The Southland Times WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1942. The Travels of Mr Churchill

Southland Times, Issue 24826, 19 August 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1942. The Travels of Mr Churchill

THE war-time travels of Mr Churchill have been extensive, dramatic, attended by certain hazards, and valuable in results. Three times he has crossed the Atlantic—once in a battleship, and twice by air. He has conferred with President Roosevelt on an American warship and in the White House. For the first time in history a British Prime Minister addressed the United States Congress. And now, again for the first time, he has crossed the threshold of the Kremlin. But before he reached Moscow he stopped in Egypt to confer with General Smuts and, no doubt, to throw a searching glance at military preparations in the Middle East. His presence in Cairo was timely and significant. Armed with information obtained at first-hand (and therefore wider and more precise than the facts available for him in official reports), he was able to speak with confidence and authority when the Moscow talks were directed towards operations in the Middle East—a, theatre which becomes increasingly important while the Germans are thrusting towards the Caucasus. In his parting message the Prime Minister said that one of the two reasons for his satisfaction with the visit was “my desire to speak, my mind.” The phrase is not without ambiguity: it suggests that there were misunderstandings which needed clearing up. This would not have been surprising. British and Soviet policy reached parallel courses after many deviations and open divergencies. Suspicion and mistrust, rooted in racial and national differences of outlook, cannot be waved out of existence, even when the chances of war have created a valuable alliance. •Russian policy is expressed through the forms of a political regime which has little in common with those of the democracies. Public opinion is disciplined, and can be used as an instrument of propaganda. Recent examples of this method gave the impression that the British-Soviet understanding on the need to open a second front before the end of the present year was not as complete as it seemed to be when the signing of the treaty was officially announced.

If there were misunderstandings, Mr Churchill has now had the opportunity to remove them, and there can be little doubt that his talks with M. Stalin will have clarified the major issues of Allied strategy. The course of the war in Russia may have necessitated certain adjustments or changes of policy.' Time is clearly the factor of paramount impoi-tance. M. Stalin has been able to state his case, and to hear in return a statement from the man who bears the highest responsibility for British policy. Moreover, Mr Churchill was not alone. He was accompanied by British and American experts who could stand at his elbow with replies for every conceivable question on strategy and supply. The value of the conference is therefore beyond question. But when this has been acknowledged it is reasonable to ask why there can be no better method of consultation. It is possible, as General Sikorski suggested a day or two ago, that the talks will clear the way for a joint Allied command. But no hint of any such development can be found in the official statement, which is confined rigidly to generalities. Although the present situation may have been clarified, it is a situation which changes with every new phase in the battles of Russia and of the Middle East. If the British Prime Minister has to risk his person in flights across the seas and continents every time the need arises for consultation there is something basically wrong in the central direction of the war. An Allied Command, representing every member state in the grand alliance, and entrusted with supreme powers, has become an obvious necessity. Only in this way can identity of purpose be translated into a unified action on all fronts. Mr Churchill’s travels are interesting and useful; but they should not be necessary.