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A PROPHETIC WRITING.

BRrTAiMS VITAL • KTfnEST. THE COST OF FRENCH DEFEAT. / Among t. • striking hooks aw.ilanle on the relationship of Germany to the rest of Europe is a vigorous volume, “What Germany Wants,” by Mr W. N. Willis. The writer has collected in this book a deal of interesting matter, and has set' out at length the German desire for colonisation, and particularly the hope of acquiring ready-made colonies by fii>t reaching a sufficient strength to take them. At the moment, however, one of the most interesting passages in the oooic is a dialogue, 'or rather a monologue, which thp author records as the utterance of “one of the best known living authorities ’ on' international politics.” “If Germany does not got what sire wants,” I asked, “what vill happen ?”

“War,” my friend laconically replied. “. . . But Germany would prefer not to go to war for at least another year or two-—say, not until the spring of 1913. Thai; is the very earliest date to suit her purpose. She would rather wait until she is stronger—in other words, until her array and navy are considerably strengthened. While she is waiting and strengthening her forces she is anxious to do a little bit of diplomatic scrummaging and bartering for minor entrees on the international banqueting menu. That policy would suit her admirably. It would give her what she wants—time. That is German policy, and it is German history repeating itself.”

“But,” I, asked, “should she he rebuffed in the. diplomatic parlor, what then?”

1 Min that case, Germany would wait until , the, spring of 1913, and then pick a quarrel with France. 1 Germany, above. a,ll, nations, cannot afford to risk a way .with big chances of being defeated. (Infernally she has all the Socialistic elements, fliough not the poverty, (that. France jhad' before the great. Revolution, with thfs 1 difference 1 —the .Socialists, of to-pay are educat--od. . . It is certain that the Socialists would fight with hand and brain against the monarchy if Germany risked a war before she was fully ready, and by any • chance lost. In all probability that would mean the . end of. : the German dynasty, and tho • end. of the Gorman Empire as | an Imperial inonarchy, If she won, and it is estimated . that single-handed she could not lose; 1 once' she'entered Paris as a victor, sho, would demand such an indemnity as would not only stagger Franco, hut tho whole world. In her 1870 war with France, Germany made it a business undertaking, and cleared about £200,000,000 ill cash, in addition to tho mvo provinces/ Alsace and Lorraine. Bismarck often■/regretted ho did not make the indemnity more, say £400,000,000. If the Germans again provoke a war with France, and enter Paris, the indemnity they exact would ho nearer £600,000,000. This will provide Germany with funds to flaunt as the disturber of Europe for many a long year. . .

“But suppose she gets all her ‘ontrees’ at the diplomatic conclave?” “Well, she will then postpone war until, as I say, she is stronger and surer. But war is sure to follow, in any event. > ; J Ifc is only a matter of when and under what circumstances.” Having thus forecasted the war as an inevitable part of Germany’s immediate plans, the speaker contrasts tho German and French armies, not at all in favor of the latter, which he set down as half a million as against tho Germans 800,000, and then speculates upon tho high probability that Germany would first take Belgium and ■Holland. Germany’s naval programme he says, is not necessarily aimed at an invasion of England, but to keep England at arm’s length to prevent England from interfering without placing her own Navy in jeopardy. “The British Navy, no matter how strong, cannot prevent the Germans entering Paris. Therefore, if wo arc to ho loyal to France and it is a life and death interest to us to he' loyal—it must lie not sentimental loyalty, hut hard, practical loyalty. If we are to keep. France safe from German thraldom we must he prepared to defend her Belgian frontier with at least 150,000 seasoned troops.”

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/STEP19140814.2.4

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXIX, Issue 97, 14 August 1914, Page 2

Word count
Tapeke kupu
686

A PROPHETIC WRITING. Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXIX, Issue 97, 14 August 1914, Page 2

A PROPHETIC WRITING. Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXIX, Issue 97, 14 August 1914, Page 2

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