The Dardanelles.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXVIII, Issue 51, 29 October 1915, Page 5

The Dardanelles.

ah interview with lord BRASSEY. “A HUGE MISTAKE.” ON PRESSURE BY THE sRUSSIANS.’! rr tM } •" , - Lord Brassey is a recognised naval expert, and the founder of ' “Brassey’s Nslval Annual.” He has been Civil Lord and Secretary - or the Admiralty. Lord Brassey, who is an ex-Governor of Victoria, was created Earl in 1911. United Press Association. (Received 8.50 a.m.) , London, October 28. Lord Brassey, interviewed by the Australian Press Association on bis return from the 1 Mediterranean and the Dardanelles region said “I neyer met any official of the Navy or military, who was not of the opinion that the operation contemplated at the Dardanelles was from every point of view a huge mistake.We were forced to undertake the' Dardanelles expedition on account of pressure by the Russians, who said, ‘We are fighting very hard; you must try and open the Dardanelles.’ The Foreign. Office felt the justice of the Russians’ representations, and no doubt urged the Admiralty to act. Mr Churchill is a dashing administrator, but he did not know how difficult the operation would he. Orders were accordingly given to tho fleet to undertake the task. Having Ruled at the first attempt by naval means alone, it was decided that though late in the day it would he a combined naval and military operation. It took a considerable time to prepare both forces, and the Germans officering the Turks had full time to prepare, and when the second attempt was ready Gallipoli was a fortress of first-class magnitude, and absolutely impregnable. We tried men at three of the leastprepared places with fearful sacrifices. Sir lan Hamilton, who hud a high imputation, was exceedingly anxious to carry out the utterly impossible task placed upon him. by the Government, and he appealed for reinforcements. Egypt was depleted, and the Australians and New Zealanders tried to penetrate the Peninsula of Gallipoli, which presented

insurmountable obstacles owing to moving artillery. “I saw it was perfectly impossible to get guns into positions for the bombardment. Attack after attack was made, Imping against hope. One doctor told me lie saw men climb a difficult .slope, and invisible gunners at the top waiting till they came in view then mowed them down. All this happened again and again, and he considered the Government should much earlier have realised the futility and stopped such useless slaughter. When I was at Lemnos a ship was sent there by the Red Cross full of supplies, but no person was in authority to distribute them. In that extremity the captain asked me to help with clothes for the Australians, many of whom needed them sorely. We got together pyjamas and such other things as we could provide, and temporarily relieved them.”

ASHMEAD BARTLETT’S LECTURE. United Press Association. London, October 27. There were 2500 people present at the Queen’s Hall to hear Mr Ashmead Bartlett’s lecture on the Dardanelles. Mr Bartlett emphasised the necessity of saying nothing that would he helpful to the enemy. Whatever criticism we might indulge in regarding the after-events, we must admit that the scheme was a great conception. 'Hie importance of opening a passage for Russia’s Black Sea ports was obvious to everyone. Unfortunately, Britain entered on the expedition without a real knowledge of' the Turkish strength. We thought Turkey was on its last legs. Turkey was believed 'to be the “sick man of Europe,” and sicker than ever. We were also led astray by the reports of great Russian victories in the Caucasus, : where, though the Russians had smashed the Turks, they were unable to follow up their victory. Mr Bartlett estimated that there were at least eight hundred thousand Turks under arms. This was a big number for Britain to tackle, in view of commitments elsewhere. Mr Bartlett then proceeded to detail the Australian landing, with the help of large maps.

AT THE NARROWS. Referring to the naval operations lie said it was quite possible to justify the use of a large surplus of the preDreadnought fleet in an attempt to force th|> Dardanelles, 'hut, unfortunately, there had been little co-ordin-atio%jp the military and naval operations, not only at the Dardanelles, but throughout the war. After the outer forts were demolished on February 25, the graver problem of the Narrows arose. Here direct naval gunfire was of little use against guns behind earthworks.. Nevertheless, 14inch Krupps and coast batteries would not have stopped the fleet at the nari'oHvest passage, which measures fourteen hundred yards, but three lines of mines west of the Narrows made the task impossible, despite the heroism ofi the’; trawler's and mine-sweepers. The attack which followed a council of war on March 18 was tile most remarkable sea fight since Trafalgar. After this naval battle Mr Bartlett dined witji dseveraj of the \ Turkish 'Embassy at Rome, when the officials showed him reports from Constantinople disclosing that the Turks were extremely frightened at the fearful noise of the bombardment, but firmly believed that Divine Providence was protecting them, since practically no damage was done, and only twentyeight persons were killed and forty wounded, 'while two guns were destroyed. Mr Bartlett said he told Admiral de Robeck this, and the admiral said: “I am surprised. I thought we had only destroyed one gun.” Mr Bartlett added: ‘‘Diplomatists let us down badly.”

