British Naval Policy Does Not Please United States

Sun (Auckland), Volume 1, Issue 108, 28 July 1927, Page 11

British Naval Policy Does Not Please United States

CHAMBERLAIN’S SPEECH AMERICAN predictions as to the failure of the Geneva EX Naval Limitation Conference have been revived by a speech in the House of Commons by Sir Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs). The difficulty is over the smaller ships.

Bjj Cable.—Press Association.—Copyright Reed. 10.15 a.m. LONDON, Wed. JX the House of Commons, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replying to a question, said that after a full discussion the Right Hon. W. C. Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Viscount Cecil had returned to Geneva. The Cabinet trusted that the conference would reach a successful conclusion. In the circumstances, it would be improper to make a detailed exposition of the British position, or to comment on the other Powers’ proposals. Instead, he proposed to read a written statement designed only to remove misunderstanding, which, if not corrected, might impede the prospects of success. Despite all British efforts in Geneva, serious misapprehensions as to Britain’s aims prevailed in some quarters. Britain was even charged with desiring to destroy the equality of the sea power of the United States and the British Empire. There was no foundation for such a suspicion. Cabinet understood that President Coolidge’s invitation was based on a desire to develop the Washington Conference by diminishing yet further naval expenditure and maintaining national security. Cabinet was in complete agreement with that twofold aim, and desired to measure the merit of every proposal by the degree to which it furthered the two-fold purpose. On this principle, Britain proposed to diminish the size and also the armament of battleships, not altering the numbers fixed at Washington. For the same reason, it suggested limitation of the number and also the armament of large fighting cruisers on similar principles. This would greatly diminish the national expenditure without endangering national security. SMALL CRUISER QUESTION Questions connected with small cruisers were more complicated. The strengths of the fleets could be tested in figures, and compared in relation to their primary function to fight other fleets. Speaking broadly, they could be compared with each other, but there was no such simple way of looking at the subject in the case of small cruisers employed for police purposes in peace time and for the protection of lines of communication in war time. Geographical considerations could not rationally be ignored. It could hardly be denied, as was clearly stated in accepting President Coolidge’s invitation, that such vessels were of vital necessity to a widely scattered Empire, whose most populous parts depend for daily bread on seaborne trade, which might perish if they failed to defend external routes. The sea routes upon which Britain’s existence, went on Sir Austen Chamberlain, depended lay largely in the narrow waters of other States. That was not the case with the United States, where most important lines lay either on land within its own frontiers, by sea along its own coasts, or in great oceans. These considerations received due regard at Washington in 1922, and had not since then lost any of their importance. WASHINGTON FORMULA INAPPLICABLE While urging special difficulties due to geographical position, Britain was far from claiming the least right to dictate a small cruiser policy for other Powers. She accepted the principle which she understood underlay Mr. Ccolidge’s policy—that no maritime Power should maintain a larger navy than was required for her own security. To translate that into fig ures was, for the reasons given, more difficult in the case of small cruisers than for the larger type of service vessels. Anything resembling the quasi-permanent formula adopted for battleships at Washington was quite inapplicable and inadequate for vessels designed for the purposes, which of necessity varied with the geographical and economic position, of the several Powers concerned It became even inapplicable when strength was estimated in terms of gross tonnage, without to numbers or armaments. Two nations which possessed 100,000 tons in battleships might be regarded without serious error as so far equal in fighting power, but no such statement could reasonably be made about two nations one having ten 10,000-ton cruisers and the other 20 5,000-tonners. It all depended on circumstances, though naval experts would probably agree that if it came to fighting, more numerous vessels would stand a poor chance against fewer hut more powerful ships. If this were so, a country which for any reason was obliged to distribute its available tonnage among smaller units would be at a permanent disadvantage, compared with one ■which was able to adopt a different scheme. There would be nominal parity, but real inequality. This,_ of course, was merely an illustration, hut it sufficed to explain why in the Government’s opinion no provisions open to that kind of criticism should he given. That international authority was already possessed by those parts of the Treaty of Washington which dealt with strength in numbers, NO SURRENDER MARITIME EQUALITY BRITAIN’S POSITION LONDON, Wednesday. Sir Austen Chamberlain, continuing, said that in the Government’s opinion there need be no difficulty in arriving at a temporary agreement about the immediate future of cruiser building, but the Empire could not be asked to give such a temporary agreement. The appearance of an immutable principle, which might be treated as a precedent in any other course, would inevitably be interpreted in the future as involving a formal surrender by the Empire of maritime equality a consummation which the Government was well assured wasnot part of the present policy. Mr. J. R- Clynes (Labour) asked whether opportunity would be given to discuss the question when the House resumes in November. Sir Austen Chamberlain said: I will

undertake, on behalf of the Prime Minister, that such opportunity will be given. Replying to Commander J. M. Kenworthy (Labour), Sir Austen said the Government regarded it as inexpedient, and almost improper, to enter into any detailed discussion while the conference was still sitting. Mr. E. Thurtle (Labour) asked: Is it not a fact that each Power is going to insist oil its own national security, making an agreement utterly impossible in the circumstances? This should not be protracted. Let the farce end at the earliest moment. Sir Austen Chamberlain: I regret such a tone and words. The Government must dissociate itself expressly and immediately from such a reference. The whole basis of the conference is to reconcile limitation of armaments with national security, and that is the only basis on which a conference for limitation of armaments can ever be brought to a successful issue.—A. and N.Z. FAILURE PREDICTED AMERICAN VIEWPOINT SIR AUSTEN’S SPEECH Reed. 9.5 a.m. WASHINGTON, Wed. The belief in official circles that the Geneva conference will break up without reaching an agreement is strengthened by Sir Austen Chamberlain’s speech. Officials are amazed at the British Foreign Secretary’s reported statement that the Washington Treaty formula for battleships, which is one of equality in total tonnages, is not applicable to small cruisers. Officials stated that if the British delegation at Geneva insists on this position, failure is inevitable. They declared that parity between the United States and Britain can be measured only by a formula of equal tonnage for each class of ships, as agreed by the Washington Conference, and as presented in President Coolidge’s invitations to the Geneva conference. —A. and N.Z. WILL FINISH WORK MR. BRIDGEMAN’S RESOLVE Reed. 5.5 a.m. LONDON, Wednesday. THE RIGHT HON. W. C. BRIDGEMAN, First Lord of the Admiralty, return to the Geneva Naval Limitation Conference, said: “We shall finish the work this time, one way or the other. We are returning after long discussions with the Cabinet. We think the position is clear. Britain’s case remains fundamentally unchanged. Nevertheless, I have just as good a hope of a settlement as when I returned to London.” The First Lord of the Admiralty is accompanied by Viscount Cecil and Earl Jellicoe. It is understood that the delegation is taking back a carefully drafted plan, to which they are more confident of the consent of America and Japan. Sir Joseph Cook, Australian delegate, returns to-night, and Sir James Parr, chief New Zealand delegate, at the week-end. —A. and N.Z. SIR FREDERICK FIELD ILL REPLACED ON DELEGATION LONDON, Wednesday. Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Field, one of the British delegates to the naval conference, is ill, and has been compelled to return to London from Geneva. Read-Admiral Alfred Pound will replace Sir Frederick on the delegation. —A. and N.Z.