VALUE OF A MUD-FLAT

Sun (Auckland), Volume III, Issue 646, 24 April 1929, Page 11

VALUE OF A MUD-FLAT

SUGAR COY.’S LEASE ASSESSMENT OPPOSED “An appeal unique in the history of litigation in New Zealand,” was the description applied by counsel in opening a Supreme Court appeal before Mr. Justice Blair. “This is the second appeal to the Supreme Court from the one assessment. The appeal was made by the Colonial Sugar Company (Mr. Richmond) against the valuation of the ValutirGeneral (Mr. Meredith) of land occupied by the storage dams of the company at Birkenhead. This area of 22£ acres is leased by the company from the Harbour Board. The appeal was first heard in June, 1927, by Mr. Justice Reed, who, in his judgment, said, “The company’s special requirements owing to its established business in the vicinity, must not be allowed to be a factor in determining the value of this eight years’ lease of an unimproved mud fiat. The use to which the land is being put or the nature of the occupation is immaterial.” He allowed the company’s appeal, and remitted the matter to the Assessment Court “with a direction to ascertain and determine the value of the appellant’s interest in the unimproved value of the property in the manner above indicated.” Following on this judgment the Assessment Court reduced its valuation from £1,660 to £1,500 and against this the company now appealed on the ground that it was contrary to the direction of the Supreme Court. Mr. Richmond said that as far back as 1925 the Assessment Court made a valuation of the Colonial Sugar Company’s interest as lessee in the unimproved value of 20 acres of tidal mud fiat. The capital value of the company’s interest in the area was assessed at £4,790. The matter had been remitted twice to the Assessment Court, and on the second occasion the value was reduced from £1,660 to £1,500. The only evidence given of the market value of the land was that given by witnesses of the appellant company. The Assessment Court held that it could base its assessment on the use of the land being made by the company. The action of the Assessment Court in altering its assessment by £l6O was merely flouting the judgment of the Supreme Court. The history of the case showed a deliberate refusal to abide by clear principles. He submitted that his Honour had power to direct the Assessment Court that it was iiot entitled to depart in its decision from the evidence placed before it. Mr. Meredith argued that the Court was bound to accept the statements of the assessors that they had acted on the correct principles laid down by the Supreme Court. It was not open to the Supreme Court to constitute itself a revising valuation court. The valuation notice required no evidence to support it, the onus being on the objector to show that the assessment was wrong. The quantum of value was a question of fact, and there was no appeal on fact. His Honour reserved his decision.