SUBMARINE POLICY DISCUSSED

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXVIV, Issue 88, 20 March 1916, Page 5

SUBMARINE POLICY DISCUSSED

Holland's Position as a Neutral

Outspoken Dutch Press

Failure of Verdun's Third Phase

Brisk Skirmish in the Balkans

CURRENT WAR TOPICS.

The outstanding feature of the cable news to-day is the question of submarine warfare and the German Admiral, von Tirpitz's resignation. It might be mentioned in passing that the old chap' has been decorated at the hands of, or rather by means of a letter from, the who has conferred upon him; the. Grand. Commander's 1 Star and the Swords of Hohenzollern. There is much speculation upon the position, especially as to the real reason for the resignation. The Daily Mail's naval expert suggests that perhaps Von Tirpitz took fright at the liner Tubantia,

and after referring to the benefits conferred upon Germany by Holland -is 7 a neutral since the war began, he asks several startling questions pertinent to the position. The forcible occupation of Holland is one of .the interrogations, and the expert points out that her all'upon being able to use ostend n and r other points on .the* Belgian v corast !: as^'bases for her submarine 'operations', I 'aild how that bauXed 'in'the iriove by the British Fleet, he asks if it'is the intention to "seize - Ro>tteldanr ,r for the purpose. Another suggestion is that owing to the laWsti ofafetayeis upon* their mercantile marine, the Dutch might join the Allies, and that - this is the Germans' method of stealing a march uopn

All this is very interesting in its way, but it is nothing compared to the definite statement by the British Admiralty that the blockade has been tightened, so that- not even enemy ships will-1 be able to pass disguised ;is neufarals.-i. This-is the best news we fdr a long time, and it will be hailed wiih satisfaction by everyone. As • some reprisal, the British notification to 1 >'the ' Scandinavian Governments thai new > 'arrangement's have! be.cn made whei>eundier neutrals failing oto stop when signalled may'be fired oh, for. The stranglehold,!'-which' ■ Germany daily fepls is growing tighter, has a great deal to do with her policy of frightfulness upon the sea.

What has been termed the "third phase" of the operations by the Germans at Verdun is now stated to have resulted in nothing but failure. After successive attacks on Douaumont and Vaux which only meant the sacrifice of thousands of the best (and worst y also,"no doubt)' of his troops, the enemy has been compelled to 'admit the-invulnerability of the French and Allied defence on the Mouse. Great efforts have been made at Bethincourt on the west side of the river, but the fiercest attacks were directed upon Douaumont and Valix. These have all failed not only miserably but terribly, as far as the suffering- and loss sustained are concerned. It has been stated that this is, if not the Kaiser's war, at any rate a war pro moted and kept going by the "men around the Kaiser," and failure, eleven want of continued and splendid success must react against the Imperial prestige and that of the ruling clique. The news of the Russians' advance to Magebatan, west of Erzerum, .r. pursuit of the Turks, opens up the possibilities of a thorough Turkish de feat. Of course, this cannot be effect ed in a day or two, but if it does come as now seems quite certain, it will b< j after considerable fighting in some rough country. Physically, Asia Min

or is a plateau sloping from the great Taurus range in the south to the mountains bordering on the Black Sea in the north and westward towards the shores of the Aegean Sea. Between the western mountains and the Aegean Sea there are plains and valleys of great fertility, while the Black Sea. coast is . rocky and almost unbroken. The roads, generally, are in a. wretched condition, and there are about 3000. miles of railways in operation, the most important of these being under German control. The Russians have not railways to assist them in their march from Erzerum, and necessarily their advancement must be comparatively slow, especially as the winter season is upon them. It »s satisfactory, therefore, to note that they have reached Magebatan, ninety, versts to the west. A verst is a Russiam.mile (3500 feet), so that they have progressed about sixty English miles. Considering that the attack on Trebiaqnd is, being continued, ( and that other forces are pushing on past Lake Vin to junction with,.the other Allied trpops with Bagdad as their objective, ihje j magnitude of ~Russian; operations inithjs tjheatre.qf fhs.war, will be quite, readily ■; admitted. , ;;,:,; t ' ,i

ilt,ii<v h*i .possible, (states,one w« r , wfi§§s that Bri;tain',s Gallipoli .adven* titrejmay, not ; b,e ended yet.;. It might be imagined that because our troops have left the peninsula Turkey has been abb? to use the forces she had there in>othe,r spheres. That is true only,t» a, limbed, e,xt,ent; she. must always be ready to guard the peninsula against further attacks, and if . she' is careful she will always keep a reserve Strong enough to be able to reinforce! her guards if necessary. A large'number of the. Turkish Gallipoli troops have undoubtedly been »withdrawn, and it was stated a fow days ago that more had been sent i off. to help'meet the Grand'' Duke] s; forces in Armenia; Tt would, be interesting, to know just what men and guM are left, and how they are disposed, and, we may be sure that the Allies' secret service, and, 'perhaps, their, airmen also, are trying to get an answer to this question. It must be a great temptation to the Turko-Germans to skim their Gallipoli guards pretty thin, for the chances of a second attack by the Allies, after so pronounced a. failure of the first, must seem exceedingly small. Yet that very fact | might, to a strategist like Sir William Robertson, make the possibilities the more worth considering.

The arguments against it, however, assuming that the Turks-were tempted into leaving it insufficiently guarded, are of two kinds. The first kind is neutral: there would be a natural disinclination towards opening the book of Suvla, Auzac, and Helles again; its story is too sad, in spite- of all its heroism, and the atmosphere of failure about it might be a real and heavy handicap. But the thing would be attempted—if it were attempted at all—in circumstances not only far more favorable, but entirely different; and it cannot be too often repeated that in spite of bad bungling and bad luck, we were more than one Avithin a very little of succeeding before. And after all there would be a very inspiring motive in the hope of "getting one back," and in the feeling that the thing'must be done this time. The second sort of objection is more practical; in order to avoid the most dangerous of the mistakes made last time, a very large force would have to be landed, and it is doubtful whether France and Britain could spare the men. For if the Russian successes in Armenia make a/i attack on Egypt less likely, Germany's spring programme, and very likely the Allies' spring programme, too, involves the bringing of every available man and gun to Flanders and France.