TANKS AT CAMBRAI

Sun (Auckland), Volume I, Issue 279, 15 February 1928, Page 15

TANKS AT CAMBRAI

NOVEMBER 20, 1917 BEGINNING OF NEW ARM Ten years ago to-day, wrote a correspondent in “The Observer, of November 20, 1927, had the spirit of Goethe been hovering over the uplands of Artois, it might have repeated the words uttered by Goethe in the flesh at the close of Valmy, just a century and a-quarter before: “Something new has this day happened in the history of the world, and you and I can say that we were present at its birth.” The “something new” of that memorable autumn morning in 1917 was the revolution in war which the tank had brought about. It was, of course, not the debut of the new arm. Tanks had been first employed bn the Somme in the previous year, and had been used in the operations of 1917 prior td November. But the initial employment in September, 1916, had been contrary to the views of those who had originated the arm. The pioneers of the new weapon had urged that tanks should be withheld until a surprise attack could be carried out on a scale so extensive as to warrant the hope of decisive success. As far back as February, 1916, before the first tank was even completed, Colonel Swinton had laid especial emphasis on this in a memorandum submitted to the Government. The advice was disregarded. Tanks were thrown into the fight in dispersed detachments and in unsuitable conditions. Particularly was this so in the Third Battle of Ypres, in the summer and autumn of 1917. There they were called upon to operate in a low-lying area, which had been converted into a potential swamp through the destruction of the drainage system by the artillery of both sides. Toward the close of 1917 there was a danger lest tanks might fall into discredit, and already in higher military circles the question was being discussed whether they should not be regarded as useless. The Attack

Tank enthusiasts, however, refused to regard the trials already made as conclusive. They doggedly set about evolving an operation which should be not only strategically valuable in itself, but would enable the Tank Corps to inspire confidence in itself and gain confidence with others. What they asked for was suitable terrain, surprise, sufficiency of tanks, and speed. The sector opposite Cambrai, rolling chalkland, pitted but slightly by shell fire, was selected as the most suitable. The objective was not Cambrai itself, for the capture of that town was entirely subsidiary to the fracture of the Hindenburg Line at an important nodal point. To secure surprise the advertising and customary artillery bombardment was to be dispensed with. The force detailed for the operation consisted of nine battalions of tanks, six divisions, a corps of cavalry, and 1,000 guns. In all, there were 378 fighting tanks and 98 administrative machines. The tanks were to lead the way, under an artillery barrage; the infantry was to follow and widen the gap; and the cavalry was to be unleashed when the hole in the German line was sufficiently deep and wide. Six Miles in Twelve Hours At zero hour, 6.20 a.m., on the foggv morning of November 20, the guns opened and the tanks advanced. The £, I ?® ra ‘‘ on waa an amazing success. 1 . Germans were completely surprised. Panic spread, and thousands or the enemy either bolted in terror or surrendered on the spot. Only in some poln , ts di <i the Germans resist, ut there, let It be recorded, the re - wa , s Ballant in the extreme, from =l® hou J s the tanks, starting from a base of some six miles, h^d

— enabled the attackers to effect a penetration at one point of almost that \ distance, a depth which at the ThW Battle of Ypres hatf required three months to effect; 8,000 prisoners and 100 guns had been taken. Our casualties were about 4,000. There had been no preliminary bombardment, and that which preceded Third Ypres had colt £22,000,000. » Further progress was made on the following days, but the extent of tha initial success had not been aatkipared or provided for. There eraa as reserve of tanks. The crews of thoae engaged became completely exhausted There was no great mass of infantry at hand to reinforce the tired fcot<soldtae and to press the advantage gained. Tha gap was just not quite deep enough far the cavalry to be flung through. Tha delay enabled the Germans to put h large reinforcements. On the 27th the impetus of the attack died away. Bot it was clear to all who had eyes to see that there had arrived in war a method of attacking a fortified line other th»n i that of merely hurling tens of thousands of the young manhood of Britain against machine guns and barbed wire.