In the West

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXII, Issue 29, 30 December 1916, Page 5

In the West

GENERAL HAIG'S REPORT. BIX MONTHS OPERATIONS. | Press Association— Copyright, Australian and N.Z. Cable Association. London, December 29. A despatch from General Sir Douglas Haig fills sixteen pages of the Gazette, and covers the period from May 19 to November 12. He states: AM the Allies agreed on the principle of the offensive campaign for the summer of and finally, with a view to the : Austro-German offensive against Verdun, Italy and Russia, General Jpffee and myself agreed that a combined Franco-British offensive should not be postponed beyond the end of June. General Remy's position consisted of several lines of deep trenches and wire entanglements, sometimes forty yards broad, built of iron stakes, interlaced with barbed wire as thick as a man's finger. Numerous Avoods and villages with deep cellars, also quarries, were provided with cover, machine-guns, and trench mortars. Two preparations for attack were commenced on 24th June, gas being

discharged, in forty places on a front-

age of fifteen miles. The infantry carried out seventy raids. An attack on July 1 from Maricourt to Serre was entrusted to General Itawlinson's Fourth Army with five army corps and Geenral Alleuby's army carried out a subsidiary attack on Gommecourt. As the result of the day's operations, I decided to: press on the front, extending our junction with the French to a point half-way between La Boiselle and s Contalmai- . son, in order that General Rawliuson might be free to concentrate hi? at- • tention on the front where the attack was being pushed home. I placed the operations from La Boiselle to Serre under General Hubert Gough, who was given the two northern corps of General Rawlinson's Jarmy.

THE THREE MAIN PHASES. OPERATIONS AT POZIERES. Press Assn.—Copyright.—Australian j and N.Z. Cable Assn., and Reuter. (Received 9.10 a.m.) London, December 29. The report continued: General Haig instructed General Gough to press on steadily and act as a pivot, whereon our line would swing as the attacks upon his right pi-ogrossed northward. He emphasises the three main phases of the battle.. Firstly, considerable confusion and disorganisation in the enemy's ranks wore caused by the attacks beginning in July; secondly, the operations from July 7 to the 14th, which gave us command of the most southern main plateau between Delville Wood and Bazenti i le Petit, with the subsequent prolonged struggle for the mastery, in which, though progress was slow and difficult," the confidence of the men in their ability to win was never shaken, and by September 1 they had established their lighting superiority, which has left its mark on the enemy; the third phase, wherein we pushed down the slopes of the ridge and extended our flanks from Morval to Thiepval continues. We commenced an attack on the second system of defences on 14th July, Tboro , was strong evidence that the enemy forces were severely shaken by-the repeated Anglo-French successes, but the great strength and depth of the German defences secured sufficient time to bring fresh troops. The vigor and determination with which 1 our troops fought to 14 th July awakened the enemy to a fuller realisation of the danger, and they hurried up numerous fresh divisions and more guns, but point after point was taken, the great majority of the frequent counter-attacks having failed completely with heavy loss.

Describing the operations at Pozieres, General Haig says: The Fourth Army on 23rd July advanced on a wide front from Guillernont to Pozieres, and found the enemy in great strength all along the line, with ma-chine-guns forward and troops in the shell-holes well ahead of the main defences. It was evident that the enemy had recovered from their previous confusion. The assault was delivered simultaneously on the 23rd by General Gough's Army against Pozieres, and by the morning of the 25th the whole of the village had been carried,/ including the cemetery. Important progress had been made along the enemy trenches to the north-east by 7th August, but it was evident that Guillernont could not be captured as an isolated enterprise without the heaviest losses. Accordingly, arrangements were made by the French Army for a series of combined attacks in progressive stages, including Maurepas, Fallemont Farm, Guillernont, Leuze Wood, and Ginchy. Apart from these major operations, there was fierce obstinate fighting on the other fronts. The British lines were pushed wherever possible by means of local attacks with bombing, and sapping. Our line was thus brought to the crest of the ridge above Martinpuich, Pozieres windmill, and the high ground north of the village, and at a later date we reached the defence of Moquet Farm. The fierceness of the fighting is shown by the fact that one regiment of German guards in reserve opposing the attack ov Moquet Farm lost 1400 men in fifteen days when a weak salient of the Allied line finally disappeared. On 9th September it was evident our new armies would not only be able to rush the enemy's strongest defences, but wear down and break the German power of resistance by a steady relentless pressure. The enemy knew what was coming, but considered that the troops already on the spot, aided by the apparently impregnable defences, would suffice for General Gough's Army. Therefore, at Thiepval, row advancing with methodical progression, wherein great skill, patience, and endurance were displayed, General Gough's Army acted most successfully as a pivot to the remainder of the attack. There no need to incur heavy casualties in the attempt to rush the Thiepval defences, though undoubtedly they could have rushed them when the time came. GLORIOUS 15th. OF SEPTEMBER. APPEARANCE OF "THE TANKS." Press Association— Copyright, Auacra. lian and N.Z. Cable Association. (Received 9.25 a.m.) London, December 29. As the result of the fighting on the 15th September and the following days,.the gain was considerably greater than any that had attended Oiu arms in the course of a- single operation since the commencement of the offensive. During a single day's figuring we broke through two of the enemy's main defensive systems,- and I advanced to a depth on a mile front for six miles, capturing three large villages, which was all accomplished with small casualties in comparison to the number of troops employed. Preparations for further attacks were hindered by the bad weather, but Morval, Lesboeufs, and Gueudecourt were assaulted on 25th September.. A belt of country about 1000 yards deep, curving round from the norm of Flers and Martinpuich and the whole of. the objectives were taken by night fall, except Gueudecourt, Combles was taken on the 26th in an inexpensive fashion. Gueudecourt was taken on the same day, after the pi»-

