The Southland Times THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1942. War Against the Submarine

Southland Times, Issue 24881, 22 October 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1942. War Against the Submarine

IN a Trafalgar Day speech the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr A. V. Alexander, quoted figures which reveal the formidable nature of submarine warfare. Since the beginning of the war 530 U-boats have been sunk or damaged by British and American forces. The American figures are not complete, and the total does not include submarines sunk by French naval vessels up to June 1940 or by units of the Soviet navy. Yet even as they stand they provide a significant comparison with the “fewer than 200” U-boats lost during the last war. There are good reasons, however, why the comparison should not be carried too far. The war against merchant shipping has been an essential feature of German policy since the beginning of the present struggle. U-boats became a menace comparatively late in the last war; this time they were ready for action as soon as Hitler ordered the march into Poland. It is true that both sides began the sea campaign with advantages derived from past experience. Moreover, advances in the technique of attack and defence tend to cancel one another. Aircraft, for instance, can be used both to guide the U-boat towards its prey and to report its presence to naval escorts. Bombers can supplement under-water attack by diving upon the convoys in coastal waters; they can also destroy submarines. Greater qualities of endurance in U-boats are offset by improvements in convoy methods and by a wider range of defensive weapons. If these facts are remembered the discrepancy between losses for two wars may seem less marked. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that the sea lanes have been kept open through every phase of the struggle for mastery. The magnitude of the task carried out by the Allied navies (and for so long by the Royal Navy, working alone) can be judged from the figures quoted by Mr Alexander. Although hundreds of submarines have been destroyed they have inevitably taken many fine ships with them to the bottom of the sea. In normal circumstances the British merchant fleet might not have been large enough to meet the constant drain upon its reserve tonnage, especially while the rate of sinkings was higher than the rate of replacement. The situation was made easier by one of the paradoxes of the war. Hitler’s military victories were so sudden and complete that they increased his difficulties at sea by forcing the shipping of European nations to take refuge in British ports. According to official figures, quoted in the latest edition of Brassey’s Naval Annual, 1952 ships of 8,750,000 tons gross were co-operating last year with British shipping in the fight for the freedom of the seas.

Naval Blitzkrieg

“That accession of strength, not only in ships but in trained seamen . . . was decisive,” says a writer in Brassey’s Annual. “It became apparent that unless the Germans could speedily increase their rate of destruction of the much larger volume of tonnage at our disposal, the more efficient would become the offensive—defensive measures of the Admiralty and the greater the production of new tonnage in British, American, Canadian and Australian shipyards.” That was why Hitler proclaimed a submarine blitzkrieg in February 1941. “U-boat war will start this spring,” he declared in a speech made on the eighth anniversary of his accession to power. “The enemy will then see that we have not been sleeping. When the hour comes we shall launch a decisive last stroke. That will happen this historic year.” All the world knows that 1941 was not, after all, the year of victory for Germany. And one of the reasons why Hitler lost his triumph was the failure of the U-boat offensive. The menace in those spring months of 1941 was very great, although never as grave as the crisis of 1917. In January the losses of British, Allied and neutral shipping were just over 300,000 tons. Three months later the monthly total had gone up to 600,000 tons. “If sinkings had continued at this rate, before any substantial new tonnage was forthcoming,” said the Minister of War Transport at the beginning of 1942, “oui’ powers of resistance would certainly have been impaired, aid to Russia would have been exceedingly problematic, and the effect might have been to add years to the war. As events showed, the enemy had underestimated both the resourcefulness of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, and also the fighting spirit of our merchant seamen. Our losses fell, and for every ship sunk our warships exacted a heavy toll from the enemy.” By October 1941 the average monthly loss was 180,000, compared with 400,000 tons a year earlier. There were reasons foxhoping that submarine warfare was under control. But the situation naturally deteriorated when Japan ranged herself with the Axis. The wider dispersal of Allied naval and ail- strength, especially while American production was not fully organized for war, created difficulties that arc only just being overcome. Two days ago the shipping losses were described in a London message as “one of the blackest aspects of the war.” Il may be necessary to smoke out the hornets’ nest at Dakar before the danger is removed from the central Atlantic sea lanes. But when the full story is told it may be shown that the darkest period was the spring of 1941. Although Germany is still making a great effort it must now be difficult to provide enough submarine crews with the necessary skill and experience. And in a sea war of attrition the advantage is increasingly with the United Nations.