THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1877.

Samoa Times and South Sea Gazette, Issue 6, 10 November 1877, Page 4

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1877.

(From "Bluckw 1-> Magazine Continui J i'r mi oui I As an attempt will presently bo made '■■ calculate the time which would Lrequired for a mobilization, it is essentia! to complete, as far as can bo foreseen, the list of tli' l apparent eau >f possible delay, so as to be able o allow approximately for their otieet It is. for this ivi>on neeossaiy to ii<Ul 11 the ea'alogue of difficulties already enumerated, the observation that the rapidity of the first stage of inobilizat'oti may s inewli.it depend on the degveo of organization 'A the regional and district magazines of stores. Th ■ organization of those magazines is determined by Articles o and 4 of the law of 2 kh July, 1873 : d« :entralization is its essential principle ; not only must each region suffice for its own n-e's anl borrow nothing from its ueighb ii's, but each subdivision of each region is to be equally complete. Each subdivision corresp mds to a regiment of

infantry, and possesses two m i a/.ines. Those iiiag.iz'nes are now ready everywhere. Hut several of the " c irps d'aniuio " have no regional stores yet, and are still dependent for their supplies on t' e great central magazines. Thus, the 2nd, 3rd, and sth corps draw their equipment from Paris; the 9th from N'antes; the 12th from Bordeaux; and th. I:sth from Lyons. All this is of course provisional, but how much longer is the provisional to last .- France will not be really ready until it bos disappeared for good. It must, however, be acknowledged that according to the cxperienc supplied by the partial calling out of the reserves during the last two years, these provisional arrangements have worked fairly well. The men <>n thus., two occasions wer di'es ed with sufficient rapidity i from five to six hours were required to e |uip the reservists of each company, and the only serious defect revealed was that the clothes in store were not sufficiently varied in size to ti: all the new-cornel's, some of whom, consequently, could not be put iii uniform at all. It is probable that the minister of war has taken measures to remedy this, for the

militan newspaper took up the question energetically at the time. Another fault which si ill remains mim,.. ] i. t ;. ■ m-! ivy . f the otfioiuU ..f tiie ministry of war to .I< lay thing's I i! the hist moment, instead of doiim us i much as ptw.sil.le beforehand. The nllicn-s. for instance, have not yet gut their " cantines " ready, either for luggage or for food. On this particular point the arrangements are positively less forward than they were in IS70"; For then each officer had his "cantines de eampagne" at his own disposal, whereas now they have all been collected into store, and kept there empty. The tilling Litem at the last moment will he a source of delay and difficulty, and of much personal a inoyanc •. As a mobilization can only he successfully performed on condition that every detail of it has been thoughtfully worked out beforehand, it is quite worth while to allude even to such seeming trifles as these. The minister of war does really seem, however, to he giving his attention to small questions ol this kind. For instance, it has just been ordered ih.it, in the event of a mobilization, each " vivaiidiero" .shall receive a horse for hoi- cart, and that all carts shall he of the same model. It wa.s state'd in a previous article that, during a small private trial of mobilization made some time ago, three .lays had been absorbed by the registra- j tioii of the equipments supplied to two companies. It was obligatory, according | to the rules then in force, to write down in three separate hooks, for each wan, the milliner of every article supplied to him—of his pouch, hi.-, waist-belt, knapsack, eartri. Ige-boXj sword-strap, audi gun-strap. Each number was composed, on an average, of six figures, so t' at each I man required IDS figures, or 16,200

figures for the one hundred and fifty reservists of a company. The ministry has at last given its attention to this absurd abuso of red tape. Simplifications have beeu introduced into the system of registration, and the time required for the work has been reduced one-half. Lei us now suppose that all the men hove passed through successive stages, from their homes to their company. The mobilization, properly so called, is terminated. Concentration is about to begin. The time has come to ask what, is the Strength of the army. How many men has the mobilization produced '. As military service, in various degrees, for successive terms of years, has become a universal obligation in Franco, it follows theoretically that all the younp men between the ages of 20 and zo ought to bO found in tho active army; that all those from 2ti to 29 should form part of tho reserve ; and thai, all the m -i between :i9 «nd n> ought to be found in the territorial ermj and its reserve. But fact, in this case, does not correspond with theory. In reality, not more than about half the available men of each year appear in the ranks of the active army. i» order to explain completely the causes of this great difference let, us'take the Idet-publithod report of an annual eonseriptlon, Ji refers t" the continent of thi yew i it .'i

