OCEAN STEAMERS FOR WAR PURPOSES.

Samoa Times and South Sea Gazette, Volume 3, Issue 142, 26 June 1880, Page 2

OCEAN STEAMERS FOR WAR PURPOSES.

At''»:nicetiii^wKl-.in > 'the Theatro of tlio Royal. Uniteif Service Institution on March 0, the Marquis of Lansdown presiding, a paper whs rend by Mr. Donald Clime on "Maritime Warfare; tlio adaptation of Ocoau Steamers to War Purposes.' Tlieru was a largo attendance, and a goodly portion of those, present consisted of ladies. Mr. Donald Carrie, after a reference to our relations with foreign Powers, observed that we had to ask ourselves these questions—May our colonies bo attacked ? May our food supplies lie cut oil":' May the enemy land upon our shores ? Having alluded to the possibility of war, he eaid that the sooner our lo:iinioiee became alive to the necessity of

assisting tlio Governmiuit; and tho Government became convinced of the propriety of preconcerted arrangement, tho better for England's position. As to the more special subject of his paper, speaking generally, merchant steamers, if of suitable, (■peril, would lie most useful (Ij if employed as mail packets in time of war; ('2) as offensive cruisers; (•'}) as cruisers on the defensive ; (41 as despatcli vessels attached to a squadron or naval station ; (•">) as transport; and ((>) as gunboats, or store ships. The value of mail steamers in time of war would not lie second to their usefulness in time of peace, Telegraphs would always be liable to destruction either by accident or design, so that during a war the mail steamer would bo a positive necessity, anil if she was a necessity she should bo armed and ready to defend herself, and if required be ready to do more than resist attack. The late war in South Africa had shown the vaiuo of the merchant ship as u transport, nnd the effective service they could render in that capacity. But tho employment of merchant steamers for war could not do awny with the necessity for a full strength in the Navy. There ninst lie, in his opinion, n huge and adequate supply, anil, indeed, n, o.nsidorable increase in the number of our cruising men-of-war. There was much misapprehension in the country as to the force in reserve which could be supplied by tho mercantile marine. There wcr'o not' a liuudrcd ocean steamers in this country really suitable for Admiralty requirements, and fit fo travel over twelve knots an hour; indeed, taking everything into account, thnro were not eighty. Shipowners had been been askod by the Admiralty to furnisli tho drawings of their vcbicls. Thny had given the authorities alt the particulars which were required, and at \yiiitehall ; the full details of evert' suiralile" steamer wnro in possession'of the officials; yet, although the shipowners wore put to considerable expense in preparing,llirir,ve»sels, and though they were assured that the preference would be given ( tn these vessels, there had Mieoii no preference whatever giuen,. ami, link .owners 'had derived' nu practical advantage for having bo .prowured their -.ahjitf. At tills moment, he.mkintaioed, there was no dofimte'prmelpW'Wtfcbrished upon which steamers were selected for Uov«rnuiAiit service. Information, ohtaineil by the authorities ludOo on Hiojiiry itito tho dcHiral'iinty oi" rfficWslty *f budding a largo number of cruising vessels for tho Itoyal Navy. Tho gcuoral conclusion arrived at by thuse coimcctcd with

