The Stratford Evening post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1916. VERDUN.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXX, Issue 71, 28 June 1916, Page 4

The Stratford Evening post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1916. VERDUN.

.The,» predictions fc ,fe i £ erm s°l would, make further gigantic, efforts ,to capture Verdun as the keystone of,,sP Allies position on the Western front are certainly being borne out, and though for three months men have boon recklessly hurled in thousands at the great wall of the French defence, the ferocity of the attack has not abated in the least. The explanation of the whole matter seems to bo that the Kaiser dare not desist, for to do so would admit defeat in such a way that internal Germany would have its eyes opened to the mad folly and falsehood, of its evil ruler's doings. A London journal a few weeks ago saul: "The Kaisor has got the wolf by the ears, and while his strength is being drained by holding on he has convincing reasons for not letting go. l«or there can for the Germans be no question of abandoning Verdun and crying honors easy. They must capture positions or confess defeat." It has been very truly said that the primary Strategy of the attacks on Verdun is based upon political considerations rather than upon military, and that German writings and utterances all point to this: that France was ready, not to surrender more territory, perhaps not to pay an indemnity, but to accept peace on terms that left her intact. Mr F. H. Simonds. in the American Review of Reviews expressed the view that when the great offensive against Verdun was commenced Germany knew that Britain was not ready to render efficient aid to her ally, and reckoned that France, defeated in a great battle, deprived of a great fortress, and lacking real aid from Britain, would become disheartened and disgusted with a struggle in which she alone bore the brunt. Germany knew also that Russia, " because of the spring thaws, could not lend a hand to Fiance, and that the Kaiser could oven transfer from the East to the West some divisions of veteran and victorious troops, and to make transfers also from the Balkans. Thus in :„ measure would be repeated the I situation of the Marne, and another i effort would be made to eliminate the I Kroneh from Germany's opponents, even if not this time by a complete ' disaster. But three months of the ' bitterest fighting and incalculable loss ' to the German arms has gained bub little else. Britain proved not to be |ho unready as the German military ' leaders hoped and imagined, and her I fine aid has greatly strengthened the ! mighty arm of patriotic France. That I famous authority on the war, Mr ' ffilaire TJelloc. not long ago said reV I

garding Verdun: "The phrase, 'to take Verdun' has, in the purely military sense, no significance whatsoever. The whole meaning and the only meaning, so far as the military problem is concerned, of the struggle round Verdun, is the proportion of loss which either party has suffered at any stage, during the attack. There is no ques-' tion of breaking the French line.J There is no question of the 'surrender of the fortress,' for there is no fortress to surrender. No army is surrounded or nearly surrounded. No mass of material and munitions even is in. jeopardy. The enemy is prepared M> sacrifice a certain number of men over; and above the number of men which he puts out of action upon our side.j He is prepared to exhaust himself in! this degree in order to be able to say that his soldiers stand upon the ruins of a particular town—that is, upon a particular geographical area upon the map—there is now nothing more Avhatsoever to be discovered in his efforts. Why is ho prepared to do this ? Because he believes that the effect, not military but political, not upon soldiers studying the military problems of disarming an opponent, but upon civilian opinion—outside France^—j will be such as to determine an early peace in his favor. For the same reason lie may direct his last efforts against ourselves. In the fii'St '-"■ days ' of the attack upon Verdun ho had another object. He thought that he] would break the French, line. Now I lie knows that this cannot be done. And we know it, too. But be is persuaded that by the continual repetition of the name 'Verdun,' by the continual description of it as a fortress, by the concentration of the world's attention upon these ruins will shake the confidence of his foes and perhaps determine some accession of neutral aid for himself. The whole thing may be compared to the point which we ridicule so rightly in the later mediaeval wars, when the capture of a single personage in an action was legarded by both parties as deeisire." To-day, at some points, the tension is more terrible than it has ever been, but oven should Verdun' actually be taken, it must be remembered that there are great lines of defence behind it, and the killing of the German hordes will still go on, providing men can still be forced tn face certain death, and that the supply does not run our