I:,. i ■! ■! nuuib r "i )"t n.u' in. it nvailab e in that v was ... 283.71 - ' ff :: 29,797 were physically unfit 12,208 w< re disperse I during peace, for family and other reasons. 19,308 v.. r ■ postponed. 20,770 were already in the army as volunteers. 4,295 were conditionally rele i- ■ I, as profi—i >, teachers, etc I 121,040 121,<i4C ' There remained, therefore, for service 102,122 These men were dealt with as follows : j they were divided (according to the I numbers they had drawn) into two ' unc iual parts, called the first and second portions of the contingent. The first j portion was incorporated in the regiments i for five yells ; the second— from motives of economy, and for want of barrack-1 room—was called uponly for six months.* : and was then sent home on leave. The respective numbers of these portions

were as follows: Ist portion, for combatant services [including 7040 marines), 9."i,7csS Do., for auxiliary services (Intendancc, stores, etc.), ... 21,259 2nd portion, for combatant scr- . vices 45,0751 Total 1G2.122 ■ Furthermore, 8,345 men who had been postponed from preceding years were called up in !>.70; 5,142 of th m were plaeed in the iirst portion of the con- ' tingent, and 3,20;5 in the second portion, 1 so carrying the exact numbers of the year to the followin" totals : ■ Ist portion: combatants, ... 100,930 i Do., auxiliary services, ... 21,259 2nd portion: combatants, ... 48,278 j i 170,4071 ; 1: happened that the numbers of 1575 ' i were rather below the average; 'out. talc- i I ing tlu'in as a minimum, tiny indicate ' i that the combatant part of the French! , army, deducting the seven thousand . I marines, recruited in peace time at the ,! rate of 93,000 men pi r annum, all of j whom are supposed to remain for five] ; years under the colors. But in con-1 .sequence of the delay of about six!

months winch takes place each year in calling up the conscripts, and of the fact that men are Imhituallv discharged from their regiments si:< months before the - •rvh.-u is practically ivdu 1 to f.-uri years ; s . t'.ial ill peace time tile army is composed of four times 1)3,000 men—that' is to say. 372,000 men, "plus" 45,000 men for one year's second portion of the contingent, and " plus," also, 25,000 men already in the ranks as volunteers. The general total of combatants, in time of peace, is therefore, -142,000 men ; or, nd win., f::r death;., asout 42:000. N deduction is, however, made here for men away on leave, who usually represent a considerable number. And to this again must be added the " portion permanonte," which includes such members of the army as are independent of the annual contingent; that is to say, the officers, the "gendarmerie," the foreign troops in Algeria, the re-engaged men, bandsmen, and certain special workmen. Tlii.-, portion amounts, altogether, to 83,000 men, so | carrying the final total to 510.000. | The reserve of the active army inI chides : 1. F.ur classes of the 2nd portion of the contingent, of ..O.DOO men each on an average 200,000 2. Four classes of the reserve men from 20 to -it, at 150,000 each 000,000 , '■). Four classes of the men dispersed during peace, at 40,000 each. 160,000 Total, 960,000 | But, allowing for mortality and other causes, this total cannot be counted to

. produce more than 920,000 men. Add- . ing thereto the 510,000 men under the . colors, tho general total available for the active army (not including the territorial , corps) when all the reserves are called , up, is 1,480,000 men. It may, however, j be supposed that this total, though theoretically exact, would not he altogether realized in practice, and that 1 the effective number would not exceed • 1,300,000. * Here, however, we meet with a difficulty. The French army is now 'I composed of nineteen "corps d'nrmde," l and of a certain number of unattached brigades, regiments, and battalions, consisting especially of cavalry and foot- ■ chasseurs. The precise war-footing of a ' " corps d'armeo " is not yet determined by any special law ; but as regard • ii '! iiiiun element—the infantry—no doubt. ' i is possible, for everybody knows that tho ; companies .are to bo composed of two 1 hundred and fifty men each. It is only 'i as regards the cavalry, .artillery, and 'I train that any rcil uncertainty exists, 1 . and for those special arms the margin ef possible error is limited. We may conI sequently adopt with tolerable confidence 1 the following approximate computation 'of the lighting force of a French i" corps d'aruu e ' I * Henceforth, the laiiiitiuun duration "t' •erviiii will br u jmir in-t. ml ..t nix mouth*. i

It will contain ' s !■ gimt•:;'- ■■< infantry, of three Imitations each" the ■,' kvi■ t in I ruwrw . -t battalions of 1000 men 24,000 1 battalionof fo. t-i bass mi- ... I not ut= ■ ■:' i .•,•..dry. say ... I.nor - regiments of artillery, 23 batteries, at say 250 men each " 5.751 1 battalion of engineers, say... 1,201 Artillery train. :) companies, say " "31 Train. :l c panics, say ... IiOO Total 34.000 Say 35,000. .->,, that mi this showing, the 10 ■■ coqis d'armce " at their I full war strength, would I absorb ... GG5.000 To which must lie added the j following imops.notinclnded in the " corps d'armce : 32 regiments of cavalry, at I 800 sabres " ... 25,000 ;ll battalions of foot-chasseurs, 11.000 157 l>attcriesofgarrisonartillery, 1 1,250 I 114 -Hli battalions of the line, ■ 144,000

