The Dardanelles.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXVIV, Issue 30, 11 January 1916, Page 5

The Dardanelles.

CALUPOLI EVACUATED. ONE BRITISHER WOUNDED. United Press Association. London, January 0. Official: The complete evacuatio;’ of Gallipoli has been snccesslully car ried out. Only one British soldier was wounded and the French had no casualties. All guns were saved,, except seventeen that were worn out, and those were destroyed, vbj The High Commissioner 4, report. from London, on January 10, 2.0, a.m.:—

General Monro reports that the complete evacuation of Gallipoli Peninsula has now been successfully carried out. All guns and howitzers were got away, excepting 17 worn-out guns, which were blown up by ns before leaving. Our casualties were one British private wounded, and there were no casualties amongst the French troops. General Monro attributes the successful accomplishment of this difficult task to Generals Birdwood and Davies, and the invaluable assistance rendered in operations of the highest difficulty by Admiral de .Roeheck and the Navy.

NO DETAILS OF THE BATTLE. BOOTY EXTRAORDINARILY \ GREAT. TURKISH REPORT OF OUR LOSSES. (Received 12.55 p.m.) Amsterdam, January 10. Semi-official reports from Constantinople give no details of the battle at Gallipoli,, which began with our attack on Friday. The extent of the booty is extraordinarily great. The enemy losses are reported to be considerable.

THE TURKISH REPORT,

Amsterdam, January 9

A telegram from Constantinople reports that as a result of a violent battle, the British completely evacuated Sedd-ul-Bahr during the night, with great losses. The report naively concludes: “Not a single Britisher remained behind.”

THE SUVLA FAILURE.

London, January 10. Lord Sydenham, in a letter, disagrees with the Times’ view that General Hamilton, when on the spot at Suvla. on August 8, meekly effaced himself at the most critical moment. Lord Sydenham points out that General Hamilton’s function was to giyc the corps commanders general directions for the attack. When he visits General Stopford, General Hamilton appears to have done everything possible to secure a general advance, which was plainly and immediately required. The attempt failed because two divisions, spread out on a front of two miles with a depth of a mile and a half, were not sufficiently in. hand to undertake night attacks. Visions of Napoleon galloping about and by a few inspiring words galvanising his host into activity suggest themselves, but this was physically impossible in the conditions of August 8, which was lost before General Hamilton landed. Lord Sydenham does not think that General Hamilton can be justly blamed on this occasion, though his dispatch as a whole must inevitably provoke criticism of his conduct. The expedition will always be associated with a gallantry that has nevei been surpassed.

HAMILTON CRITICISED.

A VOICI. FROM AMERICA.

ashmead-bartlett TALKS.

(Received .9.0 a.m.) New York, January 10. Mr Ashmead Bartlett interviewed on-General Hamilton’s report said he thought it a great mistake to publish the dispatch at this stage, while ho preferred to read General Hamilton s unabridged story. He went on to say that the comment experts, published in America, declared'th© operation to have been foolish, because it was an operation which should never have been undertaken under such conditions, and in such a country, and it war. sheer nonsense to represent the strategic plan as having almost succeeded. 1 Jbe attack at Anzac .suffered twelve thousand casualties without attaining its objective. A few Ghuikas reached the summit of Ghana Bair and Koja Chemin Tope, which were only the lower slopes leading to Sari Bair. The losses were so terrible that even supposing the troops had reached the top, it would have been utterly impossible to maintain themselves. Why were unskilled troops employed in the first Sulva landing, when the heroic TwentyNinth Division, which was unhesitatingly sacrificed later on, could have been utilised? Why were 2,500 men of the First Australian Division sent to their doom in the effort to acquiic an apparently useless position at Bone Pine ? Why were thousands thrown away at other posts which were disassociated from the main operations? If the objective was to got astride of Koja Chemin Tope,' why was the weight of tlie attack not thrown against that point? Why was'there no control from headquarters at Snvl t ? How could General Stopford gel bis men forward if (bey were split, up and lost in broken country without water or telephone communication,

and h a missed by the enemy snipers. Apart 'from all other considerations it had been insufficiently established, that even the possession of Anafarta Hills and Koja Cherain Tope' «’oul(l have forced The Narrows or cleared the road to Constantinople. General Hamilton states that- in the middle of Ammst the Turks had 110,000 bayonets gainst his 05.000. and claims 0 that Lord Kitchener had sent fifty thousand more, he would have brought the campaign to a successful conclusion. As a matter of fact, all that could have been done would have been to bring the fifty thousand to a conclusion.