Ulm Under Suspicion

Sun (Auckland), Volume III, Issue 698, 25 June 1929, Page 9

Ulm Under Suspicion

HIS VERACITY DOUBTED Inquirers Censure McWilliams BUT LANDING NOT PREMEDITATED SUSPICIONS abatit the truthfulness of Ulm, particularly in the matter of bis diary; blame for McWilliams, the radio man, for ignorance and lack of initiative; blame for the whole Southern Cross crew, for carrying inadequate tools, and for “their inexplicable failure to use the available oil to supplement the signal fires.” These are some of the principal features of the Air Committee’s report. The most important feature is that the investigators say there is nothing to show that the forced landing, of the monoplane was premeditated.

(United, P.A.— Telegraph Copyright)

SYDNEY, Monday. The report was issued today of the Committee of Inquiry set up to investigate the forced landings of the Southern Cross and the Kookaburra, also the loss of the search airplane DH9A. It says:—• No evidence was placed before the committee which would support the rumours and public allegations that the forced landing of the Southern Cross on March 31 was premeditated. There was nothing to impugn the honesty of any member of the crew. The evidence showed that the crew had intended to fly to Wyndham on March 31 and had made every effort to do so. Although through certain errors of judgment and defects of organisation they failed to accomplish their object there was nothing to lead the committee to the belief that the forced landing was the result ot a prearranged plan. In the opinion of the committee the forced landing was made because the monoplane ran into adverse weather which deprived the crew of every means of ascertaining their exact position. That resulted in them being completely lost and the exhaustion of their supply of petrol necessitated an immediate landing being made. ERROR OF JUDGMENT

Contributory causes wero the insufficient weather reports and the inability of the fliers to receive during

their actual flight the advice of Captain Chateau’s warning message of March 30 recommending their immediate return. The committee considers it was an error of judgment that the Southern Cross had not carried tools, such as a hatchet and a hammer. The possession of a hatchet would have enabled them to start their friction drives several days earlier and would have enabled them to make larger smoke fires. The crew should also have used its 18 gallons of oil for the purpose of supplementing the fires, _ says the report. Their failure to" make use of that valuable medium is inexplicable. The committee finds that the crew was justified in remaining with its machine rather than sending out parties to search for the Port George IV. mission station. It is satisfied that the Southern Cross was in first-class order and condition, and the instruments thoroughly efficient. EXPLANATION NOT ACCEPTED In regard to the claim of the wireless operator, T. H. McWilliams, that the loss of the receiving aerial was not of material importance as he could not, after, 10 hours’ flying, receive messages owing to deafness, the committee says it cannot accept that explanation. Evidence was produced that for the last seven hours of flights from New Zealand to Australia and Perth to Adelaide numerous messages were received by the monoplane on an inferior radio set. The committee feels that the real reason why the flyers did not return to Richmond after losing the aerial was the reluctance of the co-com-manders to dump the bulk of their petrol in order to make such a landing safe. Anticipating no trouble on their journey they took the risk of proceeding without any means of radio reception. That proved to be an error of judgment, because they ran into adverse weather about which they could have been advised had the receiving set been intact. The committee says reasonable care was not taken to ascertain whether the emergency rations were on hoard the machine before the departure. Such rations would have enabled the crew to maintain their full vitality after the forced landing, and to make greater efforts to communicate with the outside world. BLAME FOR RADIO MAN Certain adjustments to the receiving set could have been made on the spot which would have enabled it to have been used as a transmitting set. There was an alternative method of transmission available by connecting the receiving batteries to the transmitting set. The committee expresses surprise at McWilliam's lack of knowledge as to the adaptability of the apparatus under his control, particularly in view of his recent position as an instructor in the Union Company’s school in New Zealand. The committee attributes the failure of the crew to communicate by wireless alter the forced landing to

ignorance and lack of initiative on the part of McWilliam. DOUBTS ABOUT ULM Concerning the evidence of three witnesses as to Plight-Lieutenant C. T. P. Ulm’s alleged suggestion to get lost in Central Australia as a means to publicity and to secure finance, the -committee expresses the opinion that some such remarks were made by i ‘lni, but probably they were not made us a serious business proposition. This opinion, together with the misleading evidence about wireless reception in the air, causes this committee to regard the evidence of Ulm with some suspicion, particularly so in the matter of his- diary, which contained internal .evidence that it was no daily recewrd, but obviously written for publication. The (committee considers Ulm’s account ot the crew’s weakness was exaggerative!. However, there was no evidence- from which the committee could i'ofer that the crew of the Southern i£!ross took any steps i.o conceal their' position in order to avoid being foumdPRAI.SE FOR RESCUERS Dealing fvjth the Kookaburra tragedy the import pays tribute to the gallant efforts* *of various members of the Air Force and private airmen to find the lost crprws. Several recommendations for the future control o€ long-distance flights are submitted. The committee also expresses the opinion that the i kookaburra was not suitable for long 1 Lights, and that the primary cause of tIW tragedy was the faulty compass wliUch caused Anderson to lose his Erection, engine trouble then necessitating the forced landing. The airman could notarise again and he lacked the necessary' equipment to clear a runway. “BRANDS US AS LIARS” ULM REPLIES TO AIR COMMITTEE “WENT BEYOND SCOPE” Reed. 12.55 p.m. SYDNEY, Today. Flight-Lieutenant Ulm, replying to the Air Inquiry Committee’s criticism of the Southern Cross flight, aalys:— “The finding on my evidence* especially in regard to the condirtcvn of the crew, and the reference tft> the diary, brands ns all as liars, and indicates that the committee went outside the scope of the inquiry to deal with my diary. “The only witnesses who had aiiy knowledge of what they were talking' about were Smith, McWilliam, Litchfield and myself. The diary is true and accurate in every respect. “We have complete faith in McWUa liam as a wireless operator. His own Government has that faith, despite the criticism of certain experts, and we will carry on with him, confident that he will give 100 per cent, efficiency on the job. “The only way anyone could satisfy himself that I did not exaggerate in the account of our weakened condition at Cafe Royal would have been to see us on the spot. “Regarding the weather reports, the Director of Civil Aviation has since told us that he would have left for Wyndham on the information that we had available.” MAKING FLYING SAFER STATE REGULATIONS .ARE RECOMMENDED MINIMUM EQUIPMENT Reed. 12.40 p.m. SYDNEY, Today. The outstanding recommendation by the Air Inquiry Committee for the control of long-distance flights is that the Department of Civil Aviation should after consultation with experts, lay down requirements regarding maps, navigation instruments, food, water, tools and radio communication, with a penalty for non-observance, of confiscation of the machine or prevention of the flight. These regulations should apply to inter-State flights only. The committee does not advise any action which in any way will interfere with the initiative of persons wishing to undertake experimental, pioneering, or exploration flights, but it considers that such persons should be compelled to carry minimum equipment, and comply with certain regulations which would protect them against their own recklessness and perhaps save the community from heavy expense in the event of their becoming lost or stranded. The Commonwealth should be mapped off into recognised air routes, and accurate maps and weather information should always be available.

The committee commented at length ou the absence of emergency radio equipment aboard the Southern Cross. It declared that one of a number of transmitting sets in use when the flight began could have been installed either in the form of a battery installation or a hand generator. The weight in either case would not exceed 201 b.

In its flight to England, the Southern Cross is taking an emergency transmitting set weighing 131 b. Tests already have proved it satisfactory, and the signals have been heard in New Zealand*