Depots of the 1 14 line regiments, at 2 companies each, 72,00!) Depots oi t!:,- foot-ehasseurs,... 7,500 Depots of artillery, 70 batteries. 10,000 Depots of eavalry,7o squadrons, 14,000 Depots of engineers, train, etc., 0,000 Railway and telegraph services, artificers, and sundries. ... 5,000 Pontoon-train, 28companies,... 7.000 General total of the active army and depots, ... 900,350 It results, therefore, from these fi;:mvs, Coat although 1,:JOO,000 men would be available in the event of a mobilization. only 000,000 of them could lie utilized in the ranks in the lirst instance. The other 310,000 would remain '• en disponibilite" at the depots, to fill up gaps as they arose. An additional force of 25,000 excellent soldiers would be supplied by the coast and forest guards, all of whom have now received a military organization. As regards mere numbers, therefore, the result is clear: France has positively more men than she ran use. Measured by quantity alone, a mobilization would produce ten") lunch. But quantity and quality are not identical. The new army laws have not been in force long enough to have made | all Frenchmen into capable soldiers;!

nuil uul nt' tin' I.'iOO.GOO men who form ! I t!iu mubi!*zab|i. total, ii isi-crtnin thai at tlii-s in..i.i. :i(. not more than i*"> 0,000 hit | really educated. Of the r.iiitiin. Ki- it ; ' .:■-' he i '•'i.ii.'-d l! "t ill t riOOlino In -• had six months' ilnliiii- wh '..■' Ua 1,000 haw n.'wr served :\t ail. Still,! as all tin.' men of t!ii' twn latter categories i ! would iif emirs,. !„• placed, in thi> fust j ! li-l-.i.: I' >.■, -1! i ; . 11 ■"I . 1, [■: ;,.;i'_; j ; [lossil.li. tliat ill y Would Imvo time to j Irani their Imsim -s, partiallv, nt least. : j before they wi.lT sent mil to tight, | < .■• -i v| .>!.'• \ ,iia ; iVi'i s: \ i t only that quantity is abundant, hut also that qualitv is sufficient. And now wo roach the second par; of the iiioliilizm ion —the concentration.; On this point wo are altogether in the dark; for it is impossible to foresee the political or strategic conditions under which a war-mobilization might have to he effected. The minister of war himself could not speak with any certainty on the question, especially as. in the case of a defensive campaign (and that is the 1 sole theory admissible in the present ease), the defender can initiate nothing and must necessarily adapt his owii movements to those of the invuder. Ii will, however, surprise nobody to Irani that the French Staff Oflicc has at last applied the Prussian system of drawing l up a plan of action at the commencement of eai Ii year— an " academical " project, as the Germans call it. An i attack is supposed; its possible conditions are conjectured and Weighed,and,according to the then situation of the French army and to the available information of the 'state of the othei side, a scheme of resistance is prepared. An imaginary mobilization is composed on paper; the ■ probable points of concentration are indicated ; the " corps d'annee " are grouped up into fighting armies; their : commanders are selected ; everything is i prepared. It is scarcely necessary to : add, that the details of all this arc 'kept 1 profoundly secret; but the fact that it is , done is known, and that fact supplies a i striking proof of the progress which has i been effected. As regards thu exact nature of the col ntration, therefore, nothing whatevi r can be said. But as regards the time it would occupy, we are able to make reasonable guesses. Could both . mobilization and concentration bo completed in as it was by the Germans in in lifteen davs, as it is believed that they could do'now? , Perhaps not. It is prudent, to admit at I once—but without attempting to be , I precise.—that France would 1* slower .than Germany. Vet notwithstanding , I the possible and even very probable , causes of delay which have been set I forth here, there is no just reason for |supposing Una the difference would be , -iisidi ruble Ii could ! irdly nxrecd .three or four days. Tin- opinion is | based upon a calculation which ran only 1 1« verified In 1870, according to the official reports, the order of biiizatioii ' WHS sent nut .Hi tin lltll.blh ; it \y;|, calculated that the arrival of ill. mm nl ' ! their regiment* would be tcriiiiimU'il mi the :il-i nol iucludinc tin ,■ ucetitrci tioii i" 1 " "corps il'm n, , ;i .n,i, whii b won to U effected ift -i war U

