STEPPING-STONE TO CONQUESTS

Southland Times, Issue 24884, 26 October 1942, Page 5

STEPPING-STONE TO CONQUESTS

Solomons Campaign (Rec. 8.30 p.m.) NEW YORK, Oct. 24. “The Solomons started as a limited offensive operation aimed to stem Japanese encroachment on our supply lines to Australia, but now the Solomons are considered a stepping stone to further Pacific conquests,” says The New York Times correspondent, Hanson Baldwin. . “We embarked on the strategic offensive in only the tenth month of the war. It is apparent that the main thrust is planned from the southern Pacific towards the beast’s belly. “The United States has lost 13 ships totalling 58,000 tons in the Solomons, compared with Japan’s eight totalling 24,000 tons. The American losses are considerable though not crippling and we will probably be staying in the Solomons unless our mistakes of August and September are repeated. “There is little of the Nelson touchaudacity, audacity, always audacity—in our Solomons operations. After the first landing our task forces have not been used offensively, unlike the Japanese, who nightly raided the Guadalcanar areas and shelled marine positions. We have not raided Japanese bases in the Northern Solomons. Also we have not intercepted Japanese night raiders and have not interfered with Japanese night landings outside the Marine lines on Guadalcanar. JAPANESE SUPERIORITY “Our cautious policies have been partly dictated by Japanese air and naval superiority, which they are still maintaining, also by their shorter communication lines, but the Solomons have clearly shown our deficiencies. Over-caution and the defensive complex must be remedied. Today the situation is perhaps no worse than in the middle of September, but three basic problems remain, of which supply is the first. Although the total casualties of the Marines have not exceeded between eight and 10 per cent., we must replace our losses and keep the Marines supplied and reinforced.

“Second, the construction of roads, airfields and docks on Guadalcanar and the New Hebrides must be extended and, third, local naval superiority must be established in order to intercept Japanese vessels which are nightly landing troops. This can be done only by continuous use of surface craft, because air power alone cannot prevent constant infiltration. Until these problems are solved our footholds in the Solomons cannot be termed secure.

“The Army, Navy and Marines are working harmoniously together in the Pacific, but behind the lines there is considerable friction and mutual criticism, which is caused partly by prewar Army and Navy bitterness and partly by events since the war, for example, the disastrous Philippines campaign, for which each service is seeking a scapegoat. Much of the army has joined the chorus of criticism of General Douglas MacArthur, which behind the scenes has increased since the fall of Corregidor. This criticism is largely due to misunderstanding iof General MacArthur’s position in Australia, also to his more liberal and moie intelligent application of the censorship rules, which at first permitted and prompted a more complete coverage of war news in Australia than in the Navy’s sphere in the Pacific. It is further due to a lack of appreciation on the part of most people outside Australia of the internal difficulties of that country. CRITICISM OF NAVY “Furthermore, some Army officers are criticizing, often unjustly, the Navy, calling surface craft ‘dead ducks,’ thus exacerbating the friction. A typical example is the Midway battle, after which the Army released a story creating the impression that .Army planes were instrumental in the victory, while actually Navy carriers did the job and the Army’s role was only minor. The situation might have been rapidly smoothed if over-rigid censorship and unintelligent public-relations officers had not fed fuel to the fire. Over-stringent censorship and delay in the dissemination of war news from the Pacific is primarily the Navy’s fault. The announcement of naval losses has often been so delayed that the public has learned to keep its fingers crossed whenever Navy communiques are published. So, too, do men who do the fighting. For example, the early news published about the Solomons was so different from the actual situation that the men who did the job laughed at our own announcements.”

Mr Baldwin concluded: “The Navy’s public-relations politics have not only prevented the public from obtaining a clear idea of the crucial nature of the Pacific campaign, but they have also exaggerated the differences between the services. They have often badly affected the morale of the fighting services, but have not depressed the enemy’s morale. The power of public opinion has not yet been used as a positive war weapon.”