COMMANDER OF ALLIED FORCE

Southland Times, Issue 24819, 11 August 1942, Page 5

COMMANDER OF ALLIED FORCE

Admiral Ghormley

Mentioned

It appears to be more than possible, states the Press Association s correspondent at a South Pacific Pprt, that when the complete story is unfolded of the Allied attack on Japanese positions in the Solomon Islands, it will be found that New Zealand has had an immediate, although indirect, personal interest in it. The first communique issued by Admiral Chester Nimitz at Pearl Harbour, stating that forces of the United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean areas, assisted by units in the SouthWest Pacific area, had launched offensive operations, makes it reasonable to conjecture that Vice-Admiral R. L. Ghormley, commanding the South Pacific area, is playing an important part in the operation. There are a number of reasons why tliis is more than probable. One is to be found in Vice-Admiral Ghormley’s own character. It has been clear ever since his arrival in New Zealand that this American is not the man to cherish the warmth of a comfortable armchair ashore. In several actions taken by United States and Allied task forces in the Pacific area in the last few months he has of necessity had to watch events from a distance. To an officer who regards the simplest definition of war as being a matter of killing the greatest number of the enemy in the shortest possible time, this must have been irksome. CAREFULLY LAID PLANS Vice-Admiral Ghormley has been living for the day when carefully laid preparations could be turned into an offensive. The present action, although its immediate objectives may be limited, is of the type for which he and other Pacific area commanders have been working through several months of restrained impatience. Another reason is to be found in Vice-Admiral Ghormley’s professional capacity, which is of the highest order. Such an action calls for planning of the greatest skill, and Vice-Admiral Ghormley is the Allies’ No. 1 naval tactician in the whole of the South Pacific and South-West Pacific ocean area. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that Admiral Nimitz would place in Vice-Admiral Ghormley’s hands the responsibility for executing his own orders. Admiral Nimitz himself is a commander-in-chief whose duty makes it impossible for him to fly his flag at sea. He has to delegate his responsibility and wait for the result. Again, Vice-Admiral Ghormley is the senior Allied naval commander in the same broad-flung area. Here is another reason for the belief that an operation on the scale which the Solomons attack appears to be would be placed in his care. Indeed, everything points to the attack being under ViceAdmiral Ghormley’s direct control. At least he probably has supreme tactical control of the action. He is commander-in-chief of the forces, which may even include New Zealand naval units, although it is most improbable that any other New Zealand forces are taking part. The landing operations are'more likely being carried out by American forces.

NO HIT-AND-RUN ENTERPRISE

ADVANTAGES OF MOVE (Special Australian Correspondent, N.Z.PA.) (Rec. 7 p.m.) SYDNEY, August 10. The highest importance is attached here to what the Japanese radio has referred to as the “Battle for the Solomons.” Preparations for the engagement have been the best kept secret of the South-West Pacific war. No indication has yet been given of the size of the forces engaged, but it is generally accepted that Australian troops are taking part in the operations. It is believed that the attacks are no mere hit-and-run enterprise, but a determined move by the Allies to drive the Japanese out of the Solomons and repossess the islands. Repossession of the Solomons would smash the eastern end of the 3200 miles arc of enemy bases enveloping Northern Australia. The Solomons would then be linked up with the New Hebrides and New Caledonia as a “string of Pacific sentinels for the Allies.” The establishment of Allied bases in the area would provide striking points against Rabaul. The Japanese concentrations in Papua would be imperilled in a sea and land pincers movement between Port Moresby and the Solomons. Additionally, it is believed that occupation of the Solomons would provide security for shipping in Australia’s sea lanes as enemy submarines are thought to be based in this area. AIR-FIELDS CONSTRUCTED The Japanese forces first landed in the Solomons on January 25 at Kieta, on Bougainville Island. Bases were then established in several of the northern islands of the group. The occupation grew more serious on June 19 when ■large enemy forces were landed at Guadalcanal further south, where the construction of large air-fields was immediately begun. The enemy forces

there were increased on July 4. Guadalcanar is about 600 miles from Rabaul, which was the main target of Allied aircraft in “interdiction” raids, having as their object the making of the enemy aerodromes unusable for a long period. The raids are believed to have been markedly successful. While no official news has been released, it is anticipated that the Japanese forces in the area attacked (principally the bases around Tulagi) would offer strong resistance. Japanese Imperial Headquarters announced that units of the Japanese Fleet had initiated violent attacks on units of the AngloAmerican Fleet in the Solomons area and that the battle was still in progress. Prominence is given here to the views of the noted American analyst, Major George Fielding Eliot, who says: “The attack will hardly stop in the southeastern Solomons. Merely to seize a few of these islands would be to leave isolated garrisons exposed to concentrated Japanese attacks under conditions wholly favourable to the enemy. It is, therefore, quite possible that what we are now seeing is the beginning of a campaign to drive the enemy off the whole area.” This, he says, would relieve all anxiety about a Japanese attack on the Australian east coast or on New Zealand and would be the best safeguard for American-Australian communications. It would also make the Japanese outposts in the Marshalls and eastern Carolines untenable and would force a Japanese withdrawal from a very large portion of the central Pacific.