The Southland Times FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1942. A Japanese Threat to Siberia?

Southland Times, Issue 24840, 4 September 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1942. A Japanese Threat to Siberia?

rjIHE possibility of a Japanese at- -- tack on Russia has been frequently mentioned in recent months. Troop movements in China, an offensive in the Suiyuan province of Inner Mongolia, and the occupation of the western islands in the Aleutians all seemed to point towards an eventual move against Siberia. The importance of Suiyuan is not merely its caravan route to Outer Mongolia (which is under Soviet protection), but also its geographic position, which makes it an ideal starting point for a direct attack on the Irkutsk and Lake Baikal regions in the heart of Siberia. The seizure of bases in the Aleutians was probably intended as a defensive measure to cut the air route between American bases and the Russian mainland. These military preparations have now been followed by political changes in Japan which are being interpreted in some quarters as a preliminary to an attack on Russia. Chinese newspapers have said merely that the resignation of the Foreign Minister, Mr Togo, “portends a new and bold move by the war party.” A former Tokyo correspondent of The New York Herald-Tribune declared that the move “resulted from an internal policy dispute whether to move against Siberia or India.” And it has been reported that Dr T. V. Soong, China’s delegate on the Pacific War Council, informed the Council “that Japan was preparing to move against Russia.” These are merely opinions, although they come from quarters where Japanese policy is fairly well understood. Moreover, they receive unexpected support from a passage in a statement by Hitler. “The majority of the millions in the Far East,” he said, “have made a pact with them (the German soldiers) that will prevent their land from falling under the barbarisms of Bolshevik exploitation . . This may cause embarrassment in Tokyo, where it is customary to insist that the non-aggression pact with Russia remains inviolable. It may also indicate a growing impatience in Berlin. The Germans must be waiting anxiously for Japanese intervention in eastern Russia. And there can be little doubt that Geiman and Japanese interests have adjoining spheres on Soviet territory. If Japan attacks Siberia it will not be because her leaders are willing to help Hitler at a critical moment in his war programme. War with Russia has always been regarded as inevitable by the Japanese militarists. There could be no better time than the climax, of a campaign which is straining Soviet resources to the utmost. Risks And Chances

It is true, of course, that Japan is engaged in a war with the United Nations. But the Japanese, in spite of the non-aggression pact with Russia, have always known that the Russians are in the same camp as the British, the Americans and the Chinese. They are haunted by the proximity of air bases from which all their cities could be mercilessly bombed. Their new empire can never be safe while a potential enemy retains positions only a few hundred miles from the heart of Japan. A new campaign might seem to bring insane risks while the Japanese are so fully occupied elsewhere. Yet there are certain facts which make the risks less hazardous than they appear to be at first sight. Although the Japanese have had to withdraw in some parts of South China they may feel that they have little to fear, for some time to come, from an Allied offensive on the Asiatic mainland. The war-weary Chinese cannot receive large quantities of supplies until the new route through India replaces the Burma Road. Allied attempts to recover Burma could not be made for some months, until the torrential rains of the monsoon period are ended. And in the Pacific the war against the United States is largely a series of naval and air operations. The Japanese may believe that, with their Asiatic flanks in Burma and China immune from any early or major disturbance, and with the Pacific operations entrusted to their Navy, the greater part of their land forces could safely be used against Russia—especially against a Russia whose military strength is needed in the west. Their policy would probably be to sever the Maritime Province from the rest of Siberia, and then to secure the mineral wealth of Lake Baikal and Irkutsk. If Russia’s Far Eastern armies have been kept at full strength the Japanese would have to face costly and difficult battles. In 1939 the Russians proved their superiority at Changkufeng Hill and Lake Nomonhan, where the Japanese were soundly beaten,. It is impossible to know, however, whether the Far Eastern armies have been kept intact, or whether some diversion of forces to the west has become necessary. Japan’s decision would certainly be influenced by her information on this point. But there is another possibility which may cause General Tojo to hesitate. War with Russia would automatically give the Americans their chance to use bases on the Siberian coast. Bombers from Alaska would soon be using the Aleutian route, and it would take more than the occupation of Kiska to give the Japanese control of the northern skies. An attempt could be made to forestall the Americans by seizing the bases, and for this purpose the enemy has the advantage of naval superiority in the inner sea of Japan. There are many difficulties. But in the large extensions of the war which now seem to be imminent a move against Siberia remains something more than a possibility.