Balkans Still Are Potential Storm-Centre

Sun (Auckland), Volume 1, Issue 40, 10 May 1927, Page 13

Balkans Still Are Potential Storm-Centre

Yugoslavs Believe Their Future is Menaced ITALY’S TREATY WITH ALBANIA The following article by the Belgrade correspondent of the "Neic York Times " explains the points at tesue in the controversy between Italy and Yugoslaria over Albania and the rights of the two nations in the Adriatic Sea. Strained relations developed after the signing of the Treaty of Tirana between Italy and Albania, and the dispute reached a crisis which was only relieved by Great Britain assuming the role of peacemaker and suggesting an amicable settlentent. Since the Italo-Albanian treaty fell like a thunderbolt in Belgrade, sufficient time has elapsed for sober second thought on its meaning for the future of the Balkans. The Governments of Italy and of Albania have assured the world that their treaty is not only quite innocuous but a positive advantage to the cause of peace. They have denied that it contained any secret clauses. These assurances and denials have been accepted in some countries, but they have not reassured the Yugoslavs. The more they read the treaty the more they find between its lines, and the more it seems to constitute a decisive Rubicon. The Text of the Treaty. Here is the text of the treaty: Pact of Friendship and Security Between Albania and Italy Article I.—Albania and Italy recog--nise that any disturbance whatsoever directed against the status quo, political, juridical and territorial of Albania, is contrary to their reciprocal interests. Article 2.—For the protection of the above-mentioned interests the high contracting parties pledge themselves to lend their mutual support and their cordial co-operation; they pledge themselves equally not to conclude with other powers political and military agreements to the prejudice of the interests of the other party, as defined in the present pact. Article 3.—The high contracting parties pledge themselves to submit to a special procedure of conciliation or arbitration matters of difference that may arise which it shall not have been possible to adjust by ordinary diplomatic procedure. The . form of this procedure of peaceful regulation shall be the subject of a special convention which shall be concluded within a short time. Article 4.—The present pact is for a period of five years and can be denounced or renewed one year before its expiration. Article s.—The piesent pact will be ratified and subsequently registered with the League of Nations. Ratifications will be exchanged in Rome. Done at Tirana, Nov. 27, 1926.

The meat of this treaty, as seen here, lies in the first and second articles. Italy promises to come to the aid of Albania should any disturbance whatsoever be directed against its political status quo. In a country in which revolutions are chronic, Italy declares the maintenance of the existing Albanian Government to. be her special interest, and -pledges herself to perpetuate it. That means that Italy is in a position to intervene with military force in Albania whenever any attempt is made from within or without to overthrow the Government of Ahmed Bey Zogu. Italy sought to obtain from the powers in the Conference of Ambassadors the right to intervene in Albania whenever disturbances there injured their interests. She failed. She sought then to gain such a mandate from the League of Nations, and failed again. Now she has succeeded in obtaining this standing invitation to intervene in Albania from the Albanian Government itself. —and not merely when the interests of the great powers nr the League of Nations require it, but whenever she herself decides that the Government of Ahmed Bey Zogu is in danger of being overthrown or the status quo in Albania is menaced in any other way. Moreover, Italy has secured for herself the exclusive right to intervene in Albania. Albania can conclude with other powers no agreement which Italy considers against her interests. If this does not give Italy control of Albanian foreign affairs, Belgrade is convinced nothing is ever likely to. Albania is, or, when she signed the treaty, was, an independent country and presumably enjoys the sovereign right to assure herself of Italian protection. If Italy should now land troops in Albania her position in international law would seem to be strong.

Position of Yugoslavia The positon of Yugoslavia is correspondingly awkward. While this treaty stands, she is under constant menace of Italian occupation of Albania. And how is she to invalidate the.treaty? Some may think that the launching of a strong “surprise” revolution which could overthrow the Albanian Government and declare the treaty void before Italy had time to act would be the methods which would suggest themselves as most feasible in the

