THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1877.

Samoa Times and South Sea Gazette, Issue 5, 3 November 1877, Page 4

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1877.

(From "Blackwood's Magazine.")

Paris, March, 1877. It seems to be so distinctly to the interest of France that knowledge of the realities of her military position should not be limited to special students—it appears to be so self-evident that she can but gain by the formation throughout the world at large of correct opinions as to her strengths and her weaknesses—that her friends may justly feel that they are forwarding her cause by openly scrutinizing her situation. That situation, as it now is, presents certain facts and certain probabilities which it will aid her to indicate distinctly. That situation, of course, may change ; new circumstances may arise; but in its actual form it points to two unmistakable conclusions: the first, that France cannot attack

Germany; the second, that, if invaded, she can noir, most certainly defend herseli. In oilier words, the present evidence goes to show that the maintenance of peace between the two countries depends on the will of Germany alone; that it cannot bo endangered by France; but that) all the same, Germany will have real hard work before her if she tries to conquer France again. To set forth these probabilities, to point out these presumptions, cannot fail to render a service both to France and to the general cause of peace. With such an object in view, it is certainly permissible to carry further our investigation of the state of the French army.

Signal progress has been made since 3875; more vigor has been thrown into the management; in many directions energy has been substituted for routine; force has gone on steadily accumulating; and, though defects of system and of management are still terribly numerous, though a large variety of points are still 1 open to just criticism, the organization is so advanced, the general improvement is so real, that it may now be said, at last, that France has indisputably an army.

The causes of this amelioration are distinctly evident. Abundance of money is the foremost of them all; France has been able to pay for what she needed. The steady, zealous action of the regimental officers is, as manifestly, the second source of strength. And next may beclassed, successively, the influences of opinion, of time, of experience, and of accumulated labor.

The war minister has been changed. General Berthaut has replaced General de Cissey. The new-comer is a man of undeniable ability and of much scientific knowledge. His book " Des Marches et des Combats " is, perhaps, though rather too condensed, the cleverest composition which has been written hy a French officer shice the war. He is excessively laborious. But his great qualities are mixed up with little ones : he is constitutionally afraid of trusting anybody, and tries, therefore, to do everything himself; as a necessary consequence he gets into arrears with his work, and he is of course cordially disliked by his' " bureaux.' Still, in the utter dearth of genius which so strangely distinguishes the present generation of Frenchmen, General Berthaut may be regarded as a valuable functionary.

He is struggling honestly to root out faults and to suppress abuses; he is righting conscientiously not only against disorder, but also against—what is almost as bad—too much order. With time he may succeed; but he has still a tremendous deal to do. Many of the gravest of the old deficiencies remain unremedied. The Intendance, for instance, is still in the same satisfactory position as before. A law has been brought forward about it, but though that law has passed the Senate it has not yet been discussed in the Chamber. The Intendance is still the marrowless institution which we sawhobbling through its work in IS7O ; it still fondly clings to its immemorial feebleness and to its hereditary defects. Even at the last autumn manoeuvres, where every movement was exactly known beforehand, it seems to have felt that it would be a disgrace to it to do its work properly ; so, to keep up its traditions, the troops were left occasionally without food. Whether the proposed new law will change all this remains to be seen. Its principle is, that the Intendance shall be deprived of independent «etion, and that it shall work •exclusively and entirely under the orders of the general commanding. It there-

fore introduces unity into the army, and destroys the duality of powers which has thus far existed. With generals who are really generals this change would indisputably lie a progress; but it may most legitimately be doubted whether'acutal French commanders, taken as a whole, and excluding -certain brilliant exceptions, will be able to -direct the feeding of their soldiers any better than they direct their movements. The system is a wise •one ; but where are the men who are to apply it ? It is consoling to be able to turn one's eyes elsewhere, and to recognise that, in certain other directions, the march ahead Jias been prodigious. The system of tactics bus bocn entirely changed ; and in no army in the world is the substitution of open order for close formations likely to produce Iwtter results. The new " regfement des manoeuvres " is considered to be tho best in Europe. It is admirably fitted to the temperament of the French soldier, and will enable him to exorcise his personal qualities. If that " rogloment" had been in force on the 14th and Kith of August 1870, it is not impossible- that the battles of Horny and of IMzonvillo would have been victories for Franco. The " luatcYicl "