stated firßknirfuient that, in the event of war—then considered probable—it was intended to arm thirty merchant vessels us armed oniutens. -Nothing was really done. All tho*e inquiries, the information -obtained, tho armaments advanced, : r.nd tho opinions- given, had resulted in no practical issue; and his purpose in ; this paper had'been, aiid was; to press' upon the country the necessity for a | decision, one way or the other, whether anything was to be done. If the authorities I did not carry out some practical plari for making use of the merchant shipping of this country, they would know that thoy hud-afforded much information to foreign Powers as to the maritime resources of this country, in the shape of particulars •of nearly every vessel possessing speed. Wero the foreign Governments, then, to Jhave the choioe of our steam-u-s ? Were they to know all our weak points? "Would the British Admiralty do nothing to carry . out . .th&ir own first, intention*. While'saving^'this hacouM not but pay a tribute to' i ho' zeal, energy, and ability of the officials of the Admiralty charged with'ih»<Spl|ection of information. They had done what 'thoreould, for tho national interest in Ulis Blatter.": Without ■any further reference : to the.'past, Mr. 'Currio proceeded 'to submit what he considered a > practical pUh,. ..whereby :the merchant shipping of j the country might be employed in cases of omergenoy. The scheme he submitted to the 'meeting was this: —Let the Government •select ten, or twenty, or thirty steamers (if they could find that number) capable of steaming over twelve knots an hour from twenty-five to fifty days without stopping. Engage these vessels upon some such. terms as these —a payment monthly, or by the year for their retention ; have it an obligation on the owners tri retain in their employ men connected with tho Royal Naval Reserve. Let the Government keep at certain specified places,'such as Ascension, the Fulkland Islands, Simon's Bay, Hong Kong, Sydney, Halifax, Bermuda, Vancovier's Island, and other stragetical points, a sulficient number of men of the Royal Marina Artillery and Infantry, with guns, fittings, magazines, ammunition, torpedoes, etc.; prepare the necessary means for arming the vessels retained, and which otherwise would he employed in their regular •trades. He took for illustration Simon's Bay; If one or two of tho Cape mail steamers were fixed upon, let their guns bB kept at Simon's Bay ; on board of these vessels place four leading men as gunners, who would assist to train the crew (all; Reserve men) and be ready for emergencies; at Simon's Bay let there bo. a sufficient number of the Royal Marino Artillery, or of the Royal Marine lufanty, properly trained and ready to <<mburk at an hour's notice. The number of cruisers required would absorb all the Royal Marine Aitillory we have for instructional purposes, and also all theRoyal Marine Light Infantrv who may hereafter be instructed in artillery duties. Looking to what Franco can bring into action we had not a m.'in too many—in i'act, we had not a sufficient number of men. for the sudden outbreak of war. I'ix with the owners of the shins that these vessels are to he p.-idy at anv time to he handed over tc the naval authorities at Simon's Bay, there to be fitted and to cruiso otf thu Cape, or off Cape Horn, or towards Australia, or away in China, or wherever required, in the event of wir *nd the appearance of the enemy's cruisers. The cost, would be trifling as a means of maintaining a number of fighting vessels, it would add a splendid fighting power to our naval resources, as far as men are concerned, and on this latter point we should contidcr that upon war breaking nut the Admiralty would have difficulty in manning all the ships of the Royal Navy, or, indeed, oven a large portion of them. If there was one thing more surprising than another to him in relation to a possible war, and the probable closing up of the Suez Canal, it was the absence of a graving dock at Simon's Bay. lie urged that' Government docks should be established for Government account at ever; ono of the impoilant stragetical points of our wide-spread Empire. But beyond question, Simon's Bay, half-way as it was to Australia and tho Bast, should have a naval dockyard and graving dock suited to the repair of the largest men-of-war. At Capo Town the authorities wero building a graving dock; but a ■graving dock would not suit the purpose of tho Royal Navy in the ease of war, and the South African station, as one of .the important sea routes towards South America, as well as towards Australia, India, and tho East, claimed the earliest attention at the bands of the Government, who ought to ask Parliament at once for the necessary funds. ,-Bntwcen Plymouth and Melbourne and Sydney thore was no graving dock in exist once' fqr men-of-war ? What would happen if a naval ■combat should take place'otf the Capo Colony faulting in the.injury of our ironclads or cruisers ? It was useless to think of employing merchant steamers in war unless' wo took tho supply of coals into account. It was admitted that the eoaling stations for our fleets should be fortified. , Mr,,JPoosld Currio concluded fcy furiißsmisMitli belief that whenever *W titm at 4mpsr name the-mereantile nuriiio «f 4»i* *M*»HU-y, judiciously used, W tU» fitU, Ui reload, as it bad the I'ower to It* MftisL tit any claim which tuight be made upon it Admiral Kir W. Hull said that throe years ngo he supported Mr, Donald Cuniu wbuu be introduced iu

