The Southland Times SATURDAY, AUGUST 15, 1942. Stepping Stones in the Pacific

Southland Times, Issue 24823, 15 August 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times SATURDAY, AUGUST 15, 1942. Stepping Stones in the Pacific

HANSON W. Baldwin, military correspondent of The New York Times, is reported to have described the landing at Tulagi as "the first small step in what will probably be the most difficult operation in the history of amphibious warfare. This was no impromptu or unconsidered comment. Mr Baldwin has devoted much time and study to the basic questions of Pacific strategy. In a book published before the attack on Pearl Harbour (“Defence of the Western World”) he summarized his conclusions and outlined the tc»>k that would confront the United States in a war against Japan. .If impatient American public opinion did not force the Government to hasty and rash steps,” he wrote, “if the American people were willing to endure the hardships of a long it seems likely that a combinatioti of naval and air action plus the help of the Chinese on land —war of attrition plus war of assault —could force Japan to her knees.” Two ways of reaching the enemy have been widely discussed in naval circles —the southern route through the islands- of the western Pacific, and the Alaska-Aleutian route in the north. “This latter route is complicated by the terrible difficulties of weather, difficulties so pronounced as to make it, in the opinion of most experts, impracticable. Either route involves a slow, carefully guarded advance; air and naval operations to seize island outposts; joint army and navy operations against such islands as Jaluit, Ponape and Truk;. the consolidation of our positions on the seized islands and the gradual extension of our might into the western Pacific. Eventually we might extend our island stepping stones to within bombing range of Japan. If we were able to do so that would probably be the beginning of the end.” When Mr Baldwin wrote those words the difficulties were theoretical. Today they are being faced in actual fact; and there is no need to deny that they are formidable. The Japanese made their first landings in the Solomons some months ago; but it is only in the past few weeks that they have been engaged on the construction of air bases, and their occupation was a minor enterprise compared with what they have done in New Britain and New Guinea. Yet it is proving no easy task to dislodge them. Just how hard the operation has been, or how costly, will not be known until the attacking force is firmly established. But some naval losses have already been reported, and there will certainly be more in the sea battle that is still in progress. How much more difficult, then, must be the work of driving the enemy from his own bases, where he has had years in which to build up strong defences! Amphibious warfare has always been costly and hazardous. In the Pacific, the widest ocean in the world, the problems are complicated by the need to fight at the end of extended supply lines. Moreover, the Japanese have behind them a line of substantial land bases, whereas the Allies must bring their ships great distances, and must rely for advanced bases on a network of tiny islands. The Naval Problem

There are other factors, however, which promise to be favourable. First and most important, is the influence of air power. “Amphibious” is no longer a correct term for the type of fighting now being tested in the Pacific. A new word will have to be found to describe landing operations which are supported from the air as well as from the sea. Landbased bombers are engaged in the Solomons. And as the Allies creep northwards and westwards the bombers will go with them. Every new objective will add a link to the chain of landing fields. And every new landing field will make it easier for the Americans to seize the next stepping stone. An advance of this kind must be slow; but it would be a mistake to imagine that it has to take in every island or archipelago which has been occupied by the Japanese. The attack on the Solomons indicates that the Americans are planning to move along the eastern flank of the area controlled by the enemy. In doing this they may succeed in cutting Japan’s sea communications with her newlyacquired island empire. ' And as they draw nearer to the Philippines the Japanese may be exposed to bombing from two sides. Air bases in China are certainly within bombing range of Manila. There is also a possibility that the enemy will be forced to risk a great part of his naval strength in stopping the offensive before it has made a true beginning. Reports from Sydney speak of a “great” naval battle which has again developed in the Solomons. Events at Midway Island and in the Coral Sea must have made the Japanese unwilling to take the risks of a major naval action. They have lost some of their largest and best aircraft-carriers, and their cruiser strength was depleted in their advance to the East Indies. A serious naval reverse would make it hard for them to protect their wide network of sea communications. At the same time the American strategy would be simplified. A Japanese naval success, of course, would have the opposite effect. The enemy prefers to use small task forces, avoiding as long as possible the largescale fighting which must expose his fleet to heavy losses. But he cannot allow the Allies to obtain their first stepping stone without using all his available forces to meet the challenge. It is too much, perhaps, to hope that the battle for the Solomons will develop into a decisive struggle for the mastery of the Pacific. But when all the facts can be published it should be possible to estimate the nature of the task which awaits the Allies in the war against Japan. Great issues are at stake in the Solomons. The first battle cannot be the last; but it may show what has to be done before victory can be achieved.