“VIOLATION OF JUSTICE”

Sun (Auckland), Volume II, Issue 401, 9 July 1928, Page 1

“VIOLATION OF JUSTICE”

Judge Censures Magistrate IMPRISONED SOLICITOR S APPEAL “IN my judgment the order made by the magistrate is, in J the words of Judge Thesiger, ‘contrary to the general law of the land,’ and also so vicious as to violate the fundamental principles of justice.”

Such was the comment of Mr. justice MacGregor in the course of a judgment in the Supreme Court this morning overthrowing a separation order made by Mr. W. Meldrum, S.M., of Hokitika, in favour of Mary Ellen Woodley, wife of John Charles Woodley, the young solicitor now serving a term of imprisonment in Mt. Eden for embezzlement. Contending that as he was confined in gaol, and therefore unable to place evidence before the Court, Woodley appealed to His Honour against the magistrate’s decision. The Court awarded costs against both the defendant magistrate and the prisoner’s wife. Mr. E. H. Northcroft appeared for the plaintiff and Mr. T. N. Holmden for the defendants. The wife had sought separation, maintenance and guardianship of the children on the grounds that Woodley had failed to provide for his family and had been persistently cruel. Having been served with a summons and being unable to attend the Court at Hokitika, Woodley asked for

an adjournment to permit of his evidence, and that of others, being taken in Auckland. However, Mr. Meldrum refused the adjournment and dismissed the application to take evidence and made an order against Woodley in terms of the application. He therefore applied for a re-hearing but the application was refused. The petitioner then asked the prison authorities for permission to go to Hokitika, but the request was found impracticable. Woodley then applied to the visiting magistrate at the gaol, who advised himto instruct a solicitor to make ap-

plication to have evidence taken in Auckland on his behalf. He assured Woodley that there was no need to cause a solicitor to appear personally at Hokitika as in the circumstances no magistrate would countenance the proceedings without giving him an opportunity of being heard. ACT OF MOTHER-IN-LAW Woodley’s solicitor then wrote to the clerk of court at Hokitika asking that steps be taken to resist his wife’s application. He felt sure that a reconciliation could be effected between himself and his wife. They had always been on the best of terms. He believed that the proceedings were instigated by his mother-in-law. The prisoner asked that the case be adjourned until his release from prison. Pie was at present allowing his wife a portion of his prison pay. Continuing his judgment, his Honour said that in an affidavit Mr. Meldrum had stated that he gave due consideration to "Woodley’s application for an adjournment and examined Mrs. Woodley, but refused the request and made the order. Woodley’s application for a rehearing was summarily refused, despite a letter from the prison-visiting magistrate, trusting that the fact that Woodley was relying upon an assurance by him would be sufficient to enable him to obtain a rehearing. “Instead of giving the plaintiff an opportunity of being heard he chose to act on the ex-parte evidence of Mrs. Woodley and her witnesses alone.” His Honour went on: “He effectually prevented the plaintiff from being heard on a question which vitally affected not only his pocket, but also the future life of himself and his family,” added his Honour. “How stands the law?” asked his Honour. “A man cannot incur the loss of liberty or property until he has had a fair opportunity of answering the charge against him. “In my judgment Woodley did not have a fair opportunity of answering the charges against him, and did not have . ustice done him when the order .vas made,” declared his Honour. Quoting the Destitute Persons Act, 1910, his Honour said that a magistrate on being satisfied of the truth of the evidence and having regard to all the circumstances of the case may make an order. It was, however, difficult to see how a magistrate could be satisfied of the “truth” of such a complaint until he had heard the evidence of the husband. It was equally difficult to imagine how any magistrate could have regard to all the “circumstances of the case” unless he had before him the circumstances according to the husband as well as that given by the wife. The judge prohibited the defendants from taking any further steps upon the order in question.