is, at last, almost entirely reconstructed the fortresses and the intrenched camp: which havo been established to dafau the open air frontier are nearly finishes —some of them, indie 1, are already armed, stored, and victualled for a liege the more essential of the new forts rount Paris are terminated, armed, and ever garrisoned. To do all this, one hundrec and sixty millions sterling have ben lai'i out upon the army in the five years between 1872 and 1876; ninety millions therefore have gone in ordinary annual expenditure, and seventy millions foi special outlay on " materiel " and defences. The result is, that France has now reached a point at which she can at last begin, if necessary, to use the instrument she has created.

What would happen if she needed it ? How would she manage a mobilization of her forces ? On previous occasions we havo examined principles of direction and systems of organization ; in 1875 we looked into actual details and immediate elements ; this time, instead of apivciat-

ing the present, it will be more useful to gaze curiously at the future, and to try to estimate what a mobilization would produce. Mobilization alone would give the precise measure of the work done /since 1871; it alone would indicate the ultimate realizable value of that work ; it alone would supply a thorough, searching test of the military institutions of the country ; it alone would furnish reliable evidence of the practical adequacy of the

preparations made. How would it be carried through? Would everything break down as in 1870 ? Would the result of the last war be reproduced under the present system ? Would the helpless disorder of seven years ago be renewed all over again ?' Or has France at last developed not only an army, but also an organization which would enable her, in

spite of the weak points of her system to get that army rapidly, smoothly, anc steadily into the field > In seeking a reply to these questions, it is of course essential to commence by examining the rules which determine the conditions ' under which a mobilization would now be conducted. Those rules are detailed in the third section of the law of 24th July, 1873, on the general organization of the army, supplemented by the additional laws of 19th March, and 18th November 1875. It is prescribed in those laws that the French army may be mobilized henceforth either by a direct written order addressed to each individual member of the reserves and delivered to him in person by the " gendarmerie," or that it may be called out " en masse " by the far simpler" and more expeditious process of " publication par voie d'affiches sur la voie publique, sans attendre la notification individuelle."

By this latter plan (which is entirely new) every man is liable to serve, ; whether in the active or territorial army, may be directed to start off to the depot of his regiment without waiting for an individual summons; a simple postingbill stuck up in his village will fix the day on which he is to join. This measure is so practical and so intelligent, that of course the Germans have just copied it from France. It cannot, indeed, be doubted that it will be successively

adopted throughout Europe, and that it will be the only plan employed in all future mobilizations; for it implies a gain of two clays in the joining of the reservists, and consequently in the concentration of troops. And, with war conducted as it is now, two days may mean a victory. Unfortunately, however, the laws which set forth the duties of reservists are not all easy to be understood ; they ought to be as clear as words can make them, but the latest and most important of them is, on the contrary, the least

comprehensible of all the new military enactments. All the other laws, without exception, are to be carried into execution by some one in authority who can expound them to the soldiers under him ; but the law of November, 1875, relating to the functions of reservists, which is to be carried out, for a large part, by the reservists themselves, is

couched in a language which must render it hopelessly unintelligible to laborers and peasants. And yet those laborers and peasants are supposed to be ready to obey it scrupulously, without any aid from anybody. It is true that extracts from this law are printed in the register-book which each reservist has in his possession; but what is the use of that if he cannot comprehend the extracts ? Why, the mere title of the law I is enough to frighten the best-intentioned soldiers. It bears the scarcely credible

heading of " Loi ayant pour objet do coordonncr les lois du 27 Juillct 1872 24 Juillet 1873, 12, IS) Mara et 0 - Noycmbre 1875, avec le code de justice militairo." And yet all this means in reality " Law defining the duties of the reservists of the French army " I There is no space here to point out all tho defects of this law, but a couple of examples of them may be given at hazard. Ono is, that tho two totally distinct words," domicile "and " residence," are employed in it perpetually, without any definition of the meaning "of cither of them. The other is, that it establishes two sorts of military justice—one for the active army, and ono for the territorial corps. If a fortress is surrendered by a regultt/ officer, he is liable to be shot; but if its capitulation is signed by a territorial commander, lie can only lie imprisoned. Crime in one case becomas misdemeanor in tho other. Furthermore, while the code of military justice adopts the universal principle of never admitting extenuating circumstances fur military offences, this law of 187-5 conMdll Urea in certain cases. All this is in absolute contradiction to the law of

