Airplane Not Supreme

Sun (Auckland), Volume II, Issue 442, 25 August 1928, Page 11

Airplane Not Supreme

BATTLESHIPS ESSENTIAL

Fallacy of Bombing Tests

WARS, whether on land or sea, will be won in the future as they have been in the past—by the comparatively slow but irresistible force which is able to move from one strategic position to another, take it, consolidate it, hold it, and move on to the next. On land this force is the infantry, on sea it is the warship. The airplane is not of this type.”

As a reply to those who assert that against the cost of millions in warships, Australia could defend her coasts more efficiently for the same amount of money spent in the air. Engineer Rear-Admiral Sydenham made this statement in a lecture to the United Services Institute in Sydney recently: “During the last three years many statements of this kind have been made, some by very eminent men, all stating or suggesting that the warship had been rendered obsolete by the airplane,” he went on. ‘‘ln IS7O, the popular cry was that the ironclad was doomed —it could be destroyed by a midget —a torpedo-boat. “At the present time disaster resulting from a torpedo attack against a well organised and well balanced deet is considered remote, but in the 70’s one torpedo hit meant destruction. There were no torpedo-boat destroyers, or vessels fitted to provide anti torpedo destruction and irondads had no suitable guns with which to oppose attacks. But witn the developments which have been carried ou since, torpedo craft can no longer approach a fleet with more than a slight chance of success. “In the 70’s France hailed the torpedo as an Inexpensive means of reducing the naval supremacy of Great Britain, but its exponents spoke of cost only in comparative terms on one torpedo-boat against one battleship. No figures were given of the comparatively short life of the torpedoboat, the greatly Increased number needed, or the tender and supply ships required to assist them to keep the sea. The building and maintenance of ironclads was neglected, and France suffered a serious loss of naval prestige which it has never recovered. “To-day history Is repeating itself. The sentiment in the Empire decidedly favours any Idea purporting to reduce the cost of defence, and so parallel are the two cases that the articles and publications of 1870 require the changing of only a few words to make them applicable to the present. The bombing attacks on old battleships are described in many places as conclusive evidence of the superiority of the airplane. “It has not always been stated that the large bombing planes, which cannot be used on any existing aircraft carrier, were unopposed in the air by defending planes, that the velocity of the wind was known to the aviators, that the guns of the ship were not in action, and that the ships were of an obsolete type and stationary. "There is a failure to appreciate the fact that under the same conditions for the attack a single destroyer or a single submarine could sink the ship in less time than that taken by a whole flight of aircraft, and with much less waste of ammunition. “If you do not investigate the limitations of the new weapon and the r ns of defence against it. it appears to be more invincible 1 !i:\t it actually is. Submarine Come to Stay “The voice will long be heard of those who proclaim that the submarine almost won the war for Germany. Be that as it may, it was simply due to the new offence being initially ahead of the defence. That the submarine did not win the war for the Germans was due almost entirely to the Allied surface craft; the smaller one in their kinetic power, and the larger ones in their potential power, enabling the smaller ones to operate unmolested by German ships. “The submarine has come to remain—like the destroyer, the airplanes and the seaplane—as an adjunct of the fleet, but not, as far as we can see at present, to replace the surface vessels. “They will not do that until they develop, at approximately the same P ower embodied in the battleship. Owing to inherent advantages of reliability, power, and genemi capability, the capital ships will continue to be, as far as can be seen at present, the main reliance for carrying on successful warfare. Because each of the smaller weapons has been restricted by its own liinita“ons, the capital ship has continued 38 th Q Pinnacle of sea power. ‘ln Great Britain the Royal Air *orce has been provided with more than £160,000,000 since the war. This cannot be described as a cheap deduce when it is remembered that the Air Ministry frequently complains that it is wholly inadequate. In his book, ‘The Great Delusion,’ -Neon’ stated that for every one of “ e 21,171 airplanes in October, 191 S, . hten were kept on the ground. When •h air offensive was tried in Morocco, eneral Niessel, inspector-general of

the French Air Service, said: ‘The powers and possibilities for the employment of an air force have been exaggerated.’ Mr. A. H. Pollen, in a preface to ‘Neon’s’ book, tells of the staggering disadvantages of the air as a medium of transport. He points out that aerial navigation is extraordinarily uncertain, for the machine may, unknown to itself, he in a current moving at 40 or 50 miles an hour. The use of aircraft is extremely dependent on weather. “In holding the seas, the main fleet of heavy ships is not obliged to lie within striking distance of an enemy airplane port. Blockaders have been driven back by the threat of torpedocraft, and may be driven further back by the air, but wireless communication more than compensates for the distance. “Aircraft are too limited in radius of action to wage successful war on sea power.

“An aircraft carrier is not cheap and cannot be built overnight, and it has no more power than a cruiser; it would be against cruisers, destroyers and submarines that it would have to battle its way to the point where it could strike at the battle fleet. Until recently the control systems of anti-aircraft guns were crude, but systems have been evolved within the last two years which are of the greatest value. The United States now has a gun which fires a 151 b, shell with a range of 15,000 yards. A report issued by the Naval Board at Washington - respecting a new five-inch antiaircraft gun states that a 501 b. shell is projected to a height of 25,500 ft. at the rate of 14 shots a minute. Aircraft Not Cheap

“When a bombing plane has battled its way against distance, weather, faster fighting planes, and anti-aircraft guns to the point where it can deliver its blow, what has it to deliver? Without much exaggeration it can be said —one shot. It is doubtful whether a multiplicity of bombs will mean a multiplicity of shots in the sense that any correction can be made for misses. “The British had bombers during the war, and used them in naval operations of all kinds, but no victories of importance were claimed, even against submarines. The idea that one plane costing from £B,OOO to £IO,OOO can destroy one battleship costing £7,000,000 with one or more bombs presents an immediate solution of the financial problems attending national insurance.

“Taking into consideration the costs of replacement, supporting planes, bases, personnel, equipment, etc., it becomes apparent that our aviation endeavour is going to cost very nearly as much as the target. The lure of cheap warfare held out by aviation extremists vanishes like mist.”