Balkans. But any such step would merely furnish Italy with an excuse to intervene; it would automatically precipitate the very thing it aimed at preventing. It is rather in the interests of Yugoslavia to try to keep even the Albanians who oppose the treaty or Ahmed Bey Zogu, from rebelling on their own accord, and thus allowing Italy to step in. Yugoslavia must depend either upon bringing pressure to bear upon Italy through other great powers or on the League of Nations. It will be difficult, however, for even the powers to persuade Italy to renounce the advantageous position' she has finally secured in a region so important to her. And it would be a grave step for the powers to denounce the treaty as illegal. Remains the League of Nations. The Yugoslavs intend to make a strong fight to keep the League from registering this treaty, on the ground that it conflicts with the Covenant, especially Article 16, and is a menace to peace. If the League should accept this thesis and refuse to register the treaty, Italy’s legal position would undoubtedly be weakened. But it is doubtful if the League has such discretionary power over registration, or would care to exercise it in this case, unless world opinion was strongly aroused. If the League does register the treaty and takes no steps at its next session to draw its fangs, then Italy’s legal position will be quite solid —and Yugoslavia expects the worst. It is believed here that Italy is only waiting for the treaty to be registered in order to profit by it. Once this is done, it is expected that Italy will not delay to find reason to land troops in Albania. If Albania then escapes the status of Egypt or Morocco, the Yugoslavs will be surprised. Guessing at Italy’s Aims Moreover, they do not think that Albania, all important as it is, constitutes an end in itself for Rome, but rather, as with classic Rome, which the Fascists emulate, a means to further ends. Among these, the Yugoslavs acutely fear Albania may be used as a stepping stone to the seizure by Italy of the Dalmation coast. Even without secret clauses the Albanian treaty seems a sufficiently decisive and dangerous development to the Yugoslavs. They are sure that they must prepare for the worst from ! Italy. When one looks at Albania in tables of comparative statistics he may poohi pooh the idea that it could a dej cisive influence on world or even Euro-

pean affairs. Exception made for such miscroscopic countries as Monaco. Liechtenstein and San Marino. Albania.' both in area and population, is the smallest' State in Europe, and it is easily the most backward. Its area (10,000 square miles) is about that of Maryland. its population (S 04.000), about one-third less. Roughly, fiveeighths of the Albanians are Mohammedans. two-eighths are Greek Orthodox and the remainder Roman Catholics. Its largest city. Koritza, has a population of 25.598. Albania's budget amounts to about 4,000.000 dollars, its exports to about 600,000 dollars. A wild, mountainous country, it depends chiefly upon bridle trails for communications. The utmost a rough and ready automobile can travel on Albanian roads is 250 miles. The country’s railways are limited to three narrow gauge lines, one from Durazzo to Tirana (the capital), twenty-two miles in length; another from Durazzo to Klavaja, eighteen miles; the third from Valona (the best port) to Selenitza. eight miles. If one looks at Albania, however, on the map. its importance immediately grows. Situated at the narrow mouth of the Adriatic, Albania forms the teeth of that sea's upper jaw. as Italy forms those of its lower jaw. Only forty-one miles separate the upper and lower teeth at the Strait of Otranto. The lower jaw of Italy needs only to control those upper teeth in order to close tightly the whole Adriatic whenever it desires. That means that Italy, by controlling Albania, can close to most of Central Europe its easiest outlet to the sea and to Yugoslavia its only coast. Main Railway Project Nature, after raising a mountain barrier along Yu. s coact which makes the connection of its ports with the rest of the country extremely difficult and costly problems of railway engineering, was prodigal with west and east or south-east valleys in Albania. It has outlets made to order for all the various projects of railways to connect Northern Greece, the Aegean, Bulgaria and Serbia with the Adriatic. The chief of these is the railway from Constantinople and the Black Sea to the Adriatic which, though generally following the classic route of the Via Egnatia, is now planned to have its western terminus at Valona instead of Durazzo. Moreover, the only practicable railroad route from Belgrade to Cattaro, Yugoslavia’s finest harbour and her naval base, must cross the northern tip of Albania. Italian control of Albania thus effectively seals this most important of Yugoslavia’s westward lines of communication. Moreover Cattaro is so situated as to be open to land attack from Albania, from which it is only 20 miles distant.

To this naval, military and commercial strategic value of Albania, especially to Italy, Nature has added another which is of peculiar importance in our gasoline age. Albania has what Italy and Yugoslavia both completely lack, and without which no modern nation is really powerful. Albania has oil. iy>w much is not known, but one-tenth of the entire area of, Albania has been taken in oil concessions by various foreign groups, nearly all last summer. The biggest holders are the French, the Italians (who control a quarter of the conceded fields), the Standard Oil Company and the British, chiefly the Anglo-Persian. What borings have been made show that the oil is identical with that of Rumania.

This oil is all at seaboard, chiefly at Valona. It could not be handier for Italy. It may be thought that the concessions just accorded by Albania to companies other than Italian diminish its importance to Rome. It does, but not so much as may be imagined. Anyone who is acquainted with mandated or “protected” countries knows that there are more ways than one for the “protecting” Power to kill the foreign concession goose. What the presence of other Powers in the Albanian oil field does promise is plenty of international complications, with Italy in the best strategic place.

Albania is also endowed with other minerals Italy lacks and, as a manufacturing country and an expanding Power, needs. It is known to have copper, coal, arsenic, silver-bearing lead. The fact that it is undeveloped and underpopulated makes it of more value to Italy. She needs a market for her goods as much as raw materials and also an outlet for her surplus population.

