The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER SATURDAY, JUNE 24, 1916. THE WESTERN FRONT.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXX, Issue 68, 24 June 1916, Page 4

The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER SATURDAY, JUNE 24, 1916. THE WESTERN FRONT.

It' it is true, .ns reported, that, German Wjlhelm is’ at Brussels awaiting, a big military event, it may mean that some further desperate German .offensive is projected, but whatever the,, enemy may have in mind it is certain thatthe hour is at hand when the might of Britain’s great army will he used, lu an article in the Fortnightly Review a military officer of especial ability writes: —“I look forward, with absolute certainty to clearing France and Belgium of the Huns before the year is over.” He puts forward cogent arguments in support of his conclusion, and these are military and not economic arguments. The economic argument indeed, he dismisses as wholly inadequate and declares that there will never he peace in Europe until the Germans have been utterly defeated, in the held. An economic victory would mean nothing hut a renewal of the contest at a later date. What must he crushed if Europe is over again to know security, is not the stomachs of the German people but them belief in the invincibility of their own arms. The writer goes on to discuss the impossibility of leaving everything to Russia, “unless it is desired to extend the period of conflict at least into 1917, or even 1918,” and shows that Russia has already borne more than her fair share of the war, and contends that without resolute help on the Western front the coining autumn will not sec her armies further advanced than her own original frontier. He further contends that the key to the whole military situation is breaking through from the West, and victory for the Allies in the third year of the war depends on this. The writer referred to is sanguine* that when we are ready we may break through the German trout, and what is deal - , at least, he says, is that Germany is coming to the end of her first line troops—that is to say men who are competent to go anywhere and do anything which eiiicicnt soldiers are expected to do. In the course of the last five mouths nothing hut her interior lines ol railways have enabled her to place her effectives now on one front and now on the other. The attack on Verdun has taken its full toll. There must come a period when the spearhead ol the German armies is blunted or destroyed, and an insufficient number ol mobile soldiery exist for any given front. On the other hand our own personnel has .inherited in full measure the spirit of the original Expeditionary Force, while the Territorials ha've become war-hardened troops I with which anyone might ho proud to 1 cc-vve. It is further affirmed that

now, on the lowest estimate, wo should bo able to put three AngloFrench soldiers against two Hermans, while a concentration of two to one on the sectors selected of attack I could be made with complete safety Ito the rest of the line. The esti-, j mate errs on the side of prudence—' for three to one or four to one would bo a more probable figure at the do* cisive points. But for a successful advance the Allies need : Unlimited shells, greater numerical force, and an army not inferior in courage, skill ( and administration to tlu> Herman, j That these conditions prevail at this time wo are confident. Therefore can the advance bo made? MWe.must at any rate,” says the writer, “at-

tempt it, and if we fail the first time we must try again, and if we fail the second time we must make a third effort, and if British soldiers are what we think them to be, they will succeed before they have finished. . . and victory will crown our efforts with peace before the year has run out.”