• 1.. i j.;:.- til- infantry n - rvi»ts in the saim regions ;.- ti.'ii '< -'i'" n'- a notice issued on tlie I Hh could or.br the r, . rvUls to ' ■ ' their ■: ; ots on the I 'veiling of the 17th. Tie- IMh would bo iu -, i in equipping tie in. They could I irt tin same uighl for theii regiments which in most rases would not he v«r\ far off';, and on the morning .1" the 10th •ach company r- lid I II its .. : • looting. Counting, however, nunthei ' fortv-i ight hours, t.. comjiensate for the ' |>oss'iblo delays which have been : , enumerated, it" follows that it is now possible t" .1" in seven days the saim ili.it 1....1; seventeen days in 1870. i It ; true that, as regards the sjioeial , anus. whose reservists Would have greater distances to travel, the time might be a little longer; but, allowing largely for that contingency, there ! -, rins to l*» no fair ground for doubting that the mobilization properly so called) could 1« finished in a time which could ! scarcely exceed twelve days in all. The concentration of the regiments into brigades, divisions, and " corps . d'armee," and of the 'corps d'armes" into armies, could probably be effected in ten days more, for even-thing is ready. ' i> ,'.,..,• ii ..i- ... i..." ',.,.„> ....V..,.

It may therefore be assorted -so far, at least, as apparent probabilities can iruide us—that the entire process might be completed in n time which would range between eighteen and twenty-two And even if Franco were a little longer over it than Germany would be, no perceptible disadvantage to her could 1 result from the delay ; for, as it is morally certain (as will be shown presently) that Frame "cannot" attack Germany, and that, if another war takes place, the I attack must be made by Germany, it ■follows that the invader'must have to travel a greater distance to the fighting ground than the defender would have to cover, and would therefore lose in distance what he might gain in time. 1 Consequently, as regards speed, the two sides would probably find themselves on . a footing of virtual equality. Well, we will now suppose the concentration to be c pleted, comfortably to tin l exigencies of the situation as it mav present itself at the time. The troops j have formed up into thr r four fighting armies, and have drafted off' the I frame-works of the garrisons of the great j intrenched, cam]'-. ' and of the forces I destined to guard Paris and Lyons. In estimating that six -corps' d'arme'e" [would 1" required for these latter j iirj ■• s, and that the other elements of

re.-erves and the territorial army! we shall ii .[. probably, be Very wide of the ' truth ; if so. thirteen "corps d'armi'o." j •.at i.f the total ■l' iiim t ■ ■!! the nim- ! ': ■:.-:■ having ~f r ~,-, . 1,,.,.,, !r...flit i |o\vr fn.iu Algeria, where it is habitual*v j stationed';, would be disposable for I action in tie- field. !t has been shown ! j that each " corps d'annee " would I ; number about 5.i.000 men, so that on : ; tiii-. calculation the army on the frontier; would am.. nut to 4.*i.*i,00 men — a fie-iov | I which would most certainly he amply I .sufficient to begin with, it would be .barked lip by the rest of the 1.H00.000 men of the active army—that is to saw j ; by 21,000 in the intrenched ramp,, by an nneoncelitrnted second line of oio.OOO, and bv nn umuiiized depot reserve of . .''lo,ooo more. And it must be borne in mind, that if instead of leaving the 144 fourth battalions iinconcentrated. they were at once developed into regiments, a large part of the unincorporated reservists Midd he nim-.: ..in >\ firow.i m o tl'.eni. and a second series'of ( iplcto armies, amounting, with cavalry and artillery, to at least 330.000 men, could be" not together. Plenty of non-commissioned officers could be found amongst the one- ; year volunteers who have rejoined. Forty-live thousand of those young 1 gentlemen have now passed through the army; and though the institution which has produced them is most objectionable, and is on the point of being ahandoncd. they could, at all events, serve a useful • purpose in this case. The front army ■ would of course require part of them to keep up its supply of "sous-ofliciers," , but eight or ten thousand of them could . easily be spared to start the extra companies suggested here. This second scries ■ of armies could he established either by grouping two fourth battalions to form a i new regiment, or by converting each . fourth battalion, with the addition of the two depot companies, into a separate regiment. In either ease the unutilized reservists of the original regiment would be at once incorporated into the new regiment thus formed. This general scheme of action would fit in equally with either of the hypotheses of victory or defeat, provided always that the garrisons of the intrenched camps were constituted at the very commencement of the concentration, nnd not at the moment of a disaster. The troops which occupy them would have lighting . to do, for the great space covered by the camps, especially by the fortification's round Paris, would render investment ] vr,y difficult, if not, indeed, impossible, i and would in all probability oblige the ' Germans tc try to storm them. For the ' same reason, sorties on a large scale ' against, extended circles of attack might c iifldently bo looked for, It is there- " for., of extreme importance thai the ' defence of these positions should be * organized at the very origin of the I campaign, and that it should be intrusted I to thoroughly solid troops. (to hi; rn.NTIMMin.)