“A Dangerous Step”

Sun (Auckland), Volume III, Issue 855, 26 December 1929, Page 9

“A Dangerous Step”

PROPOSED EGYPT TREATY Chamberlain Apprehensive LONG DISCUSSION IN COMMONS British Official "Wireless RUGBY, Thursday. SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, who was Foreign Secretary in the late Government, raised the question of the present Government’s Egyptian policy in the House of Commons today. He said that although there was no direct change in the situation in regard to the Sudan as a result of the new proposals, there was a contingent promise to allow an Egyptian battalion, in certain circumstances, to return to the Sudan.

Sir Austell said be regarded that as a dangerous and retrograde step. The time had not come—if ever it should come —when Britain could divest herself of any part of her responsibility for it with the Egyptian people. It an Egyptian battalion were sent back to the Sudan would it be made perfectly clear that its continuance there depended solely upon the decision of the British Government? Would it be made clear also that if there should be any repetition of the offences which led to its withdrawal it would be the prerogative of the British Government, uncontrolled by reference to any other authority, whether in Geneva, or at The Hague, to order and enforce its withdrawal? Referring to clause 5 of the new proposals of the Government, providing that each of the contracting parties should undertake not to conclude political agreements prejudicial to the interests of the other, Sir Austen said it was ridiculous to say that the foreign policy of' the British Government and the British Empire -was to be governed by the interests and circumstances of the kingdom of Egypt. The ex-Minister said he hoped the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Arthur Henderson. would reconsider the clause, biased as it was on mutuality which did not exist in fact.

It was proposed that British troops should leave Cairo and Alexandria. Had they the right to go back at once if the lives of foreigners in Cairo and Alexandria, or elsewhere, were threatened? He viewed with profound anxiety the consent of the Government to the removal of those troops. NO CHANGE IN POLICY

Mr. Henderson, in replying, said his policy was the same as Sir Austen’s' had been when he was Foreign Secretary. His proposals contained one modification as contrasted with the proposals in the Chamberlain-Sarwat treaty. This concerned the location of the troops for the defence of the Suez Canal. Under the Chamberlain-Sarwat proposals the British Government was not. prepared to withdraw troops from the interior to the banks of the canal for a period of 10 years. Knowing that, the Egyptians did not like to have British troops in occupation of their cities. The present Government did not consider it right to continue occupation for 10 years and had decided to terminate it when proper arrangements had been made for the troops to be located in the rear of the canal. The troops would be located there for the purpose of ensuring the defence of that vital artery of British Imperial communications. This would take from three to five years from the coming into operation of the treaty which might result from the negotiations, because the Government hacl determined that the Egyptian Government should satisfy the British military authorities as to the accommodation and amenities necessary for the comfort of British troops. Mr. Henderson said he thought that by the time the operation of the change became practicable the best part of the 10 years would have gone. The Government believed it was impossible to keep military forces permanently in the capital of a country it desired to recognise as one of independent sovereignty. It was more difficult to defend such a position if the maintenance of a force was advocated, not as a means of protecting the Suez Canal, but of preserving internal order in the country. With regard to the Sudan, that question had been the subject of prolonged and anxious consideration. From the Notes which had accompanied the Government’s proposals it would have been seen that the Government was prepared to examine sympathetically the proposal for the return to the Sudan of an Egyptian battalion, simultaneously with the withdrawal of the troops from Cairo. Regarding the position from the viewpoints of the interests of the Sudan the Governor-General had expressed himself as being strongly in favour of the conclusion of the AngloEgyptian agreement. He was willing to agree to the return of one Egyptian battalion to the Sudafi. The Government was most unwilling to agree to anything which might in the slightest degree create a danger, however remote, of a recurrence of the memorable events of 1924. It felt, however, that the conclusion of a treaty would create an entirely new atmosphere and ensure that relations between the two countries should be inspired by a spirit of genuine co-operation. DEFINITE OBLIGATIONS Paragraph 6 ot the present proposals, as distinct from the Sarwat treaty, imposed definite treaty obligations on Egypt to ensure the due discharge of her responsibilities for the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt, said the Minister. He believed that proposal was adequate and if the treaty were observed in the spirit iu which it had been conceived he believed it would be effective. The Government proceeded on the lines that no agreement would be of permanent value unless credit were given to the Egyptians for a desire to operate the agreement in the spirit in i which its provisions had been conceived. Irritating restrictions calculated to arouse suspicions, and which wounded national susceptibilities, had been removed. The purpose, so far as the British Government was concerned, was the establishment of a firm and lasting friendship with the Egyptian people by the removal of those sources of suspicion which in the past had