| gtncrai organization, which declares (_ Art. i 35) that "the territorial annv, when I mobfliied, is governed by the faws and regulations which wouhi apply to the active army." This law must l>o made over again. It must bo brought into harmony with the j principles and the practices of the other pre-existing army laws ; and what is almost more urgent still, it must be made eoiupreheasiblo to uneducated intelligences ; it must indicate with cxplieitness and lucidity the duties which it imposes f And when the law shall have been redrafted—when it shall be rendered

absolutely clear—it must be brought to the distinct knowledge of those who may have to execute it. On this point the military authorities have at their disposal a means of action of extreme simplicity, and of indisputable efficacy. Why do they not use the civil institutions for th« purpose ? In France, as elsewhere, men occupy themselves more willingly about laws which assign rights to thorn than about

those, which impose duties on theiu. Every Frenchman knows, understands; and applies in his own person, the requirements of the electoral law. Whs then, should not that law and tt_ mobilization law be made identical, so far as their prescriptions fit together, in all that concerns domicile and residence, for instance ? Why not teach military duties by the very document which confers civil

rights 1. The municipal law, also, might be utilized for the same end; for the mayors have now to play a part in the matter, and are destined to act as agents of the state in certain details of mobilization. Yet when that interminable discussion about municipalities took place in the Chamber, not one single word was said on this point—not one line was introduced into the law with the object of drawing the attention of the majors to the fact that new duties devolve upon them in consequence of the new military organization of the country. It cannot be doubted that, under such defective conditions as these, with everything new, undeveloped, and unpractised, there would be many hitches and some disorder in a mobilization.

And now that we have got a rough idea of the conditions and the imperfections of the law, let us go on to the practical working out of the process itself. The walls are covered all over France with placards calling up the men; the mayors and the other civil authorities are spreading in their villages the news of the order of mobilization; the " gendarmerie " and the " employe's" of the military offices of each "district (the

" bureaux do recruternent ") are looking after men to the best of their power, and are serving notices and " feuillts de route " on all the laggards they can find. The men get ready as fast as they can ; short time is allowed to them ; both the placards and the "feuilles de route" specify the day on which they are to reach their depot. How are they to travel to it ? singly or in groups ? But plans have been tried during the partial calling-up of the reserves for the autumn manoeuvres in 1875 and 1870. For short

distances the men have been grouped ; for long distances they have generally been allowed to go singly. Grouping necessitates a muster at the office of one of the districts into which France is now divided,* and this means loss of time; but it produces order, and it facilitates the payment of travelling expenses to the men, an operation which becomes extremely difficult when they travel separately. The question varies in importance for the different branches of the service. Infantry reservists have rarely to migrate very far to join, for (with the exception mentioned hereafter of the men from Paris and Lyons) they

almost always belong to regiments which are quartered in their own immediate neighbourhood. But for reservists of the special arms, the case is often different; it has been found impossible to attach them all to regiments in their districts, and they (as Well as the men on leave of absence from the infantry) may have to cross half France to reach their corps. For such of them as have money no real difficulty would however, arise from this ; but the greater part of them would probably be either unable or unwilling to advance their railway fare, and in all such cases time would be lost by going to the district office for money, or for one of the railway passes which the military authorities are now empowered by the minister to issue. But the sole object of this new plan of mobilization by proclamation is to obtain speed and to economize not only days but hours. Why, then, should it not be enacted that travelling expenees may ho advanced to mobilized soldiers (as in Germany) by the municipal treasurers or by the local taxreceivers ? It is true that this could only be done on the production of a " feuillc de route " specifying the sum receivable by each man, and that waiting for the " feuillc " might involve a delay.of a day or two ; but, after all, that delay would not arise in every ease, and furthermore, it would only represent the time necessary for the delivery at the " feuillc " by the " gendarmerie, ami not the additional time required fora journey to the district office to fetch money. By this plan each man would find at once, even in the smallest cantons, a resident local functionary prepared to pay him. Let ire, however, suppose that all these difficulties have been surmounted, and let us now follow the men to the depots of their regiments. Their arms, uniforms,

