was made for an appointed Upper House when our Constitution was granted in 1852. Its history was fairly uneventful till 1890, when the great Liberal Government came into power. The new Premier, John Ballance, found that the Council contained 26 Conservatives and only nine Liberals. In order to give the Liberals.a chance in debates, be asked for the inclusion of 12 new Liberals. Lord Glasgow (who had been here only two days) refused, but he was over-ruled by the Colonial Secretary. However, Ballance’s opponents still had a majority In the Council, and they did everything possible to waste time and to block the famous series of Bills concerning land, labour and social problems. Ballance and Seddon patiently refrained from “swamping” the House, and gradually filled the vacancies with Liberals. A somewhat similar scene, but with the parts reversed, was played in 1912 when Mr. Massey’s Conservative Government came into power after a long period of Liberal rule. In 1914 the Legislative Council Act was passed. This provided for the division of each island into two electorates, returning 40 members on a population basis. The electoral system was to be that of proportional representation (so as to avoid making the body a mere replica of the Lower House). But, alas! the legislation was not to come into force until a date to be fixed by proclamation. Surely that date is long overdue. So long ago as 1904 Monsieur Siegfried wrote scathingly: “The Legislative Council has become steadily more spiritless and feeble. The Senate . . . is now a mere council for the automatic registration of laws.” Viscount Bryce writes In much the same strain in 1921: “Its life is sluggish . . . its debates are little reported, or read, or regarded. With members selected for nomination chiefly because they had rendered steady support to their party, it has become an almost superfluous part of the constitutional machinery. And with these shrewd verdicts few thinking men will differ much today. The present position is that we have 41 members appointed for seven years and eligible for reappointment, each member drawing £315 a year and travelling expenses 7 and this body, which should be the most influential, active and august in the land, is little better than a laugh-ing-stock to thinking people. To the unthinking majority It is scarcely even that, for they are not sufficiently familiar with it to find it amusing Machinery for its reform exists and is ready to be put into operation Certainly election would not secure perfection (as witness the House of Representatives), but at least the experiment is well worth trying—the position could not well be worse 4t the present moment four members of the Council are just retiring; is this not an excellent opportunity for revising the present farcical situation and trying to “set our House in order?”