THE SUGAR TRUST.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXIV, Issue 99, 21 December 1912, Page 5

THE SUGAR TRUST.

FINED £IOOO,

(Per Press Association.) Wellington, December 20

Sir R. Stout delivered his reserved judgment in the sugar case of The King v. The Merchants’ Association. Ho found :—(1) J hat the discount scales of the Colonial Sugar Company on numbers 2 and 3 were made to prevent competition in the sale and disposal cf sugar; (2) .that they were mads to enable a commercial trust or association with a group of buyers, to get control of the distribution of sugar; (3) that they were made so as to prevent Fairbairn, Wright and Co. or other persons from purchasing sugar, and giving certain discounts to purchasers from them; (4) that defendants wore acting in consort or conspiring together to get this control; (6) that they were made so as to ensure a profit that might otherwise not have gone to members of tho trust going to members of the trust. In the course of his judgment, Sir R. Stout said that in his opinion the court must hold that the keeping up of the price of goods or nob reducing them when they could he reduced if there were free competition, was contrary to the public interest. To say that a difference of 4 or 4£ per cent, on goods would not affect prices was not proved. ihe only evidence on the subject was that it would affect prices to the consumer. As defendants culled no evidence to contradict the statements of Fairbairn, the court must assume that ’ no such evidence could iiave been called. His Honor held that the Australian coal vend case was not a parallel with the case under review. If the Sugar Company cairied out or arranged to carry out schemes that the statute declared to be offences, such schemes must be deemed to he contrary to the public interest. What was, then, the aim o! the defendants in altering scales? In his opinion there could be only one answer: It was to prevent persons who were not members of the commercial trust getting goods at the same price as persons who were members of the commercial trust. It was to arrange a discount for one class and not for another class; to arrange a discount for the class that would obey the commercial trust and give another discount to a class that would not, obey the commercial trust. Such an action was distinctly prohibited by section 3of the Act. He found all the defendants guilty of the offences charged in paragraph 37 of the statement of claim in the first action, being an offence under section 5 of the Act. The Sugar Company was guilty under section 3 in giving discounts to Levin and Co. The defendants other than the Sugar Company were guilty of an offence tinder section 7 of the Act. As to the second action, he found that Levin and Co. were not principals in the transaction of giving discounts, and not agents of the Sugar Company. Eacli defendant was fined an aggregate of £IOOO in the first action, with costs. After judgment had been delivered, Mr. Skerrett, for the Merchants’ Association, asked if judgment was for the defendant in the first action in respect to those charges under section 4, His Honour: I have picked cut tho section. I consider judgment should be given for the Crown. Mr. Skerrett: And those you have not mentioned? You do net consider they have been proved? His Honour: That is so.

In answer to the Attorney-General, his Honour said that he would allow fifteen guineas costs in respect to the interlocutory proceedings. Mr. Skerrett: I apply for a stay of proceedings, pending the determination of the appeal. The Crown is willing to consent on the understanding that security lie found for the amount of the judgment and costs by January 22; the appellants to undertake to proceed with the appeal at sittings of the Court of Appeal. A stay of proceedings was granted on these terms.

Mr. Herdman; We claimed an injunction. Your Honour did not mention it.

His Honour: That is a matter you can move for if you wish. I think it is a matter there is no need for. I will reserve the question of an injunction and you can make application.