tecting trenches to the westward haa been captured in an interesting fashion. A ''tan];" in the early morrii-ig started down portion of a trench, firing its machine-guns and followed by bombers. The enemy was unable uescape us. We held the southern end of the trench, and at the same iim • our aeroplanes flew the length of the trench, firing their machine-guns. The enemy waved handkerchiefs, and when the surrender was rep::"i.e., our infantry accepted the surrender of the garrison, making 370 prisoners, apart from the groat number who were killed. Our casualties were five. The success of the Fourth Army enabled me to assault. Thiepval.

THE WEATHER TURNED "ROTTEN." | DIFFICULTIES INCREASED. j ATTACK IN DENSE FOG. ROUNDABOUT ARMENTIERES. | SOMME BATTLE RESULTS. | I . (Received 9.4.5 a.m.) London, December 29. General Haig continues: Unfortunately unfavourable weather interfered with our advance in the direct tion of Le Transloy and Bapaume. Constant rain in October and November turned the hastily-dug trenches into channels of deep mud. The country roads were broken up, and countless shell-craters left them almost impassable, making the supply of stores and ammunition a serious, problem. These conditions multiplied the difficulties of an attack to such an extent that it was found impossible to exploit the situation rapidly, which was necessary for us to reap the full benefits of the advantages' that had been gained. /The delay gave the enemy tima to reorganise and rally his .troops. The German resistance against us was stubborn. They, seized every available opportunity of counter-attacks, and the trenches changed hands with great rapidity, j the condition of the ground having made it difficult to renew the supply of bombs and ammunition and consol-, idate the ground won. The weather, improved on 9th November, and we experienced dry, cold, frosty nights ( and misty mornings. Final preparations were made to attack Ancre, • Beaucourt, and Beaumont Hamel, and realising the darfger of the enemy having multiplied their guns we introduced additional divisions between Graundcourt and Hobuternezo. The attack was made in a dense fog on 13th November and was remarkable for the- successes in view of rapidity of execution and the lightness of the cost. Fourteen hundred prisoners were captured at St. Pierre, n division being taken by a single division. There were six hundred casual-. ■ties from May to November. The role of another of the British armies be-] Their task was to keep the enemy yond Ypres was necessarily secondary constantly alert and entailed heavy work on the troops and constant vigilance on the part of the commanders, 1 which was carried out with unfailing' spirit and unselfish broad-minded devotion to the general good. During four and a Half months from Ist July, 360 raids were carri*] out,' in which the enemy had many casualties and hundreds of prisoners were! taken. . i

The largest undertaking was on the 19th July in the neighbourhood of Armentieres. The troops penetrated deeply into the enemy trenches, greatly damaging his works and inflicting severe losses. During the battle of the Somme there was a steady deterioration of morale among large numbers of the enemy's troops. Many fought with the greatest determination, but resistance by larger numbers became lately decidedly feebler than earlier in the battle. The great depth of defences and the frequent reliefs, which the resources in men enabled the enemy to effect, together with their discipline and training, held the machine sufficiently to enable the enemy to rally and reorganise their troops after each defeat,.

