LABOUR PROBLEM IN AUSTRALIA

Southland Times, Issue 24885, 27 October 1942, Page 5

LABOUR PROBLEM IN AUSTRALIA

AMERICAN CRITICISM

(Rec. 8.15 p.m.) NEW YORK, Oct. 25. Hanson Baldwin, writing in the New York Times, says:— “After 10 months of war in the Pacific, Australia’s role is still uncertain. The campaign in the Solomons is not based on Australia. It is primarily based on Hawaii and secondarily on New Zealand and New Caledonia. The Battle of the Solomons is not primarily an effort to protect the supply line to Australia, for under the present strategy Australia has become a secondary base. It is a battle to break Japan’s power by pushing northwards toward Rabaul and Truk, the heart of the Japanese dominated Western Pacific. “When General Douglas MacArthur was assigned to command the Southwest Pacific it was understood that Australia would be the main base for any such move. Australia may yet become the main base of a powerful Allied effort, but her potentialities are not yet fully developed, partly due to internal problems indigent to Australia and partly due to the shipping shortage. The strategic problem is further complicated by the division of the Pacific into two separate areas. General MacArthur’s position as commander-in-chief is made difficult by Australia’s internal problems. “Warwick Fairfax, referring to the serious Japanese threat to Port Moresby recently, asked whether the margin of time given by the arrival of Allied reiforcements was not somewhat narrow, also whether the fact that Australia might have to be defended partly in New Guinea was generally appreciated, adding: ‘Any retort to the effect that it was first necessary to concentrate on the defence of Australia is not, I think, complete.’ As Mr Fairfax wrote, such a reply is far from complete, but it contains inferentially part of the explanation of what has been wrong in Australia. Like so many other nations and like some of our own leaders, Australia was for a long time too preoccupied in the defence of its own soil to pay proper attention to New Guinea. WAR CABINET’S AUTHORITY “Nor was this the fault of General MacArthur, who in some ways is supreme commander in name only. He has been hampered by a number of factors, first, the unfortunate proposal made in the United States to nominate him as President, which General MacArthur has not supported. Australian politics also must be considered as they weigh heavily in the war’s bal-ance-sheet as in the case of all the other United Nations. The position of any American or any non-Australian as supreme commander of both American and Australian troops is naturally somewhat difficult. The circumstances in which General MacArthur arrived in Australia, when the country was in dire danger of invasion, naturally strengthend Mr Curtin’s political position. The Australian War Cabinet naturally continued to reserve a considerable share of authority—the military decisions have not always been General MacArthur’s. “The normal difficulties of waging a coalition war have been increased in Australia by the labour problem, about which Australians themselves are complaining. There is no question, in the opinion of many Australians, that Labour’s insistence on “its rights,” its determination to work no more than a stated number of hours, excluding Saturday afternoons, and holidays, and its general attitude to the war have hampered the full development of the United Nations war effort in Australia. The Labour attitude is described as complacency. Many workers seem primarily interested in retaining their peace-time privileges. The Australians, open-hearted, friendly and hospitable, have treated our troops as brothers, but as a result of the labour situation what has been accomplished in Australia is largely due to our own efforts. WORK DONE BY TROOPS “Our troops in many instances have unloaded convoys, replacing stevedores who were not'required to work after the whistle. We have built airfields, roads and cantonments. The Australians helped, but in so far as labour is concerned their help has by no means been what we hoped for. There are other problems which are only a reflection of the casual, easy, care-free mind too common in many of the United Nations, but the full development of Australia as a main base of operations is handicapped by more than internal problems. Shipping is a major factor, because the long supply lines to Australia impose a great strain to keep Australia supplied. _ Yet the only way in which an offensive can be developed from Australia is across the seas. This means that any offensive from Australia must be amphibious. This means not only transports and cargo ships, but also battleships. To protect them General MacArthur has only a very limited naval force, insufficient to support a strategic push northward. Some of his vessels have been attached to the South Pacific forces in the Solomons offensive. General MacArthur’s bombers have also supported this offensive by heavy attacks against Rabaul and northern Solomons bases. In other words, the forces under the command of one of the two great strategical commanders in the Pacific supported the forces under the commander of the other and vice versa.

“When the commands of General MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, were defined the strategic problems were complicated by the division of the Pacific into two separate areas, lumping Australia, New Guinea, part of the Solomons, the Netherland East Indies and the Philippines as one strategic unit under General MacArthur, but excluding New Zealand and New Caledonia; When the Solomons campaign was mapped out the dividing line between the authority of General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz ran squarely through Guadalcanar. Thus, to centralize authority under the Navy, which conducted the campaign, the line was moved westward, putting all Guadalcanar and the Southern Solomons under Admiral Nimitz, but today the line still divides the Solomons. All the Japanese bases in the Northern Solomons, also Rabaul, lie on General MacArthur’s side, although our first footholds in the Southern Solomons are on the Nimitz side. “This division is not necessarily a serious handicap, but it poses problems, particularly should Australia some day become the base for a great counteroffensive. That in turn is dependent on a solution of the shipping shortage, remedial measures to solve Australian Internal difficulties and the determination of the strategic role Australia must play in the Pacific.”