The Southland Times SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1940. Japan's Link with the Axis

Southland Times, Issue 24243, 28 September 1940, Page 4

The Southland Times SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1940. Japan's Link with the Axis

THE JAPANESE have always been good imitators, and in their political methods they are now very close to the Nazi model, especially in the trick of ascribing their own shortcomings to other nations. An example was provided yesterday in a quotation from the Tokyo newspaper, Nichi Nichi Shimbun, which charged the United States, Britain and Australia with preparing “aggressive formations . . . with the purpose of interfering with Japan’s southward policy.” Polemics of this kind can always be destroyed by facts, and the one fact which forcibly presents itself in the Far East is that while Japan accuses othei’ Governments of aggressive intentions she herself is engaged in aggressive actions. Like the Nazis, the Japanese are striving to wreck the independence of free nations, and to impose their peculiar type of “enlightenment” on peoples that prefer to cherish their own cultural traditions. They are seeking, also, to finance new adventures out of the spoils gained in previous acts of international brigandage. It is therefore not surprising that Japan has now openly linked herself with the Axis Powers in a 10-year defensive pact. Under the terms of this pact, so far as they are known, Japan has agreed to recognize the leadership of Germany and Italy in European affairs, and in return the Axis Powers will recognize her leadership in Asia. Provision is made for mutual assistance in the event of a Power not at present taking part in the European war attacking any of the signatories. This appears to mean that Japan will not abandon her policy of “noninvolvement” unless either the United States or Russia comes into the war. It is, in effect, a warning to these two great neutrals, both deeply feared by Japan, that the entry of either into the war will provoke a world conflict. And since Russia has a non-aggression pact with Germany and a similar, though more flimsy, arrangement with Japan, the warning seems to be intended primarily for the United States. Reactions in America

Any more immediate involvement appears to be out of the question for Japan at the present time. Japan and Germany can work towards the same ends in different hemispheres: it would be difficult for them to give each other direct aid. On the diplomatic front the agreement is unlikely to be any more effective. Germany is already doing everything in her power to stir up trouble in South America; and it is here, if anywhere, that Nazi and Japanese agents could work in the same field. But Hitler has always regarded the Latin Republics as the bases for Nazi expansion in the Americas; he is not likely to encourage any large-scale Japanese activity. The ultimate effect of the agreement will be a sharper definition of world opinion. Now that Germany, Italy and Japan are officially grouped in the same camp, the disturbing influences of world politics have reached their logical result. Up to the present the Japanese have been able to maintain some kind of diplomatic pretence, encouraging the optimists in Britain, America and Australia to believe that a little appeasement might still be a good policy. But now the game of makebelieve has finally been abandoned there will certainly be a hardening of opinion in the United States. To this extent the agreement may help to create an actual solidarity among the democracies while merely erecting a facade of totalitarian collaboration. And although the Japanese like to insist on their independence of action, especially in the economic field, they know that there are many ways “short of war” in which America could seriously embarrass them. The danger which appears to have troubled American opinion is that a trade embargo might make war inevitable. But the day seems to be approaching when the United States Government will have to decide if risks of some kind can be avoided indefinitely.