Ulster's Position.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 85, 1 April 1914, Page 5

Ulster's Position.

THE ARMY IN POLITICS.

DEBATE IN THE LORDS.

(By Electric Telegraph—Copyright] [United Press Association.) London, March 31.

In tha House of Lords, in a series of replies to questions, Lord Morley stated that Sir Arthur Paget had not received instructions to put hypothetical question to officers. Beyond a general order granting leave to domiciled officers in Ulster, if their unit were ordered to support the civil power, no instructions were given to Sir Arthur Paget. The conduct of the troops generally had been exenn pary. Lord Morley related that he remained after the Cabinet had dispersed on the Monday, and Colonel Seely showed him the proposed paragraphs. He did not perceive then, and did not perceive now, that they differed in spirit or substance from the previous paragraphs sanctioned by Cabinet. Lord Morley confessed that he had joined in the offence against the sound Cabinet rule that the addition had no right to be mad© without the sanction of Cabinet, Lord Curzon asked, as Colonel Seely has resigned, why is Lord Morley still a Minister? Lord Morley replied: “I shall answer that to-morrow.” Lord Selbourne thought Mr Asquith’s explanations incompatible with established facts. He was glad the Premier was going to the War Office. He would get the greatest surprise of his life when he found what hig colleagues had really been doing. Mr Asquith could not have issued his statement of the 23rd inst. if he had been fully informed. His inference to “two small cruisers” was incompatible with Mr Churchill’s movement of the battle squadron. What had Mr Churchill in his mind when he contemplated the whole of the paraphernalia of war, at a time when Ulster was profoundly tranquil? It was perfectly clear that active operations were intended, leading to all the in« cidents of war. Lord Selbourne asked the Government to tell what had really happened 911 the fateful day when General Paget met Colopey ■ Seely and some of his colleagues in London. Why 1 General Paget’s terrible apprehension at the mere- movement of foUr companies ? Wag it intended to instruct* the . constabulary, to search for arms and bank them 1 up ? Mr Churchill now sought;‘tci create B ’a diversion; by rais-. ing-tlie ory- of <the “Army versus the people,’’!'j i Mr* Churchill’s statement that the Unionists considered it right that soldiers should shoot down - a Radical or a Liberal was a foul falsehood.

Lord Haldane agreed that it was 1 wrong to bring the Army into poli- ! tics. No more splendid or more loyal body of men existed, but a largo number of officers had raised a big issue at The Curragh. They had not disobeyed orders, but raised questions about 'orders-whiclv may be giveii them. I 'A grfeat'Armed force had been raised ip.; Ulster, /yet it was’suggested that it was Ijjie Government’s duty to do n6thi%.‘’Tjie '.iGovernment had. gazhd with ■ patience on' the utterly 1 illegal drilling, iri, Ulster because they .j felt it was better not to interfere, bpt i it beqame ythe;|Government’s imperative duty to have instruments on hand to maintain order if a conflict occurred. So a battle squadron was sent to Lamlash. as a preventative measure, but was withdrawn when it was found that the troops had been peaceably moved. It was deplorable that a : number of unfortunate officers had been misled by the suggestions of the Unionist press, and the sooner the 1 incident was ended the , better it would be for the Army. Lord Roberts said the baseless assertions made that the Army was implicated in politics and conspiracy was also equally slanderous, and so were the charges of disobedience and disregard of discipline. There was not the smallest justification for any of these incidents. Officers were asked to make their choice between two terrible alternatives. The option was not sought by them. It was deliberately instigated by the Government, through General Paget. The Government evidently realised that it was making a demand on the Army that it had no right to make, and contemplated something not provided in the Army Act of the King’s Regulations, the answer to which was to be found in the Manual of Military Law, which says that the English law never presupposes the possibility of civil war, and does not make any express provision for such contingencies. IN THE COMMONS. London, March 31. On the motion for the third reading of the Consolidated Bill, the Army crisis was further debated, i Mr Churchill,, referring to General Paget’s anxiety regarding the move- ■ ment of troops, said that General Paget had assured the Government he r would not allow the troops to fire on - the Orangemen until the troops had • been fired at for some time, and had 1 suffered effective loss. The Government was absolutely bound to be , prepared. It seemed to bo patriotic c and loyal to raise an army in Ulster, ? but the Government precautions to • support and protect troops against ' this army, were considered a fiendish land treacherous conspiracy. He definitely charged the leaders of the Opposition in both Houses with the 9 seduction of the Army. Mr Bonar Law denied the charge, i Tf the officers had been influenced c ito was by Mr Churchill’s Bradford