CONDUCT OF WAR IN PACIFIC

Southland Times, Issue 24886, 28 October 1942, Page 5

CONDUCT OF WAR IN PACIFIC

DIVIDED COMMAND CRITICIZED

(Special Australian Correspondent, N.Z.P.A.)

(Rec. 10.55 p.m.) SYDNEY, Oct. 27. With the news of additional American losses of warships in the Solomons the conduct of the war in the South Pacific is again being critically reviewed in the United States and Australia. The New York journal American declares that the divided command in the area has been largely responsible for the heavy losses, while The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, declares that there cannot be close co-ordination and maximum efficiency until the whole of the South Pacific is placed under a single high command. The appointment of the provenly of-fensively-minded Vice-Admiral William Halsey to the South Pacific naval command in place of Vice-Admiral Robert L. Ghormley is welcomed in Australia as suggesting that Washington is anxious for aggressive action. The changes in command must also be accepted as confirmation that all has not gone well, in addition to being a sign of American determination to maintain an aggressive strategy in this area.

The Sydney Morning Herald emphasizes the need for ever-closer cooperation between the forces of ViceAdmiral Halsey and General MacArthur. MACARTHUR’S POSITION Answering the long-smouldering gossip that General MacArthur was “put on the shelf or exiled to Australia,” David Lawrence writes in The New York Sun: “If General MacArthur is not . taking a bitter part in the Solomons fighting, the responsibility lies with General George C. Marshall, United States Army Chief of Staff. It is General Marshall’s duty as a member of the High Command to insist on the Army’s participation if he thinks it wise. General MacArthur is not shelved, but the time has not yet come for him to assume command of the military operations because the Navy has not acquired big bases or approaches to new land areas for him to command.” United States newspaper and radio commentators and Congressmen are hammering on the censorship front for a more liberal policy on the release of information about what they describe as the “unknown war with Japan” and it is believed that a more swift release of battle news compatible with security may be hoped for.

CRITICISM OF ERRORS

NEW YORK, October 26.

“Vice-Admiral Halsey’s replacement of Vice-Admiral Robert L. Ghormley is a clear admission of costly and inexcusable errors made in the prosecution of the war,” points out The New York Daily Mirror in an editorial. “The Japanese out-smarted, out-manoeuvred and out-gunned our naval forces, notably by the sinkings of the Canberra, Quincy, Vincennes and Astoria in a sudden, audacious attack. Apparently the end of these great ships was without glory for the Navy High Command.

“There are reports passed by the censorship that all our losses have not yet been announced. In addition, there are disquieting reports from competent sources of inter-service friction. In replacing Vice-Admiral Ghormley the Navy apparently acted on the wise principle that blame for mistakes must be fixed and those responsible must be removed, but it is questionable if ViceAdmiral Ghormley’s removal alone will compose all our difficulties in the Pacific. The root of the difficulties lies in the lack of unity of command. We might learn a lesson from the Japanese, who have a single commander for the entire area.” “Vice-Admiral Halsey is a resourceful, aggressive leader who may be expected to enforce stricter tactical measures and tighter organization,” declares The New York Times, “but whethex- he can reverse the course of events is dependent on how fully he is supported. He must have the necessary ships, planes and troops to drive the enemy back.”