BULGARIA’S PLACE The operations at Gallipoli were severely handicapped i«y the difficulty of getting a concentrated artillery fire upon the trenches. Commanders in France were now country commanders at Gallipoli. Did not the British Cabinet in July decide to send out reinforcements to secure decisive results It would have been far better to have used the troops to force Bulgaria to join our side, Bulgaria could have got astride Bnlair, and with our attacks on the coast and those of the submarines in the Sea of Marmora, we could easily have cut off the Turks at Gallipoli. The Bulgarians were sympathetic with Russia, and to the last did not desire to fight against the Allies. The diplomatic situation wanted proper stage management. Diplomatists needed plenty of money to spend, and as these were lacking Serbia was sacrificed. In view of Bulgaria’s indecision, our best course would have been to land north of Bnlair. The difficulty was the length of communications, which was thirty miles, if Enos had been chosen as the base. If we had landed at Bnlair alone the sea communication would have been equally lengthy, though the navy undertook to land troops anywhere. Even if the attacks on Au/.ac had succeeded, Mr Bartlett said he was convinced that it did not mean getting to Constantinople, as the Turks had fortified the channel beyond the Narrows at the entrance to the Sea of

Marmora. Even if a large part of the navy reached Constantinople it was doubtful if the Turks would surrender, j “1 have never wavered from my opin- | ion that the attacks and attempts had 1 Hot ilie smallest chance of success. OLD v. NEW STYLE. No regulars were landed at Suvla who were trained to fight in any climate. The attackers deserve all hon!or and consideration, but the untrain- ( I od old-fashioned skirmishing style of , warfare was required at Gallipoli. .Men ' who were trained in modern trench warfare, when unable to sec their offiU;ers and required to work individually, failed in the objective of capturing Anafarta heights. The English nation is one of the thirstiest in the world, and it was impossible to supply the Suvla troops with water, particularly as Turkish corpses were found ,in the wells. The whole operation at Suvla was far too difficult in the face of modern rifle fire. COLONIALS’ REM AREA BLE FIGHT. The Australians and New Zealanders at Anzac put up a remarkable fight, and the great tragedy had not succeeded. It was hoped that if they took the position they would get to Constantinople, but it was useless to hide the fact that it was a very bad reverse. When the Bulgarian attaches found that we had failed they reported that they thought the other side would win. Now »that the Bulgarians and Turks have joined with the AustroGermans coming south it is too much to hope that we shall reach Constantinople. “1 don’t think,” said Mr Bartlett, “that we can advance any further in the Dardanelles.”

Continuing, Mr Bartlett said that the popular query was, why did not the Allies persevere in the attack on the Asiatic side. The fact was there were hardly enough troops to hold Cape Helles. It was essential to bring back the French and extend our lines. Another possibility was a landing at Bulair; but though the‘naval demonstration revealed that there were no Turks there we landed no troops. Cape Helles was selected because the landing was easily covered by the fire from the battleships.

THE AUSTRALIANS’ TASK. Mr Bartlett considered that the landing at Anzac was unwise, as. our hands were' full at Cape Helles in withstanding the Turkish counter-at-tacks. If the had been put ashore at Cape Helles there would have been enough riien’. The capture of Achi; Baba would, not have been decisive, but it AVdold have 1 been usdful in view of future operations. The task of; the Australians was to push on to Maidos, capturing the Narrows, but the sciheme failed. A new situation arose after the failure of the May attacks, and new plans should have been introduced at> this juncture. It was quite evident that the Turks were not feeble and were not going to surrender the Dardanelles. English divisions continued to arrive and were used in various local attacks of little purpose.; False optimism prevailed everywhere.. People seemed to think it an' accident that the Turks had held \put ;i so long. They were in reality becoming more skilful and more tenacious; daily, and the positions at Achi Iffiba . and Anzat were stronger than Plevna.

THE PLEDGE TO SERBIA. Air Bartlett said: “The pledge to Help Serbia was made in all honorable intentions, and it is that we are unable to redeem it. Serbia must not go under nor make terms. It is useless for the Allies to pom troops into Salonika. The difficulties are enormous, it is mountainous country, the railway is cut, and there are no roads. It is equally impossible to attack Bulgaria, and only three or four weeks remain wherein a campaign is possible. “Our mistake was not going to -Macedonia long ago to occupy the Varna line, which is one of the best defensive positions in the world. “I am not pessimistic. We are bound to win the war, but ve aio, go ing tiie wrong way about it. Our enemies are now able to send men to any part of the Near East in three or four days, and our troops arrive m the worst condition. When we direct our forces to the right channel the real end will begin.” OUR SUBMARINES. Mr Bartlett declared that what our submarines had achieved in the Sea of Marmora was so marvellous that when the complete tale is told their deeds will almost atone for the other mistakes' on the Peninsula.