4ud equipment.-- aN le.td> tJI Item there ; the men receive them, put them on, and then wait until the number of each article is in.scril.ed in the books. The Crowding is tremendous ; the men are all on each other's backs, and in each other's way. According to the " loi des cadres," the depot consists of two companies— that is to say, in peace time I of about one hundred and fifty men ; but the mobilization of the whole regiment brings in more than twenty-five hundred men on the same day I W here arc they to be put ?—where" are they even to stand ? There is another danger here, and it will be well to look to it in time.

Each of the sixteen companies of the regiment sends a " cadre de contluite " to" the depot to fetch the men which belong to it. Each " cadre "is composed of one officer and a few non-com-missioned officers ami steady privates. Directly each group is complete, the men are marched away to the company. But where is the company ! In certain cases the depot is quartered with the service companies ; but as a rule it is

detached from them, and may be even at I some distance. Until the late war they were always separated from each other; but such extreme inconvenience resulted from this cause during the mobilization of INTO, that the principle of keeping the service and depot companies together has been laid down since. In consequence, however, of the new distribution of the army into permanent regional corps,

many regiments are quartered in places where no garrisons previously existed, and where, consequently, theie are no barracks. The army, on its peace footing, is more numerous than it used to be. The abundant barracks wliich existed in Alsace-Lorraine have disappeared. For these various reasons, therefore, though the building of new barracks has gone on actively—though about nine millions sterling have been voted for them from State and municipal sources—it lias not yet been found practical to provide room enough in the " casernes " of each region to lodge the depots with the regiments. Two years must still pass before the change can be completely effected. It is only in the Ist and 7th corps (Lille and Besancon) that the measure is thus far regularly applied. In the 2nd corps, two regiments out of eight are separated from their depots; four regiments are in the same condition in the 3rd and 4th corps; and so on with the others. '

Another cause of difficulty in bringing together the depots and the regiments arises from the special organization wliich has been adopted for the garrisons of Paris and Lyons. 'Hie French active army is recruited all over the territory ; conscripts from all over the [provinces are mixed up in the same regiment; and not only is no attempt made to group together men of the same department, but care is even taken to prevent that result, it being considered, for both special and general reasons, that great inconvenience would accrue from the bestowal of a local character on the regiments of the active army. But with the men of the reserve, as has been ex-

plained, the exactly opposite system is employed; they are attached exclusively (for the infantry, at least) to regiments permanently quartered in their own region ; and the territorial army is composed on the same principle. For the troops of Paris, however (and to some extent for those of Lyons), an exception has been made: the reservists of the department of the Seine and Seine-et-Oise are attached to " corps d'armeo " of four different regions, whose headquarters and regimental depots are not in Paris, but in those regions. The result is that, in the event of a mobilization, all the reservists in Paris would have first to start oti' to their depots at Amiens, Orleans, Rouen, Laval, Le Mans,

and all sorts of equally distant places, in order to get them equipped, and then to return to go elsewhere, to their regiments. When it is remembered that the garrison of its neighborhood amounts to 120,1*00 men (more than a quarter of the whole uctivearmy), it will be recognized that 8/ serious cause of delay will arise here. / And there exists no present reason fqrJsupposing that this difficulty will ever l#got over. It should, however, be added that, in peace time, this system prints many serious disadvantages ; it mixes up the Parisians with the rural soldiers ; it does not encumber the Paris barracks (where there is no space to spare), with the extra men belonging to the depots; and it keeps the system of " corps d'arme"' intact and separate from the huge mixed garrison of Paris, which does not form u permanent " corps d'arme'" by itself, but is almost entirely composed of regiments temporarily detached from the surrounding corps. (to BE continued.)