FRANKNESS

Sun (Auckland), Volume 1, Issue 77, 22 June 1927, Page 1

FRANKNESS

AN historic feature of the Naval Limitations Conference was that the United States participation for the first time in any conference at Geneva since the formation of the League of Nations. Admiral Earl Jellicoe, in an interview, points out that the British proposals contain the germ of an agreement. ’He stresses the vital importance of Britain’s responsibility in ensuring, for her own security and existence, the protection of her trade routes. Regarding submarines, he says that no country requires craft of from 1,000 to 2,000 tons for defensive purposes. There seems to be a genuine desire for an agreement. Satisfaction is expressed by the American Press at the frankness with which the programmes were presented, and Earl Jellicoe points out that there can be no better method than that of arriving at a good result.

By Cable.—Press Association.—Copyright Reed. 8.32 a.m. GENEVA, Tuesday. A DMIRAL Earl Jellicoe, New Zealand representative at the conference of the three Powers at Geneva, interviewed by the Australian Press Association, made comments which were not only his personal opinions, but also those of the whole British delegation. He said the essence of the British proposal was extreme frankness, and he could not conceive a better method of arriving at a good result than that each nation should say definitely (; what it wanted, and why it wanted it, all placing their cards on the table. Defence of Trade Routes “We must be prepared to defend our demands for the various numbers and types of vessels,’’ he continued. "The whole world knows that for Britain, the navy is a matter of defence of the trade routes, without which Britain could uot exist, without which the Dominions and colonies could not market their products.” “Britain is in this respect In a different position from that of other countries. Japan is nearest to our position, in her dependence on imports. We can, and are willing to, show the world what need there is to defend the sea routes, and I believe that if others did the same according to their own requirements, it should eventually prove the basis of the agreement. “It seems to me obvious, when we come down to the details, that our first effort should be to reduce the size of ships in different classes. We propose to reduce battleships by 5,000 tons,‘and cruisers (except 10,000 tonners built under the Washington Agreement) to 7,500 tons. Anybody who recollects pre-war competitive shipbuilding must be convinced that the British proposals contain the germ of an agreement. "The system of reducing the size of warships was recognised in the Washington Agreement. It seems to us that the most logical method to pursue is

to try to reduce other classes as well as battleships. For instance, most nations claim that the submarine is a

defensive weapon. As such it should be considerably reduced in size. Nobody can possibly call a submarine of from 1,200 to 2,000 tons a defensive weapon. For coastal defence, submarines do not need to be anything approaching these sizes.” Earl Jellicoe endorsed entirely the examination by the British naval experts of the British proposals, compared with those of America and Japan.—A. and N.Z.

EARL JEULICOE’S IDEA JAPAN’S PROPOSALS SATISFACTION FELT IN AMERICA