It is evident from every point of view that Albania is a prize of prime importance to Italy. It is also of vita! interest to Yugoslavia, but with an essential difference. Italy, to derive from Albania the great advantages it has for her, must possess or control the country. Yugoslavia, though it would prefer also to possess or control Albania, does not and, for many years to come, will not need to go that far. Until its development is much nearer to that of Italy than it now is, the interests of Yugoslavia in Albania are defensive, and they will be fairly well protected as long as Albania is independent with its neutrality guaranteed—as long, above ail, as it is free from Italian control. But once the Albanian gate to the Adriatic Sea and to the Balkan Mountains passes or threatens to pass into the hands of Italy, it becomes for Yugoslavia a danger of the most far-reach-ing kind. Foreign Minister Blamed With Ahmed Bey Zogu President of the Albanian Republic (which he proceeded to establish). Yugoslavia has since felt safe—so safe that Belgrade apparently did not bother to answer his pressing appeals for funds. For this carelessness, this “throwing away of Yugoslavia's golden opportunity,” the then Foreign Minister, Dr. Xinchitch, is now roundly blamed in Belgrade, and the question, “What use did he make then of the ‘Secret Funds of the Foreign Office’?” is suggested by some as a fit subject for Parliamentary investigation.

Mussolini, however, seems to have succeeded in quieting all suspicions in the breast of Foreign Minister Ninchitch. They signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1924, followed by a long series of conventions settling all questions between them. The general trend of these conventions was to facilitate Italian economic penetration in Yugoslavia itself. Yugoslavia went so far as to exempt Italians from the lawdividing big estates in Yugoslavia and to allow Italian factories, even on the Dalmatian Coast and along the frontier zone, to bring in workmen from Italy. Most of these conventions were ratified by Belgrade last summer, but those containing tl\e above provisions (■called the Nettuno Conventions) caused such popular outcry that they were postponed to the present session of Parliament.

Conciliation with Italy became the keystone of Dr. Ninchitch’s policy. Apparently he felt confident he could thus divert Italian energies into economic channels of great benefit to his undeveloped country. He thought there was more to gain from this policy than from continuing the intrigues in Albania. Yugoslavia left her protege, Ahmed Bey Zogu, to shift for himself. He shifted secretly toward Italy. Rome did not let the opportunity pass. Dr. Ninchitch awoke one day to read the Italo-Albanian Treaty —and to resign forthwith, admitting that his policy had failed. At one stroke the work of years was .undone. At the same time the Nettuno Conventions were due to come before the Yugoslav Parliament for ratification. Italy had gained such privileges in these conventions —the right to own land even along the frontier zone and in Dalmatia and to man Italian-owned industries in her Dalmatian irridenta with Italian;'workmeu, etc. —that Italy

needed to be especially tactful In order to soothe the natiopalist opposition they aroused in Yugoslavia. To sign tiie Albanian treaty—and to sign it in such secret fashion—was bound to make ratification of the Nettuno Conventions impossible, except bv diplomatic bullying or war. If Mussolini were not nourishing greater projects in Albania, the control of which is far more important to Italy than these concessions in Dalmatia or even possession of Dalmatia itself, and if he did not consider it most essential to lose no time in pushing toward them why, the Herbs are asking, did he not at least delay until Nettuno Contentions were ratified before signing a treaty with Albania which Albania did not need? The Y'ugoslavs want to furnish Italy with no excuse for war. They want above all to gain time—and if that means anything, it means they think that the future can be no worse for them than the presc*nt. The Y'ugoslavs’ best if' not their only hope against immediate danger lies, they are more and more convinced, in England. This belief led Belgrade, shortly after the Albanian Treaty was signed, to announce its willingness to fund its war debt with England at once. That is only a. slight indication of what they are prepared to do to gain British protection against Italy. The eyes which the Yugoslavs turn toward London, however, are none the less anxious, for it is also inconceivable to them that Mussolini should have signed the Albanian Treaty unless he had previously assured himself of the benevolent neutrality of England. The recent British denial of foreknowledge of the Italo-Aibanian' treaty received a warm official wel- | come in Belgrade, but it did not dis- , pel the anxiety felt over England's relations with Italy. I Yugoslavia's surest hope is. of course, her ally, France. France j could undoubtedly bring strong pres- | sure to bear on Italy. The risks which confront Italian oc- | cupation of Albania at best would be I very great. The Albanians alone are a problem, and the Y'ugoslavs are still

less to be ignored, even if they be isolated. England, France, the League of Nations, world opinion and Italy’s basic, weakness—all these make action in Albania full of peril. It seems inconceivable that Mussolini should take such risks this year or in the near future or that a world which undoubtedly wants peace should let the Albanian Treaty develop into a real war menac*