The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 1914. HOW WAR AFFECTS COMMERCE.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXIX, Issue 93, 10 August 1914, Page 4

The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 1914. HOW WAR AFFECTS COMMERCE.

The. great Nations of Europe have been so Jong- at peace, between themselves that very few of us can realise from experience of previous events what a state of war means to us in our business and, private life. Some may remember the, Franco-Prussian

War of 1870, but only our oldest pioneers can re-call the last European war in which England was directly engaged, the Crimean War of 1854. The Spanisli-American War, the South African War, and the Russo-Japanese War, are all of recent memory, but in none of these was our commerce or oversea trading materially affected. In the present war. however, not only are the largest armies and navies in the world with the exception of the United States in conflict, but the great bulk of the world’s mercantile marine is endangered as. well. As the nations at war are the chief carriers of the world’s commerce, it is certain that in spite of the war they must continue to carry, or Europe at any rate will starve.The question then that the man in the street naturally asks is: What

protection will British,- German, French, Austrian and Russian merchants have in carrying on their over-

| seas trade from the outbreak of hostilities? First of all, on the out T break of hostilities—Will all German merchantmen in the various ports of our Empire be liable to seizure and forfeiture? As no declaration of war is required by international law or usage before commencing hostile action, it necessarily follows that ■German and English ships would enter each .other’s ports in all .good faith until they' received official notification of the outbreak of war from their own Governments. The answer is that they would probably be detained but would not be confiscated. There has been only one instance since the Napoleonic War in which the right of confiscation was exercised, and that was in the American Civil War of 18(11. During recent wars in such cases a certain limited time has been granted to such ships to leave the hostile port for the nearest port of their own-country. An equally important question is: Can the enemy’s merchantmen shelter in neutral ports when pursued or to avoid

pursuit? The answer is that they can and they are permitted to stay so long as they choose to remain. The same answer applies in similar circumstances to ships of war, but if they stay any longer than is strictly necessary to refit or coal they must either leave forthwith or be dismantled. ' In the latter case they would be in the custody of the neutral power until the. termination; of the war. During recent years there] has been a growing feeling against the right of capture of private -property at sea, and most of the European nations have been strongly in favor of it. The exemption however Eas always been strongly opposed by Great Britain, who realises that once this privilege was granted, an effective blockade of the enemy’s coast would be impossible. The case for Great Britain is well put by Sir Edward Grey in his instructions to the British Plenipotentiary to the Hague Conference in 1907. Sir Edward Grey ithen said: “It is possible to imagine cases in which the interests of Great Britain might benefit by the adoption of this principle. But on the other hand, it must be remembered that the principle—if earned to its logical conclusion—must entail the abolition of the right of commercial blockade. Unless commercial blockade is discontinued there will he constant interference with an enemy’s ships, and constant di 'pates as to what constitutes an elf a: ri re blockade. And when such disputes have once arisen bot.veen beingrfnv powers it is obvious that ins one which considers itself aggrieved by the application of commercial blockade to any of its ports would ceu-o to respect the immunity of Ibe Merchant ships and private property of its enemy,Wherever 'bey me to be found. It seems, therefore, that it is impossible to separate this question of immunity from capture from that oir ' commercial' blockade; and that"the question to which his Majesty’s Government have to apply themselves is whether they should ( agree to a proposal which would deprive the British navy in time of war of the right of interfering with an .enemy’s merchant ships ("• property, and of the power of commercial blockade. The British Navy is ihe oyiy offensive weapon which Great Britain has against Continental powers. The latter have a double means of offence; they have their navies ahd they have ; their powerful armies. During recent years the proportion between the British Army and the great Continental armies has come to be such that the British Army operating, alone could not be regarded as i means of offence against the main-, ‘and of a great Continental power. For her ability to bring pressure to bear upon her enemies in war Groat Britain lias, therefore, to rely on the Navy alone.- His Majesty’s ■ Government cannot, therefore, authorise you to agree to any resolution which would diminish-/ the effective means which the Navy has of bringing pressure to bear upon an enemy. If at some future date the great Continental armies were to he diminished and other changes favourable to the diminution of armaments were :o take place, the British Government nigh't be able ‘to reconsider the question.” Blockade,’as it is term’d, to be effectual, must render liable to capture not mly the enemy’s merchantmen but dso neutral vessels. If the Tatter ittempt to run. the blockade, they u-e liable to seiznreWnd confiscation. \part from this restriction,; neutral hips, cannot be seized merely bemuse they are bound for an enemy’s port unless they are carrying muniions or contraband of war for the ■nerny. The belligerents have always he right to search neutral ships if they suspect them of. carrying contraband of war. This right of search has always lead to a great deal of auction between the belligerents and lie neutral powers concerned. It led o the war between England and the United States in 1812, and caused a rood deal of friction with Germany n the South African War. .The.right >f search has in recent years been •endered much less stringent owing to the inconvenience caused to shipping. Ever since the celebrated, case in'lß6l, when the Confederate envoys 'Messrs Mason and Slidell) were taken iff a British mail steamer (the Trent) in the. Gulf of Mexico by a federal frigate, the right- to ar•est prominent officials or officers of the enemy has been regarded as illegal. In the Trent case the United states was given the option of banting over the envoys within twenty-four lours or accepting a declaration of v.-i r.