DISHEARTENED

Sun (Auckland), Volume I, Issue 137, 31 August 1927, Page 13

DISHEARTENED

CECIL’S FIGHT FOR PEACE CABINET NOT WITH HIM REASON FOR RESIGNATION On the broad question of disarmament my colleagues do not agree with me,” says Viscount Cecil, in a minute explaining his resignation from the British Cabinet. ‘‘l can see no way then, in which I can be of further service in the Cabinet to this cause, which I regard as supremely important. But outside there is much to be done. The hope of the future lies in an aroused and instructed public opinion. That is the object which may employ all, and more than all, the energies which remain to me.”

(British Official Wireless. — Copyright)

RUGBY, Monday. TTUSCOUNT CECIL has resigned his * seat in the “Cabinet. The text is issued of the communications which he has addressed to the Prime Minister. In a letter dated August 25, Viscount Cecil says, “I wrote to you on August 9. immediately on my return from Geneva, to tell you that I felt it impossible to continue in office. Owing to your absence in Canada, I understand that that letter has only just reached you. .1 have, therefore, restated, in the form of a minute which I now enclose, my reasons for resignation.” In the accompanying minute, Lord Cecil says: “I am sorry to say I have arrived at the conclusion that I ought to resign my office. Let me in the first place assure you that this conclusion is not due to any personal difficulty. On the contrary, I feel that I owe you and all my colleagues much gratitude for your kindness and consideration.

“Least of all have I any grievance against Mr. Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty. He will, I hope, have already told you that throughout our time at Geneva we worked together in the closest agreement. Apart from one or two questions of procedure, I do not think we had any differences of opinion. Certainly we had none with respect to the policy to he pursued at the conference. “It is true that in technical matters I had to rely chiefly on the advice given to us by naval experts. Here again we were extremely fortunate in having as our chief adviser so able and wide-minded an officer as Admiral Sir Frederick Field. A Serious Difficulty “The difficulty is, I am sorry to say, much more serious, for I cannot conceal from myself that on the broad policy of disarmament, the majority of the Cabinet and I are not really agreed. “I believe that general reduction and limitation of armaments is essential to the peace of the world, and on that peace depends not only the existence of the British Empire but even that of European civilisation itself. “It follows that I regard limitation of armaments as by far the most important public question of to-day. Further, I am convinced that no considerable limitation of armaments can be obtained except by international agreement. On the attainment of such agreement, therefore, in my judgment the chief energies of the Government ought to be concentrated. X say it is of greater value than any other political object. Disquieting Happenings “Much that happened during the

session last spring of the preparatory commission for the reduction and limitation of armaments was to me of a disquieting nature. “Over and over again I was compelled by my Instructions to maintain propositions in the commission which were difficult to reconcile with any serious desire for the success of its labours. “For the most part, those instructions' turned on smaller points, but the cumulative effect on the minds of the commission was very unfortunate, and was largely the cause of its comparative ill-success. “Nevertheless, when you were good enough to ask me to be one of the British representatives at the recent conference, I gladly accepted. I thought there was little doubt of an agreement being reached, and I believed that an agreement between three great naval Powers to the reduction of their armaments would be of great assistance in facilitating the efforts of the preparatory commission for general limitation. Its failure would, of course, be a corresponding disaster, but I did not contemplate failure. Unfortunately failure followed, and the causes of that failure may have to be probed when Parliament meets. “It is enough now to say that I found myself out of sympathy with the instructions I received, and I believe that an agreement might have been reached on terms which would have sacrificed no essential British interest. “What, then, of the future? I look back on the refusal to accept a treaty of mutual assistance, the unconditional rejection of the protocol, the Ministerial declaration against compulsory arbitration, the partial failure of the preparatory commission, and now the breakdown of the Three-Power Conference. ‘‘My Policy Overruled” “An advance in the direction, first of security, then of arbitration, and lastly of disarmament itself, has been tried, and in each case has made little progress. In each case the policy I advocated has been more or less completely overruled. As it has been in the past, so will it be in the future. The same causes will produce similar effects, for the truth is, however unwilling I am to recognise it, that in these matters my colleagues do not agree with me. I can see no way, then, in which I can be of further service to the Cabinet to this cause which I regard as supremely important; but outside there is much to be done. The hope of the future lies in an aroused and instructed public opinion. That is the object which may employ all, and more than all, the energies which remain to me.”