THE GENERAL'S FINE TRIBUTE. I HARDSHIPS CHEERFULLY MET. DUTY NOBLY DONE. London, December 29. (Received t0.2<3 a.m.) j When the weather unfortunately f broke, there was no doubt that the ] enemy and the enemy's power of resistance had very seriously diminish-: ed the results achieved by the troops,, the vast majority of whom had gamed their first experience of war. the Somme battle we were compelled 1 to use hastily-trained and inexperienced troops and officers, or we would have failed. The Allies' difficulties j and hardships were cheerfully overcome. The endurance, determination, and invincible courage displayed can be hardly imagined by those wiio we>o not personally experienced. In the Somme battle it is possible to particularise the units, brigades, and divisions, without giving information to the enemy. It must suffice to say that the troops from every part of the British Isles and every Dominion and quarter of the Empire—Regulars, Territorials, and men in the new Armies —have borne their share. All have ! done their duty nobly. The enemy's employment of gas and liquid fcanic 1 necessitated our devising similar mI struments, and great fertility in inI ventiou was shown by chemists, physiologists and physicists of the highest rank, who devoted their energy to ! enabling us to surpass the enemy in ' in the use of means of warfare which i took the civilised world by surprise.

The eueray sufferede heavy casualties from our gas attacks. The gallantry and devotion of the Medical Service is shown by the large number of Royal Army Medicals and Medical Corps from the Dominions who have fallen in the field.

The health of the troops was most satisfactory, there being almost a complete absence of wastage due to diseases of a preventable nature. The responsibility of the Somme battle was entrusted to Generals tfcuv-

linson and Cough, who, for five months controlled operations in one of the greatest struggles that have ever taken place. Their thorough knowledge of their profession, cool sound judgment in attack, and determination proved equal to every call upon them.

DELAY IN THE OFFENSIVE. THE ALLIES' ACHIEVEMENTS. "BIG PUSH" JUSTIFIED. (Received 10.45 a.m.) London, December 29. General Haig explains why the offensive was so long delayed, namely, because of the necessity of numbers of men and munitions, and also the fact that a large proportion of officers and men were far f/om being fully trained. For these reasons, the'longer it was delayed the better, but it was evident from the German attack on Verdun and the Austrian offensive in the Trentino that the strain might become too great to be borne unless timely relief in action was taken.

Details arc given of the stupendous preparations, including the accumulation of vast stores of all kinds near the front, the construction of new railways of different gauges, gun emplacements, trench tramways, dugouts for ammunition, food, and water, engineering materials and stores miles of deep communication trenches ; also numerous wells and bores were sunk, and 120 miles of water-mains were laid.

General Haig defines the threefold object of the offensive: First, the relief of Verdun; second, to assist the Allies in other theatres by stopping the further transference of enemy troops from the. West; third, to wear down the strength of the enemy. General Haig claims that all the three objectives of the battle were achieved. Any one of those results in itself justified the battle of the Soinme, but the attainment of all three amply compensates for the sacrifices made by ourselves and our Allies, bringing us a long way towards final victory. He says: The fact that the strength of the enemy in November on the Western front was greater than in July, despite the abandonment of the Verdun offensive justifies the two first claims, while, regarding the. third he admits that any statement must depend to some degree upon estimates; nevertheless there is sufficient evidence to show undoubtedly that the enemy's losses in men and material were considerably higher than the Allies, while morally our advantage i was greater. Four-fifths of the enemy divisions on the West front were thrown successively into the Battle of the Somme twice, and some thrice. Undoubtedly, towards the end of the operations, the enemy's power of resistance was very seriously diminished. These results by troops, the vast majority wherefore were raised and trained during the war, constitute a feat whereof the history of our nation contains no equal.

ENEMY NOT VANQUISHED. CONFIDENCE IN FINAL VICTORY. General Haig concludes: The enemy power is not yet broken, nor is it possible to estimate the period before the object sfor which the Allies are fighting will bo attained, but the Battle of the Somme placed beyond douot the ability of the Allies to gain those objects. The German Army is the mainstay of the Central Powers, and fully half of that army, despite all the advantages of defensive, supported by the strongest fortifications, suifered defeat on the Somme. Neither victors nor vanquished will forget this, and though bad weather has given the enemy some respite, there undoubtedly will be many thousands in his ran«* who will begin a new'campaign with little confidence of ability to resist Our new Army entered the battle with a determination to win, and confidence io their power to do so, and they hav« proved to themselves, the enemy, and the world that this confidence was justified. They have learnt it in the fierce struggle, and many valuable lessons will help them in the future.