ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND AFGHANISTAN.

Samoa Times and South Sea Gazette, Volume 2, Issue 75, 8 March 1879, Page 3

ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND AFGHANISTAN.

•■ The following is an extract from a letter addressed to tho London Times, by ..Sir James Stephen:— I should be very sorry to join in all ■that is said in the Press about Russia. I -do not think that it is either diguitied or Jnst to £nd fault with others for looking after their own intersts without regarding ours. If General Kaufniann sees his way to taking up a positor and so making an alliance which will give him 1 lie upper hand over as, I do not see why ho should Abstain from doing so ; but I <ln see many cogent reasons why, if wo can, we should defeat his plans. The more the matter is considered tho more distinctly will it, I think, appear that the real question is this ;—lnasmuch as England and Russia must meet in Central Asia, where is the frontier between them to be drawn? and how can we take security for its being so drawn that Russia shall not have the means of invading us at pleasure Y Our past experience, both Russian and English, appeal's to me to prove to demonstration that barbarism and civilisation cannot bo coterminous permanently. England, Russia, and China will, sooner or later, either form part of the dominions of England or Russia or else become practically dependent and subordinate. Without the smallest feeling of hostility or ill-will to Russia, I think tho English people ought to say, quite quietly, but also with unmistakable firmness, wo do not mean to lie at the mercy of our neighbours. We have already more territory and widor responsibilities than we want. We should bo sorry indeed to add to either, but we intend to retain our hold upon India, and to take, if necessary, by force of arms, whatever may be essential to the maintenance of our power there. If a defensible frontier k required, and can and ought to be obtained, it is hardly likely that we shall hare a better opportunity hereafter of getting such a fron-

tier than we have at preseut. If everything now falls back into the drifting position in which it has been for a series of years, Russia and Afghanistan will at once be in alliance, and the difficulty of any advance on our part will increase by every year that passes. I do not doubt that whenever the enterprise of securing the frontier is undertaken, it will involve a very serious effort; but I do not seo why we should exjicet to be stronger hereafter than we are now, and we are not now under any speeiul difficulties. Ido nut think that, as matters stand, the Russians will interfere. They will do all they can to frighten us; they will give any amount of sympathy, ami, perhaps, underhand, sohie nrrna, soma money, and a certain number of officers to the Afghan*; but it seems to me most unlikely that just at this moment they will i;o to war with England upon such a quarrel, unless, indeed, the Turkestan authorities manage to commit the Emperor to the step. As for the special threats of the Russians, they do not impress me very much. Their papers seem to dwell principally upon the native princess and their armies; the population " eager to throw off the British yoke ;" and the disaffection of the nativo troops. These seem to me to be ignorant, conventional commonplaces. If British power were upset, no native prince in India would be suru of anything whatever, except that he would be plunged into a bottomless whirlpool of war and confusiou, whereas under British rule his position is perfectly secure though it may not bo absolutely satisfactory. If any native prince tried to upset British power and failed, he would certainly be dethroned, and would hi all probability be hanged. Every native prince in India knows all this perfectly well. These are plain and strong reasons for fidelity. As to the army, it is not during war that mercenary troops are untrustworthy. They are faithful enough in the face of the enemy. An enormous number of native levies, of one sort or another, were raised during the Mutiny, and the mutineers had no more relentless enemies than men of their own colour. As to the mass of the population, my belief is that if a Russian army crossed the Indus tomorrow, the first and last thought of the bulk of the people would be to hide their valuables safely and to wait to obey the winning side. In one word, 1 urn far from wishing to see the English take up a position of hostility to the Russians. I believe that we are destined to bo neighbours; but perfect independence is the Condition upon which alone friendship and cordial good offices are possible and if we meet upon terms which them great military advantages over us, we shall not be independent.