that saino hMlnho' so*b}et?or-\v^rcfi present papVi freaked. " T Ou"tha to which ho referred- riiftilSilirtenieessrty of carrying out Mr. Donald CurrieV view's was urged, so as to-piu the country and the Empire in a pfrojuir state of defence. Little or nothing had, however, been done in the matter ever since. The consequence was that the country was, nt tho present moment, from a national point of view, iu almost a perfectly defenceless position. The fact was, too 'much of party spirit was usually iutroduecd when this question camo up for treatment in Parliament. What was wanted was to place before the country the actual state of affairs, and to ask the opinion of' the country respecting it. Tho question bad often-* been asked, Was England prepare*} ft* war ? His opinion was that she was Sot. Efforts had, no doubt, been made from time to tinio to put her in a proper state of preparedness ; but he believed they had been made in tho wroug direction. What was required was a fleet of gunboats stationed round our coasts, not a lot of big ships that cost millions of money and that took yoars to build. Ho believed that if ono-tonth of the monster ironclads had been directed to the construction of good gunboats we should bo in a much bettor state of defence now than we were. Sir Spencer Robinson considered that the meeting and the public were greatly indebted to .Mi-. Donald Currio for the iinpvrtant paper he had just read, and for tho able exposition he bad given, not only of the present state of our naval forces, but of their possible requirements in the future. In the main he concurred iu all tiiat had been advanced by Mr. Currio. Thu subject was, however, so dilfnsc, and, indeed, so enormous that time would not allow of anything like a full discussion as to ils details. All that could be given, theieforo, was either s general concurrence or a very brief criticism—if there should be a.ny criticism—as to some of the leading details. That merchant ships might bo made available for war purposes, and that our armed naval fjrees were not as strong as they needed to be, considering the extent of the British Empire and the interests involved, must be evident to every thoughtful mind. It was not, indeed, pretended that we bad a sufficient niinibei of armed cruisers to protect all our mercantile murine, which might | be said to.be at the present momoi.t I located in every latitude and longitude of the world. It was no doubt of great | importance to see how far the mercantile navy of (he country could bo madn serviceable" to the military navy in cases of emergency, and it was pretty generally admitted that the as-istaneo was needed in every possible way. The point* which Mr. Donald Currio had urged were capable of mnch comment and deserved serious consideration. 'lhe question- of makiug merchant ships available for war purposes was n..t. however, one easy of solution. It could not bo sr> easily dealt with as Mr. Currio seemed to think. It would be. necessary, for iu stance, to bear in mind tho Weight of the guns which it would be requisite to place on board these vessels, thu capability of those vessels to bear such a weight, and ils bearing upon thu vessel's other carrying requirements. At. too same time ho fully agreed that it. would be Well to so fit out merchant soips as to make them capable .if defending thomselves. This point, however, bad to do with the details of the scheme, whi-h e.itlhl not be just then vory fully entered into. 'J'hnt a merchant ship could ever he made capable of successfully combatting a regal war vessel was not very likely. In fitting up merchant vessels for war purposes, great speed was alvolutcly necessary, particularly when we found, as wo did, that every effort was made by pur possible enemies to possess themselves of vessels of superior armament and superior Hpecd. It was ono of tbo3o things impossible to conceive bow tie statesmen of this country, who know that, no matter what might be their desire to preserve peace, .war might be forced upon them at any time, and who must know that the efficiency of our navy depoudsd upon its proper supply of coal in different regions visited by our vessels—it was impossible for him to conceivo how they could, knowing all this, have neglected to supply coal depots whtre they wore required, and allowed those depots that bad been provided to remain unprotected. This was a mystery ho could not acoount for. lie agreed with ovefything Mr. Currio had Baid on this point. The whole question was of great importance, and he hoped the views laid before the meeting by Mr. Currio would receive that public attention which they deserved. Captain J. C. Colomb, R.M.A., looked upon the question as tho most important mid serious a mooting of English gentlomon could ho called upou to consider. Tho expenses of the Admiralty had boon so, out down that it was -impossible for tho work of the Department to bo carried out as efficiently us it Bhould bo. In dealing with this question thoy should boar in mind that merchant ships and those who manned them wero open to the highest bidder iu any unprovided for emergency, and that it would be woll to have their interests allied to somo oxtont with thoito of tho Royal Navy. As for tho protection of our colonics and stations abroad a Commission wns now making -an inquiry; and bo hoped that it would 00 fully into thu matter. Constituted as the navy won at present, he feared vory much that if tho merchant vessels were. as much drawn upon as an auxiliary as ho foarod thoy would bo, very fsv vcmols would lie loit to cany on our commercial transactions. Doau Swift said otto time

Iftat "the-tnari-Wfio ofrcofn 1 fa. _wh(ire..only. one. to grow deserved batter of, hw country 1 than jj whoij_jaeo()f ; 'pali{iciaus and statesmen'put together. \f hen Deafi 'that we grow our own food,and wo could, go and buy hj in our own market'and' take it home. Now'we had' to depend for our food on the traffic of the.sea and ! , the ocean,, and the man who built twi magni|lciml, steamers where only one wus built before deserved well of his cauutry. On the motion of Captain Bedford Pirn, ! M.P.,thc debate was adjourned till March' j 11, when the discussion was again resumed 1 Mr. Donald Currie, previous to the meetlug separating, explained that he did not j-mean, us Sir Spencer Robinson seemed to .think, that merchant ships should carry ,'for any length of timu heavy guns. All : he meant was that 'they should be so ; prepared that they could' ship them at | any moment, and that these guu3 should I be kept in readiness at'certain foreign j stations.—European Mail.