been the cause of so much damage to the interests of both peoples. The Government believed it must regard the declaration of Egyptian independence of 1922 as having made a clean sweep of interference in the internal administration of Egypt. Such interference, in his judgment, could only be maintained by force. The policy of force was hardly worth a moment’s discussion. It was a policy for which today no Government would make itself responsible and no Parliament in Britain would support.

Mr. Henderson said he believed that if the present proposals resulted in a treaty it would open up a happier chapter in Britain’s relations with Egypt. It was his first conviction that such a treaty, by obtaining for Britain the friendship and support of Egypt, especially in times of difficulty, would ensure the security of British Imperial communications far more effectively than occupation enforced in the teeth of the opposition of the Egyptian people. The Minister said he believed that •through her newly-elected Government Egypt would reciprocate the spirit of friendship and faith which had been reposed in her in recent months by the representatives .of Britain.

Mr. Winston Churchill, ex-Cbancellor of the Exchequer, said the acceptance of the treaty in its present form, and the withdrawal of the British troops from Cairo, would be far more likely to lead to bloodshed and to a tense and dangerous situation in the Mediterranean than if they went on as they were, which would be both difficult and unsatisfactory. But they must he careful in seeking clarity not to set in train events which might lead to a shocking and sanguinary disaster. Retirement to the Suez Canal was pregnant with danger. Any substantial increase of Egyptian troops in Cairo would require a counter-rein-forcement of British troops on the canal. They could at any time while they retained the canal zone advance upon Cairo and win another Tel El Kebir, but did they want to do that? A Labour Member: Who wants to? Mr. Churchill said it was a situation no one wanted to see. The treaty should impose a limit on the size of the Egyptian forces. Otherwise it would simply be equivalent to manufacturing explosives in a retort. Lord Thomson obviously had misgivings when he mentioned that armoured cars could reach Cairo from the canal in six hours, continued Mr. Churchill. Was it part of the Government’s plan to keep a mobile force on the canal to advance if necessary on Cairo? It was advisable to bring to the notice of the House what the Government had in mind. (Ministerial laughter.) Mr. Churchill said that either they must be prepared to concede the full Egyptian claims in relation to the Sudan or face continual quarrelling with those forces in Egypt, at whose behest Britain was to evacuate Cairo, which would resound throughout Asia. It would be better to leave the British troops iu Cairo, conceding to Egyptian sentiment every considerate usage and every guidance in selfdevelopment. He urged the Government t<) insist on the limitation of Egypt’s army and the abandonment of conscription. CHURCHILL’S CHARGE Mr. Churchill said he believed Lord Lloyd’s dismissal had been interpreted by the Arabs as inherent British weakness. Therefore it was the direct precursor of the Palestine massacres. Labour cries of “Shame.” The ex-Chancellor emphasised the farce of the recent Egyptian elections, when not a single Liberal dared to stand. They had confronted themselves with the most bitter foes of Britain. He predicted that long before three to five years events would occur in Cairo which would afford a brutal demonstration of the need for British troops there. Labour cries of “Shame.’ Mr. Churchill said he believed the Government would be long enough in office to reap some of the results of the folly and evil sown by it. Sir Herbert Samuel, Liberal member for Darwen, said Mr. Churchill seemed to forget that independence was the dominating consideration of the 1922 declaration. He said Mr. Churchill thought always in terms of the strategy of troops iu war. That spirit retarded progress. He was prepared to take the risks that came from goodwill. It was time the reserved points were settled. There appeared to be no margin for further concessions in the treaty.