The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER. MONDAY, AUGUST 31, 1914. IS IT A BUBBLE?

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXX, Issue 11, 31 August 1914, Page 4

The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER. MONDAY, AUGUST 31, 1914. IS IT A BUBBLE?

In the September number of the “London.” “En Avant” writes of tiie “German .Military L.-bbio.” and who will prick it. He remarks that thencan be no doubt that in military and diplomatic matters judicious advertising pays as well as it does in all trades or professions. The great essential of success is to establish a reputation and subsequently to maintain it bv careful advertisement. The writer goes on to point out that for half a century Turkey existed upon the reputation the army won at Plevna and for a similar period the German Army has been living on the reputation achieved in 1866 and 1870 against the Austrians and the French. Since the FrancoGerman war no State has dared to call in question the invincibility of the German Army. Ho admits that on paper this army is not only the greatest, but the most perfectly organised army in the world, but contends that there is no sound criterion by which the worth of an army for war can bo judged in time of peace. Proceeding, it is shown how the Germans’ system of life and military training is not designed to encourage individual effort but rather to stultify it, and to reduce the individual man or unit, to the state of a disciplined automaton. Again, what men may do at manoeuvres is no criterion whatever of what they will do in war, and the army that is not proven in war is like a piece of machinery that has never been set in motion. The Gorman Army is bound by rule of thumb, its science of warfare is cut ami dried. Officers and men alike know what they ought to do under a hundred different conditions, hut if other conditions arise then the difficulty comes in. The whole training of the German soldier is designed to eradicate individualism and to reduce soldiers, battalions, regiments, and brigades to a state ol iron-bound antomatorn'sin. The writer very properly points out that patriotism and hardiness win through in many cases where discipline has I dled completely, and there is no risk so hopeless as that of any army which lias been kept together oidv by bonds of discipline when once those bonds have boon loosed. Speaking especially of infantry, the same critic holds that the German infantryman is too fat. that bo tries to carry too much weight on his back, and that he lacks the dash

of ilia French, the doggoclnsss °f the Russian, this fatalism of the 1 ark, or the practical aclaptahility of his British rival. Touching for a moment on the Navy, it is pointed out that of late, not content with worshipping the German Army, Europe has taken to adulating the German Navy, calculating ice strength in Dreadnoughts, forgetting altogether the more important factor of the men who man the fleet. Consequently, though Germany may manufacture Dreadnoughts, she cannot manufacture sailors, tor the past five years the question of the manning of the German fleet has been a difficult ouo, whilst that of finding officers for it has been even more difficult. r lhe conclusion arrived at is that the German sailor in war time will have to face battle with his ships largely manned by amateurs and ex-amateui it servists. That is why, amongst other tilings, the writer concludes that the idea of Germany’s military and naval power is hut a highly-inflated bubble, of brilliant hues, but only too susceptible of being pricked and burst.