Second Edition. Ihe Dardanelles.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXVIV, Issue 27, 7 January 1916, Page 6

Second Edition. Ihe Dardanelles.

DRAWING TO A CLOSE. A SIQHT OF THE NARROWS. AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK.

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(Received 11.30 a.m.) General Hamilton, continuing, says: Other battalions of the New Army attacked with fine audacity, but the Turks were now lining the whole crest in overwhelming numbers. The enemy, much encouraged, turned their attention to the New Zealand troops, and the other battalions holding the south-west of Chunuk Bair. Constant attacks urged with fanatical persistence, met sterner resolution. Although our troops were greatly exhausted at the end of the day they still kept a footing on the summit, which covered the Narrows themselves and the roads leading to Bulair and Constantinople. Eight hundred men held the crest of Chunuk Bair. Slight trenches were dug, but the fatigue of the New Zealanders and the fire of the enemy prevented solid work, and the trenches were only a few inches deep. Unprotected at first, the First Australian Brigade were now reduced from two thousand to one thousand, the total casualties on the evening of the 9th being 8500. . The troops were still of extraordinarily good, heart, and nothing could damp the keenness of the New Zealanders. The New Army at Chunuk 1 - Bair was relieved at night when they were half dead from fatigue, and Chunuk Bair, which they had so magnificently held, was handed to the Sixth North Lancashires and the Fifth Wiltshires. The Turks delivered a grand assault at daybreak on the I.oth, the North lancashires being simply overwhelmed in the shallow" trenches by sheer weight of numbers, while the Wilts, who were caughtj in the open, were literally almost annihilated. The assaulting column consisted of a full division plus three battalions } who swept over the crest in swarms. Baldwin's column was only extricated with the heaviest losses. But it was now our turn.

The warships, Jhe New* Zealand and Australian .Artillery got a chance of a lifetime. Iron rain fell on succesive solid of Turks, and ten machine guns of the New Zealand Infantry played on the serried ranks at close range until the barrels were red hot. Only a handful straggled * back to their own side of Chunuk Bair. By the evening of the lOth General Birdcasualties had amounted to twelve thousand, including the largest proportion of officers, and the grand coup had failed to come off, and the Narrows was beyond field gun range. It was not General Birdwood's fault or of any of the officers or the men under his command. Birdwood had done all mortal man could do. He handled two divisions with conspicuous ability, and his troops faced death with joyous alacrity, as if it wer£some. form of exciting recreation, which even astonished an old campaigner like myself. The operations at Suvla Bay were entrusted to Lieut-General Stopford. It was. believed the Turks' defences Were under four thousand, and the Eleventh Division was ferried from Imbros, disembarking in half an hour. After the attack on the northern flank at Anzac, I hopd the Chocolate Hills would be captured at daybreak. The surprise of the Turks was complete.. The weather was very hot, and the new troops suffered much from lack of water, partly owing to the enemy's fire, and partly owing to the want of/"nous" —which is second nature to an old campaigner—they hung fire. Stopford, recollecting the vast issues hanging on success in forestalling the enemy, urged the Division commanders to push on. They believed themselves unable to move owing to the men being exhausted with the fighting on the 7th at Suvla. The commanders overlooked the fact that the half defeated Turks were equally exhausted, and an advance was the simplest and swiftest method of solving the water trouble and other difficulties. The Divisional Commander's objections overbore General Stopford's resolution, and he told them he did not wish them to make frontal attacks on the entrenched positions, but desired them to turn any of the trenches possible. This instruction was the root of our failure. To make use of the priceless daylight hour on Bth August, t driving power was required, even a certain amount of ruthlessness, to brush aside the pleas for the respite" of the tired troops. One | "fatal error was the inertia which prevailed. I went to Suvla when I found the battle was gjring wrong and ordered my general reserve to Suvla, hoping to f'!:iblf General Stopford to secure the commanding ground. I finally appointed Major-General De Lisle in Stopford's place. When the fighting ended, General Birdwood was , commanding twentyfive thousand rifles and Davies at Hell es had twenty-three thousand, in addition to seventeen thousand French. The Turks had one hundred and ten thousand, with all the advantages of the ground. I therefore sent your Lordship a long cable asking for fifty thousand fresh rifles of the British 'divisions, al«'n the forty-five thousand under establishment. If the reinforcements were sent immediately, it seemed a certainty, .humanlv speak? ing, we could still clear a passage for the Fleet to Constantinople.- Yon. may judge how deep were the riis?ppomt- | ments when it was learnt that the

essential reinforcements and munition could not be sent, the reason given preventing further insistence. j Your Lordship cabled on 11th Gc- ) tober asking for an estimate of losses involved in the evacuation, of the Peninsula. I replied on the 12th that 1 such a step seemed to me unthinkable. I received a cable on the 16th recalling me to London as the Government desired a fresh unbiassed opinion on the question of' an early evacuation.

So I farewelled, with a special Godspeed, the compaigners who had served me right through from tho terrible yet most glorious early .days, the incomparable Twenty-ninth Division, the young veterans of the Naval Di? vision, the ever victorious Australians and New Zealanders, the stout East Lancashires, and my brave fellowcountrymen from the lowlands of jScolfand..—(Signed):' lAN HAMILTON.