The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1916. THE CASE OF DENMARK.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXX, Issue 72, 29 June 1916, Page 4

The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1916. THE CASE OF DENMARK.

Referring to the now admitted mistake irr! allowing Germany and Austria to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from , .Denmark in 1864, the Christchurch I ress (gavs it is not very difficult to see the reason why England did not go to the help of Denmark in that year. It was not because the issues at stake were not realised by the Government of the day. In 1863, Lord Salisbury (then Sir Robert Cecil) in a remarkable article which he contributed to the “Quarterly Review,” referring to Prussia’s openly avowed designs upon Schleswig-Holstein, ironically scoffed at the pretence which was put, forward that the German population were oppressed, and that the Germans of Schleswig wanted to hear sermons preached in German. “Happy are the people,” he wrote, “whose grievances are such as these! It is necessary in order to avoid forming too mean an opinion of the mental calibre of the Schleswig Estates to keep m view the vista in the background—the German fleet riding in the harbour of Kiel. The German national party, he wen on to point out, desired above all things that Germany should be a great naval Power; the dismemberment of i Denmark was essential to that end, and consequently it was found that thej National party were those who were j urging on with the greatest vehemence I the dismemberment of Denmaik. C 1 seems very remarkable, the Press goes 1 on to say, that the English statesmanj [who in 1883 had such a clear insight iinto German naval designs was the I very Prime Minister who in 1890 gavoj np Heligoland to Germany. But the; find gives us a clue to the whole mysterv. Humiliating as it is to con-j f e s ß it,' the plain truth is that in 18(5-1 England was not in a position to fight botli Prussia and Austria. As a correspondent of the “Spectator” aptly puts it, “Denmark did not fathom that the psychological moment chosen Iby her was the worst possible—a Russia under an obligation to Prussia, a France engaged in a campaign in I Mexico, a Great Britain ruled by an I octogenarian Premier who had a constant dispute on with Washington during ihe Civil War. None .of these was able to help her, least of all Great Britain, with her small army little prepared for a Continental campaign against a foe armed with the latest rifled guns from Krnpp's, and with the “Zundnadel rifle.” In conclusion, the Press remarks; Before leaving this question there is one aspect of the war with Denmark which shows how little the Prussian spirit has changed in the interval. She paid i

as little respect to “scraps of paper” then ns she showed in 1914. The Ger- ( man States had signed the Treaty of i London in 1852, recognising Prince ! Christian of Olucksburg as the right- , ful heir to the Danish throne, and ; pledged themselves “to the maintenj ance of tlic ihtegrity of the Danish I monarchy” as “being connected with the general interests of the equilibrium of Europe.” Yet on the death of King Frederick VII., Prussia and Austria not only refused to recognise! Prince Christian, but supported the Pretender, the Duke of Augusteuburg, the German historian and politician, von Sybel, putting forward the theory 1 that the Treaty of London was “contra bonos mores,” and therefore ought uou to bo observed. Upon this Lord Salisbury caustically commented“ This habit of political repudiation appears to lie ingrained in Prussian politicians. Along with his conquests and his glory, Frederick the Great left them also the disastrous legacy of his treachery. Like most more imitators, they follow chiefly the defects of their model and overlook its beauties. There is little; enough in their recent history of his military prowess or his political sagacity: but of his unblushing perfidy: of his cynical contempt *for„ pledges given and treaties signed they are admirable copyists,” f v