THE SUPPRESSION OF OFFENDERS’ NAMES

Sun (Auckland), Volume II, Issue 315, 28 March 1928, Page 15

THE SUPPRESSION OF OFFENDERS’ NAMES

BARRISTER WRITES ON PROVISIONS OF 1920 ACT At the Magistrate's Court on Mon-, day, two charges of “drunkenness while in control of a motor-car” were heard. In one, the case of a doctor, the magistrate ordered the suppression of the name of the accused. In the other, the case of a mechanic, an order for the suppression of the name of the accused was not made. A number of letters commenting on the divergence in sentences appeared in The Sun last evening. Mr. R. A. Singer, who defended the doctor in the Magistrate’s Court, has forwarded the following letter, on the provisions of the Offenders Probation Act, 1920, to the editor of The Sun: Sir, — As a practising barrister and cne who has had a large experience in the j Courts, I desire to explain, as clearly and as succinctly as possible, the views and sentiments that seem to me to be properly held in connection with the much-discussed provisions of the Offenders Probation Act, 1920. The Legislature—with wisa mercifulness—realised that there are many occasions when the far-reaching and complicated provisions of our modern laws and the ordinary penalties of older days, coupled with the publicity of our latter-day journals, might be entirely disproportionate to some of the newl3 r -tabulated offences which do not constitute •’crimes” in the ordinarily accepted sense of that term. Accordingly, in the year 1920, “The Offenders Probation Act” was enacted, and Section 9 of that Act reads as follows: — If any person accused of an offence >vithin the meaning of this Act has not previously been convicted of any offence, the Court may prohibit the publication ot his name in any report or account of his arrest, trial, or conviction, or of his release on probation. Now. there are several considerations that at once—at any rate, to the legal mind—present themselves after the perusal of that section. Firstly, it must be obvious that a dutv is immediately imposed upon a Judge or Magistrate to exercise the discretion to prohibit publication of the name of the offender, and this is a duty which must obviously be exercised on request. It must be observed that the statute makes one condition only, that the offender is a first offender. It is not to be denied that the exercise of this discrimination may be difficult in many cases, and that the setting down of principles may be equally difficult; but the duty being there, no tribunal can endeavour to avoid it, and notwithstanding what I have said, it seems I to me that there are some obvious , principles which may be laid down, and, it should be observed, particularly j for the reason that the objects of the j statute are plain, clear and simple, if j it is read aright, and the reasons of j its enactment are appreciated. Many persons are mistaken in their attitude towards the statute, and this is only to be expected, if the objects of the statute and the principles to be employed in its exercise are not explained. It is to be regretted that sucJi explanation has not been fully made in the past. Once it is established that an accused person is a first offender and an application that the suppression of the name of that offender is made to the tribunal, wbat should 1 e the sequence as far as the tribunal's exercise of its discretion is concerned? A little consideration destroys the suggestion that the statute makes one law for the rich and one ior the poor. The first real test must be: Is the penalty of fine or imprisonment or both —coupled with the publication of the name of offenders, who are obviously not criminals, or even if guilty of criminal acts, are not beyond redemption—out of proportion to the offence ! charged ? To the poor man—the labourer. | without any disrespect—publication of I the name may be of no moment whatever. To the professional man who i has spent many years and much effort ! in acquiring a proficiency, publication of the name may spell ruination—utter , and irretriei*ab!e. The offence of intoxication while n j charge of a car cannot possibly be j held, save in very exceptional circum- I .stances, to be such an unlawful act .is ; to justify the infliction of ruination ! upon one man in comparison with a j mere financial penalty upon another. Public security must, of course, be j carefully preserved. Persons who may have tendencies to direct vio- i lence, dishonesty or evil practices, ; which may spread among or cause offence to others, deserve no mercy or i consideration as a rule, but once the j j public realises the fact that this particular Act is on the Statute Book and that the objects of the Act are merciful and reasonable, and once tribunals realise that the duty I have referred to is imposed upon them and must be judicially exercised by them, all complaints and controversies must cease. It should certainly be added that when the “mechanic” whose name was published came before the Court last Monday', and application ior tho suppression of his name was made to the Magistrate, the Magistrate asked counsel if there were any grounds or reasons for making such an application. When counsel promptly admitted there were no such grounds or reasons to put forward, the Magistrate naturally, and properly, declined to exercise the discretion given to him by Uxe statute.

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