THE NAVAL POLICY.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXIX, Issue 46, 16 June 1914, Page 7

THE NAVAL POLICY.

[To The Editoe Stratford Post.] Sir, — it will be conceded that , public opinion is considerably concerned about the form of naval policy our Government will decide to commit this Dominion to in the near future, and it is true that statesmen and politicians do not always rise superior to the pettiness of party politics when questions, touching the Imperial side of public interests and the nation as a whole, are engaging public opium, but on the naval policy of this Dominion 1 believe most thinking men adhere to the belief that our public men are honorably sincere in their efforts to follow the wisest course in the settlement of our future protection on' the sea. To me it doesniseem unfortunate that the press of the Dominion is not used to the full by thinking men to make an improved public opinion on such a subject as: the future naval policy we should adopt. Now, it is surely possible for men to discard party feeling and to dispassionately speak and write in the interests of Imperial issues without in the least belittling themselves by attacking the political party to which they are opposed. During the last few years the naval policy of the Empire has been fashioning itself to meet the changing conditions that are appearing in every quarter of the globe and we, in these remote islands, are called upon to decide which of two courses it would be, wisest for us to follow in shifting into line with tlie peculiar changes taking place. In order to make clear my remarks, I think it best to set down here what I conceive to be the two courses open to us : (a) To immediately lay the nucleus of a local navy, and as it assumes the strength needful to our protection so should we by gradations reduce our contributions to the Imperial navy until a vanishing point in; these contributions is reached.

(b) To continue our present policy of annual contributions on a rising scale to meet the needs of our rising importance. Now, in discussing (a), there are so many fascinating byways ono might follo-.v* that the most useful and important arguments are liable to be overlooked in a short article like this. However, let us suppose we adopt, (a): "It is clear we must acquire the most modern class of ships of whichever type we decide upon, and it is clear we must continue to steadily add vessels of the most recent designs ' and fighting power or Our navy would be a mere bubble on the ocean's bosom. It is fair to presume that these ships would be manned and officered by New Zealand-born, subjects, and it is also fair to presume that it would cost twice as much to man ,'and officer a i ship with New Zealandors as it would to man jand officer the same ship with men born and reared in the British Isles for colonials would not 'join the service under the condidtions now prevailing in !the Imperial navy. Taking into consideration these circumstances I am of opinion that we should consider carebefore adopting .course (a), j In following the ever-changing, ;eircumstances surrounding the naval defence of our Empire, I notice that the weight of expert opinion is that none of the outstanding members of the Empire will'be molested until the central strength of the navy has been challenged and overwhelmed by an enemy. After paying due respect to this expert opinion I am convinced that it is our imperative duty to strengthen the central power of the Imperial navy in the North Sea and its imemdiate precincts and not to expend large sums in purchasing a few ships that are to float on the horizon off the coast of the Dominion twelve thousand miles from the centre of the Empire's naval strength. The greatest seamen in the Imperial navy are agreed that in future sea fights will be, not between scattered divisions [of contending fleets, but between the concentrated fleets of the contending nations, and that victory will go to the fleet that strikes quickest, is most successfully handled, and possesses superiority of numbers and fighting power at the centre of attack. If this is so wo must see the inutility of a local navy at the time of an attack on the Empire's central power in the North Sea.

It has been suggested that the establishment of a local fleet would create a new and useful field of employment for the youth of this Dominion, but in looking over the surrounding circumstances, I feel forced to the conclusion that this suggestion must be dismissed as unworthy for the following reasons:—Firstly, it is apparent we could not spare a single youth for service in the navy at the present time, for in the wise and economical development of the untouched natural resources of this young country we need the aid of every available man at the present time; secondly, as it wovdd cost twice as much to man a local navy with New Zealand-born subjects as it would to man the same navy with men born and reared in the British Isles, the unwiseness of this suggestion will bo clear to all who think. As time will not permit of my entering at the present into the more complex phases of this question, I will, with your permission, sir, engage in a few days in a closer examination of a few more of the numerous aspects, of this most absorbing topic, and though I am conscious of the imperfect nature of any observations I may make, yet I trust no harm will be done by setting forth a few of my own ideas on this question, which is troubling the intellects of our publi« men.—! am, etc.,

THOMAS BOYLE,